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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the role of regions and heterogeneity as determinants of the spatial
distribution of economic activities.
The first essay provides a prospective assessment of some new avenues of research for New
Economic Geography. We also identify new possible directions along which the field could
develop.
In the second essay, we study the Footloose Entrepreneur (FE) model with a finite num-
ber of equidistant regions, focusing on the qualitative properties of the following equilibria:
agglomeration, dispersion and partial dispersion. We find that the tendency for agglomera-
tion increases with the number of regions, whereas numerical evidence suggests that partial
dispersion is always unstable. Locational hysteresis appears to be a persistent feature with
an arbitrary number of regions. Finally, we introduce exogenous regional heterogeneity in the
model and conclude that having more (less) farmers on the core (periphery) region improves
the likelihood of a core-periphery pattern.
In the third essay, we extend the FE model with quasi-linear log utility to multiple regions.
We show that industry cannot disperse evenly among regions if there is at least one other
region with no industry. We find that a spatial distribution where industry is evenly distribu-
ted among all regions except one requires that one region is considerably more industrialized
than the others. As transportation costs decrease: (i) if inter-regional mobility is low, there is
catastrophic agglomeration once dispersion becomes unstable; (ii) if it is high, the transition
towards agglomeration is smoother. Finally, we find that the welfare of mobile workers is
highest at agglomeration, whereas the welfare of the immobile workers is highest at disper-
sion. For the society as a whole, however, there is a tendency towards over-agglomeration of
economic activities.
In the last essay, we study a New Economic Geography model where all consumers are
inter-regionally mobile and have Hotelling-type heterogeneous preferences for location. This
heterogeneity produces a dispersive home-sweet-home effect. We demonstrate that different
functional forms of preferences for location induce different spatial distributions in the long-
run. We also find that a higher trade integration leads to less spatial inequality.
Keywords: New economic geography, Multiple regions, Heterogeneity
JEL Classification Numbers: R10, R12, R23
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Resumo
Esta dissertação foca-se no papel das regiões e da heterogeneidade como determinantes da
distribuição espacial das atividades económicas.
O primeiro ensaio fornece uma avaliação prospectiva de algumas novas vias de pesquisa
para a Nova Economia Geográfica. Identificamos, também, novas direções possíveis ao longo
das quais a área poderá desenvolver-se.
No segundo ensaio, estudamos o modelo Footloose Entrepreneur (FE) com um número
finito de regiões equidistantes, com ênfase nas propriedades qualitativas dos equilíbrios de
aglomeração, dispersão e dispersão parcial. Constatamos que a tendência para a aglomeração
aumenta com o número de regiões, enquanto a evidência numérica sugere que a dispersão
parcial é sempre instável. A histerese locacional parece ser uma característica persistente
no modelo com um número arbitrário de regiões. Finalmente, introduzimos heterogeneidade
regional exógena no modelo e concluímos que a existência de mais (menos) agricultores na
região do centro (periferia) aumenta a probabilidade de um padrão Centro-Periferia.
No terceiro capítulo, estendemos o modelo FE com utilidade quase-linear logarítmica
para várias regiões. Mostramos que a indústria não se pode dispersar uniformemente entre
as regiões se houver pelo menos uma região sem indústria. Uma distribuição geográfica
onde a indústria está uniformente distribuída por todas as regiões exceto uma requer que
esta última seja consideravelmente mais industrializada do que as outras. À medida que os
custos de transporte diminuem, concluimos que: (i) se a mobilidade inter-regional é baixa,
existe aglomeração catastrófica quando a dispersão se torna instável; (ii) se a mobilidade for
alta, a transição para a aglomeração é suave. Finalmente, verificamos que o bem-estar dos
trabalhadores móveis é máximo na aglomeração, enquanto que o bem-estar dos trabalhadores
imóveis é máximo na dispersão. Para a sociedade como um todo, no entanto, existe uma
tendência para a sobre-aglomeração das atividades económicas.
No último ensaio, estudamos um modelo da Nova Economia Geográfica onde todos os
consumidores são inter-regionalmente móveis e têm preferências heterogéneas do tipo Hotelling
relativamente à sua residência. Esta heterogeneidade produz um efeito home-sweet-home
dispersivo. Demontramos que diferentes formas funcionais para estas preferência induzem
distribuições espaciais muito diferentes no longo prazo. Constatamos também que uma maior
integração comercial reduz as desigualdades regionais.
Palavras-chave: Nova Economia Geográfica, Regiões Múltiplas, Heterogeneidade
Código JEL: R10, R12, R23
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
Throughout its history, the field of New Economic Geography (NEG) has continuously
sought to uncover new ways to explain the impact of economic integration on the geo-
graphical distribution of economic activities and how these contribute to shape regional
income disparities. Particularly, its main study object remains the tendency towards
spatial agglomeration of industry as a result of decreasing trade barriers.
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to NEG by providing new insights
and explanations for the aforementioned issues. In a broad sense, our aim is to study
the interdependencies among regions and how they impact the spatial structure of the
economy. In this regard, our objectives are mainly threefold. First, we provide an overall
assessment of NEG, reviewing the literature and also identifying paths along which the
field could yet improve. Second, we incorporate multiple regions, equidistant among
themselves, into two otherwise well-known distinct Footloose Entrepreneur (FE) models
(Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003; Baldwin et al., 2004; Pflüger, 2004), that belong to a
class of analytically solvable versions of Krugman’s seminal Core-Periphery (CP) model
(Krugman, 1991). Lastly, we study the impact of the interaction between differences in
how each individual perceives different regions and market-factor driven agglomeration
forces. The rest of this introduction is devoted to explaining the structure and contents
within each chapter.
Chapter 2 contains a prospective review of the field of NEG and lays down the
context for the topics addressed in the subsequent main chapters of the Thesis. We
start by providing a general overview of the state of the art of NEG and then describe
some of its main limitations and shortcomings. We then proceed to characterize possible
research paths along which NEG has improved or could develop further. Among several
issues, we identify the two main topics that comprise the following chapters: the role of
multiple regions and the impact of heterogeneity in preferences for residential location.
Therefore, Chapter 2 also serves as in introductory approach to our main research topics
and hopefully motivates the reader to our main points of interest by putting them into
a broad perspective. In the subsequent chapters, we narrow down our focus and adopt
a more technical and detailed approach that rigorously addresses these two main topics.
The first major topic seeks to overcome the limited dimensionality in Economic
Geography. We depart from the usual two-region setup and thus embrace a multi-
regional framework. We analyse the spatial distribution of economic activities across an
arbitrary number of equidistant regions using two analytically solvable Core-Periphery
2
models: first, we extend the FE model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003);1 second, we use
the FE model with quasi-linear log utility (QLLog) without income effects developed
by Pflüger (2004). This covers up Chapters 3 and 4, respectively, of the Thesis. The
second topic, addressed in Chapter 4, tackles the role of consumer heterogeneity in
Economic Geography. Particularly, we introduce preferences à la Hotelling in order
to study how different preferences for residential location affect the resulting spatial
patterns.
Chapter 3 of the Thesis, called “The Footloose Entrepreneur Model with an arbi-
trary number of equidistant regions”, extends the FE model (Forslid and Ottaviano,
2003; Baldwin et al., 2004) to an arbitrary number of equidistant regions. The FE
setup departs from the original CP model in that each manufacturing firm’s scale of
production does not depend on the skilled, inter-regionally mobile workforce; rather,
each firm uses a fixed amount of entrepreneurs. This renders the model analytically
solvable and allows us to obtain the entrepreneur’s wage as an explicit function of the
spatial distribution of workers. Since the main qualitative properties of the CP mo-
del are preserved in the FE model, the latter becomes a good potential candidate for
a multi-regional extension. We show that, whatever the global size of unskilled and
skilled labour, as the number of regions increases, single-region agglomeration becomes
more likely while symmetric dispersion becomes less likely. We also provide numerical
evidence that a spatial equilibrium with at least one region absent of industry is al-
ways unstable. Moreover, the simultaneity of stability of agglomeration and dispersion
(and therefore, the existence of locational hysteresis) in the original CP and FE models
seems to persist for the multi-regional case. Finally, we introduce exogenous asym-
metries by allowing regional endowments of the immobile (unskilled) labour to differ
across regions and study the qualitative properties of agglomeration under changes in
these endowments.
Chapter 4, “A multi-regional agglomeration model without income effects”, follows
up the previous multi-regional extension by considering the slightly different quasi-linear
log (QLLog) model by Pflüger (2004). In its original formulation, the QLLog model con-
siders a Footloose Entrepreneur setup (described above) with a quasi-linear upper tier
1See also Baldwin et al. (2004).
3
utility function for consumers, instead of the usual Cobb-Douglas functional form. The
modification, albeit small, produces two important effects. Firstly, the model becomes
even simpler and more tractable than the FE model. Secondly, the consequent removal
of income effects on the demand for manufactures leads to the emergence of asymmetric
spatial equilibria, which may correspond to any possible spatial distribution, depending
on the level of transportation costs.
Unlike the FE model, many of the findings of the two-region QLLog model are not
preserved by its multi-regional extension. In other words, the inclusion of additional
regions significantly modifies the qualitative structure of the space economy. Most noti-
ceably, we find that along a space with n− 1 evenly distributed regions, an asymmetric
equilibrium requires one region to be significantly more industrialized compared to the
others. Moreover, the transition from symmetric dispersion towards agglomeration, al-
ong a smooth path where transport costs fall steadily, depends crucially on the global
worker mobility. Specifically: if mobility is low, agglomeration becomes catastrophic
as in the original CP model; if mobility is high, the transition towards agglomeration
is more progressive. Lastly, the greater tractability of the QLLog model allows us to
analytically confirm that any spatial distribution whereby at least one region is absent
of industry (while all the other regions are evenly distributed) is not possible.
In Chapter 5, “Economic Geography meets Hotelling: a home-sweet-home effect”,
we use a modified version of the two-region CP model where all labour is free to migrate
between regions, as in Helpman (1998), and incorporate consumer heterogeneity in
the preferences for residential location. This is achieved by considering a uniform
distribution of consumer preferences along a line segment in the fashion of Hotelling’s
(1929) linear city model. Each consumer is identified by his position on this line which
corresponds to his preference towards residing in a given country. Therefore, whereas a
more industrialized region provides a higher utility from consumption of manufactures
for all consumers, it may fail to attract consumers who have a higher idiosyncratic
preference for the less industrialized region.
Hotelling-type preferences allow us to formulate different utility penalties as a
function of these preferences, i.e., to infer about the impact of different consumer behavi-
ours in the long-run spatial distributions. The widely used logit model used in previous
works (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002; Murata, 2003; Combes et al. 2008), which yields an
equivalent closed form in our setting, corresponds to a very specific type of consumer
heterogeneity regarding location preferences. On the other hand, our Hotelling-type
4
heterogeneity is general enough that we are able to compare the predictions based on
the logit model with other types of consumer behaviour. Doing this, we are able to con-
clude that the long-run geographical distribution of economic activities is not invariant
to the type of consumer heterogeneity. However, irrespective of the latter, we find that
lower transport costs promote symmetric distributions and discourage agglomeration,
a result which is at odds with Krugman’s original predictions (and those of models
similar to the CP model).
In Chapter 6 we provide a brief discussion on the more general results obtained in
the Thesis. We take the opportunity to discuss how different assumptions across the
different models are likely to influence different outcomes. By way of conjecture, we
try to infer about how some specifications determine different results, and leave some
considerations for possible future work.
5
Chapter 2
Economic Geography: a prospective
review
6
2.1 Introduction
Since the path-breaking contribution of Krugman’s (1991) Core-Periphery (CP) mo-
del, which marked the surge of the field of New Economic Geography (NEG), many
researchers have devoted their attention towards providing theoretical and empirical
works that add to the study of the geographical agglomeration of economic activities.
Throughout its rather brief history, up to recent years, NEG has remained yet an at-
tractive and vibrant field for many economists. In spite of this, NEG has also been
constantly susceptible to a wide range of criticism. Moreover, the lack of departure
from some main, albeit restrictive, assumptions has confined the field to a theoretical
strait-jacket, thus thwarting efforts to come up with new insights and providing new
relevant developments. In this review, we summarize the contents of a number of papers
in NEG literature which we consider to be very successful in the attempt to provide an
overall assessment of the discipline.
What these works have in common is the fact that they are all aware of the techni-
cal limitations of the frameworks generally assumed in the literature, and they all
try to analyse the causes for the shortcomings in terms of new developments in the
field. Generally speaking, we refer to the stringent assumption of constant elasticity
of substitution models of monopolistic competition, the unrealistic assumption of ice-
berg transportation costs, the lack of calibration and attention devoted to the use of
numerical computations, the strict homogeneity assumed across consumers and firms,
the homogeneity in location space, and the overuse of migration adjustment proces-
ses where agents are assumed to be short-sighted, to mention but a few. The papers
reviewed throughout this survey are aware of these limitations and thus try to give a
prospective account of new directions that the field of NEG should follow.
At a later stage, we briefly describe some notable contributions in the literature
that address some of the issues raised by the recent criticism surveyed in this work.
Some of the issues pertain to: the influence of firm or consumer heterogeneity in spa-
tial agglomeration outcomes; new general models of monopolistic competition; reduced
dimensionality; the role of the spatial topology in a multi-regional setting; forward-
looking expectations in the migration adjustment process; the role of the computer for
the sake of numerical simulations; and new analytical approaches that provide valuable
insights on bifurcation mechanisms in CP models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature
from the dawn of NEG, starting from Krugman’s 1991 seminal Core-Periphery model,
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up to subsequent models that allowed NEG to span across different (but not unrelated)
fields such as urban economics and economic growth. Section 3 overviews the main
limitations that have confined the field of NEG in a theoretical strait-jacket. We then
proceed to identify possible avenues of search within the field and some of the recent
contributions that have provided new path-breaking insights in Section 4. Section 5 is
left for some concluding remarks.
2.2 An overview on NEG
In this section we summarize the state of the art in New Economic Geography literature
and the recent discussions aiming to provide new insights and future developments in
the field. These contributions provide an overview on the economic history of the
early developments in NEG up the the more recent theories at the frontier of the field.
Furthermore, they underline the main restrictions in NEG and show what needs to
change in the field if new path-breaking conclusions are to be drawn from the study of
economic geography.
Recently, urban economics has had the merit of delivering important contributions,
such as providing micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies and explaining
the impact of neighbourhood effects and spatial externalities on the stratification of
cities. Location theory, deeply rooted in Hotelling’s “Stability in Competition” (1929)
and Lösch’s “The Economics of Location” (1954), studies the geographical distribution
of industry and geographical variations in mark-ups. Though relevant fields in their
own right, neither of them has achieved the interest reached by NEG. One of the re-
asons might be that, unlike the other two, NEG has a well defined and broad enough
objective. As Walter Isard (1956) complained, classical location theory, for instance,
was disentangled from mainstream economics because it confined itself to a disinte-
grated framework of partial equilibrium theory, constant coefficients, linear transport
costs, and ad hoc demands (Blaug, 1997).
On the other hand, NEG is first field in economics to provide a detailed description
of spatial inequalities that emerge as the outcome of a general equilibrium model. Paul
Krugman, as a precursor of NEG with his seminal article from 1991, was the first to
show how regional imbalances arise. The reason why it took so long to come up with an
explanation probably hinged on the technical impossibilities imposed by dominant para-
digms of economic theory up to that date. Authors such as Duranton and Puga (2004),
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Fujita and Thisse (2009) and Puga (2010) discuss what results are consistent with the
neoclassical theory in terms of the spatial distribution of economic activities. To sum
up their overview, it is useful to state Starret’s (1978) “Spatial Impossibility Theo-
rem”. The theorem states that in an Arrow-Debreu economy under constant returns
to scale, with a finite number of agents and locations, homogeneous space and cos-
tly transportation, there is no competitive equilibrium involving inter-locational trade
(transportation). By homogeneous space it is meant that both preferences and the
set of production technologies are independent of location. In other words, if econo-
mic activities are perfectly divisible, there is a competitive equilibrium such that each
location is autarkic.
Bearing the previous in mind, it is not difficult to find that, in order to explain spatial
inequalities and regional specialization, one must violate at least one of the assumptions
stated in the Theorem. This led to the surge of models of comparative advantages ba-
sed on spatial heterogeneities among regions, models of agglomeration externalities that
arise from non-market interactions that yield increasing returns external to the firms,
and models of imperfect competition. The first type of models cannot account for the
existence of full-fledged agglomerations and very high spatial imbalances. The second
type appeared long before NEG, but, as the previous type models, works under the
framework of constant returns and perfect competition. As such, models with agglome-
ration externalities fail to give an explanation for the microeconomic interactions that
give rise to those spatial externalities. Moreover, such externalities seem to be relevant
in the small but not as essential in the large. With models of imperfect competition,
pricing decisions by firms depend on the spatial distribution of both consumers and
other firms. Models of monopolistic competition are favoured in particular. One reason
is that, since there is no strategic interaction between firms, the common problem of
existence of equilibrium which occurs frequently in oligopolistic competition, is not that
problematic in this case. Another reason pertains to the higher tractability of mono-
polistic competition. Since the framework implies increasing returns to scale at the
plant level, and transportation is costly, location decisions are not trivial. Hence, both
ingredients are essential to any model that aims at explaining the space-economy. A
particular case is the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1973), where consumers value variety of a horizontally differentiated good and where
there exists a continuum of firms operating under internal economies of scale for each
good.
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Seeing that the space-economy is a result of agglomeration forces operating against
dispersion forces, we scrutinize the main principles at work that led to NEG. Price com-
petition is known to be a strong dispersion force (see Tirole, 1988). However, product
differentiation alleviates price competition and hence allows firms to locate where they
have access to a bigger market and higher demand, and where transport costs are lower.
The other principle at work is that of the home market effect (HME), whereby large
markets are relatively more attractive to firms. But this view assumes that the market
size is exogenous, i.e., that consumers are not allowed to migrate between regions. The
path-breaking contribution to tackle this issue is the Core-Periphery (CP) model by
Krugman (1991). The starting point of the CP model is that the migration of some
workers affects the global welfare and thus changes the relative attractiveness of both
origin and destination. These effects can be seen as externalities because workers do
not take them into account in their decisions (they are short-sighted). The basic layout
of the CP model comprises two regions, and two sectors: one operating under monopo-
listic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz and the other operating under perfect competition;
and two factors of production. One factor is regionally immobile and is used as an
input in the agricultural sector. The other is regionally mobile and is used as input in
the industrial sector. There is a cumulative process whereby market size (inducing the
HME) and cost of living effects work in a way that promotes agglomeration of industry
in one region. As this region becomes bigger, so does the market, thus attracting more
industry (the HME at work). This circular causation of forward linkages and backward
linkages, noted by Krugman (1991), generates a centripetal force. On the other hand,
a more concentrated market enhances price competition, thus working as a dispersion
force (market crowding effect). This is also called a centrifugal force. All things con-
sidered, the key factor for determining the spatial distribution of industry is the level
of transportation costs. Hence, contrary to the neoclassical model that predicts only
convergence, the CP model accounts for both convergence and divergence. Inasmuch
as there is also a need to explain how agglomeration outcomes are possible when factor
mobility is reduced, several models have come up with explanations based on input-
output linkages. One such contribution is the paper by Krugman and Venables (1995).
The main idea is that agglomeration of a sector in a region occurs because there is
a vertically linked sector that is already agglomerated in that region. The forces at
work in this framework are different. There is also a market expansion effect but in
this case it is due to higher income (higher wages since labour supply is inelastic) that
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leads to higher consumer demand. However, if wages are too high, some firms will
want to relocate their production to the periphery, so there is also a dispersion force.
The advantage of this framework is that a self-perpetuating agglomeration process may
not happen. Instead, economic integration yields a bell-shaped curve of spatial de-
velopment. This kind of model accounts for the possibility of re-industrialization of
the periphery, supporting the hypothesis of a “spatial” Kuznets curve whereby market
forces initially increase, and then decrease, economic inequalities. This prediction has
also been uncovered in CP models where consumers are heterogeneous concerning their
preferences for different locations (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002; Murata, 2003; Combes
et al., 2008). The mechanism that precludes agglomeration in this setting is different.
Simply put, heterogeneity in preferences towards residing in one region or the other
implies that regional utility differentials differ across individuals, all other things being
equal. This implies that some consumers are less willing to migrate than others. A hig-
her dispersion of consumer preferences naturally strengthens its role as an additional
dispersion force.
Krugman’s contribution from 1991 has also lead to insights on city formation and
urban systems. The NEG models that belong to the class of urban and regional systems
deal with the spatial distribution of agglomerations without considering their internal
spatial structure (Fujita and Mori, 2005). Henderson (1974) developed an approach
that allows him to describe the emergence of a hierarchy of cities. Fujita, Krugman and
Mori (1999) further extend this approach by considering several differentiated industrial
goods in a model similar to an NEG model. Another precursor in this literature refers to
the “Racetrack Economy” by Krugman (1993) which extends the original CP model to
include 12 regions around an homogeneous circle with the same distance between each
adjacent region. The main conclusion reached by Krugman was that a simulation with
a nearly uniform initial spatial distribution of industry around the circle would always
end up with all manufacturers concentrated equally at two regions located at exact
opposite sides of the circle. A more realistic approach is taken by Fujita and Krugman
(1995) which sets out from the von Thünen’s city centre, where industry is concentrated,
surrounded by concentric rings where agriculture takes place. The main prediction of
the model is that, as population increases, the borders of the agriculture hinterland
locate sufficiently far from the city centre so that firms find it attractive to locate out of
the city centre, thus giving rise to a new city. This process is self-perpetuating as more
cities arise. A key feature here lies in the role of natural exogenous regional differences
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between regions in explaining economic geography. These differences determine the
initial advantages of a region which may become a new centre; it then grows through
a self-perpetuating process until a point from which the initial advantages no longer
matter (or are relatively unimportant) for further agglomeration.
The original CP model can also be extended to study regional growth. Baldwin
and Martin (2004) and Fujita and Thisse (2003) have attempted to take advantage of
the common “tools” shared by both NEG and “new growth” theories. In the latter,
the authors show that the growth rate of the global economy depends on the spatial
distribution of an innovation sector (that applies mobile skilled workers) across regions.
This sopports the evidence that there is a trade-off between growth and spatial equity.
Overall, the result is desirable in the sense that, as the economy agglomerates in a
region, the innovation rate tends to increase, and all workers benefit from this including
those living in the periphery. Hence, the overall outcome is Pareto superior. Of course,
workers in the core benefit from a higher welfare than workers with the same set of
skills that live in the periphery. Thus, the main implication of these works is that there
may be a trade-off between social cohesion and economic growth.
2.3 Reassessing New Economic Geography
The fact that NEG models are intrinsically difficult to work with has led most authors
in the field to stick to a narrow framework, almost mimicking Krugman’s original setup.
Altogether, even accounting for the models departing the common framework, like the
class of footloose entrepreneur models (Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003; Baldwin et al.,
2004), these models display relatively common equilibrium properties, thus asserting
the robustness of the insights provided by the original CP model. Though this may seem
attractive, it also means that building models based on frameworks close to the original
CP model is very unlikely to bring additional knowledge on NEG. Thus, new important
insights can only be obtained by departing from some of the canonical assumptions and
functional forms underlying the original CP model.
2.3.1 Persistent features in NEG models
Whatever the agglomeration mechanism, be it labour migration as in the original CP
model, input-output linkages as in Venables (1996) or capital accumulation as in Bald-
win (1999), and even with marginal changes in functional forms, the key features of
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Krugman’s original model do not change. Robert-Nicoud (2005), Garretsen and Martin
(2010) and Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2011) argue that, as long as goods are ma-
nufactured under increasing returns to scale and markets are segmented in a standard
model with 2 regions, what happens in one region impacts the other one. The effects
of the economic geography of the two regions is similar across most CP models, as the
change in the relevant market sizes for CES-good producers is at the heart of agglome-
ration and dispersion forces. Following Baldwin et al. (2004), we summarize the seven
features displayed by most NEG preliminary models:
i. Home-market effect. A more than proportional re-location of industry due to CES
demand shifts;
ii. Circular causality between rents and industry size. The reciprocal relation between
higher income and a larger industry;
iii. Endogenous asymmetries. They relate to how one region grows at the expense of
the other;
iv. Catastrophic agglomeration. Small variations in parameter values lead to sudden
single-region agglomeration;
v. Multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling expectations. History and expectations mat-
ter for the selection of the relevant spatial distribution;
vi. Locational hysteresis. Persistence of the stability of a core-periphery pattern after
a decrease in transport costs below a certain threshold, even if the decrease is
temporary.
vii. Bell-shaped agglomeration rents. Agglomeration rents exist and are highest for
intermediate values of transportation costs;
It turns out that all simple NEG models with Cobb-Douglas-cum-CES preferences,
iceberg costs and constant returns to labour share the aforementioned features and
“are isomorphic in an economically meaningful state space” (Robert-Nicoud, 2005).
Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) have also pointed this out.
Slight modifications in subsequent NEG models have come to contradict some of
these, but not all, persistent features. Of the aforementioned, features (iv) and (vi) are
the less likely to hold under slight modifications to the original CP model. For instance,
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Pflüger (2004) introduces a quasi-linear upper-tier utility function that removes all in-
come effects from manufactured goods and, by giving rise to a continuum of asymmetric
distributions between dispersion and agglomeration, excludes both catastrophic agglo-
meration and locational hysteresis. In Ottaviano et al. (2002), where utility is quadratic
in the consumption of manufactured goods, catastrophic agglomeration is possible but
locational hysteresis is precluded. Another departure from the original CP model is
the early footloose capital (FC) model by Martin and Rogers (1995). Noteworthy, in
the FC model, the production shift from one region to another is not accompanied by
a shift in expenditure. This strips the model of the typical demand and cost linkages,
making it completely tractable while still featuring agglomeration.
Each of the following subsections analyses in detail one stringent feature common
in most NEG models and suggests ways to overcome it.
2.3.2 Costly icebergs
One limitation commonly present in NEG models is that of assuming iceberg costs
(Neary, 2001; Fujita and Mori, 2005; Fujita and Thisse, 2009; Behrens and Robert-
Nicoud, 2011). Any variation in mill prices is accompanied by a proportional variation
in transport costs. However, transport costs are known to decline steadily as a share
of a firm’s total cost. Therefore, such an assumption is hardly credible. Ottaviano,
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) assume that trading the industrial good requires a given
amount of the numéraire good per unit shipped, which is more in line with empirical
evidence as it allows to dwell into the relationship between agglomeration and firms’
pricing decisions. In spite of the lack of realism, Fujita and Thisse (2009) argue that
the main properties of NEG do not hinge on the specification of transportation costs.
This view is perhaps shared by most researchers, as the issue of iceberg transport costs
has been continuously under-emphasized in NEG literature up to recently.
On the other side of the spectrum, Fujita and Mori (2005), and Behrens and Robert-
Nicoud (2011), call for an endogeneization of transport costs. They argue that NEG
has yet to account for the fact that transport costs and trade costs are not symmetric.
Furthermore, in the presence of firm heterogeneity, iceberg costs imply that more pro-
ductive firms face lower per unit trade costs, since the iceberg amounts to a scaling of
the firm’s marginal cost. As a result, exploring these issues requires explicit modelling
of the transport sector.
Fujita and Mori (2005) call for the explicit modelling of the transport sector, so-
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mething that was attempted by Takahashi (2006), who developed a microfounded for-
mulation of economies of transport density, endogeneizing the transport sector in the
2-region context. However, such a setup precludes any insights on the interdependence
between agglomeration patterns and the structure of the transport network.
In a broader sense of geography and transport costs, NEG has also continuously
overlooked important location factors such as costs associated with labour, taxes, cli-
mate, topography, or the political environment. What is more, these factors are not
likely to vary proportionally with distance (Blaug, 1997) or with firms’ costs. There-
fore, further development of NEG should build on more comprehensive studies on the
nature and modelling of transportation activities.
2.3.3 Monopolistic competition
Another resilient feature of most NEG models is the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of mo-
nopolistic competition. The main argument supporting the framework is that it is
analytically convenient, while still conveying the integration of imperfect competition
and increasing returns. However, there are shortcomings. Its framework is lacking in
that it contradicts both economic theory and some well known empirically observed
facts (Fujita and Thisse, 2009; Zhelobodko et al., 2012), namely: varying markups and
prices with firm entry and market size; flexible preferences; and the fact that the size
of firms depends on the number of consumers. Fujita and Thisse (2009) claim that
this modelling strategy thus reduces both agglomeration and dispersion forces. This
reduction is a direct consequence of the lack of pro-competitive effects in firms’ markups.
Behrens and Murata (2007) provided a model of monopolistic competition with
income and price competition effects. Particularly, under quasi-separable preferences,
they showed that profit-maximizing prices may be decreasing in market size and con-
verge to the level of marginal costs (the competitive limit) when the number of firms is
arbitrarily large. Zhelobodko et al. (2012) attempt to develop a general monopolistic
competition model, thus trying to improve on the stringent CES specification. This
particular contribution shall be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2 of this paper.
2.3.4 A lack of geography
Other important issues discussed in the literature relate to the spatial origin of costs, the
consideration of only two sectors and two regions and the restricted and highly stylized
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role of the agricultural sector. Out of these three, the dimensionality issue appears to
be the most problematic. One reason is the theoretical understanding of realistic inter-
dependencies to guide empirical studies (Fujita et al., 1999). The other stems from the
fact that a two-region setup overlooks the variability of market access across regions.
Of course, the latter issue clearly departs from models with symmetric transportation
costs across regions. Another insight relates to the more complex impacts that may
arise from a multi-regional setup compared to a two-region one (Neary, 2001; Fujita
and Thisse, 2009).
In the original CP model (Krugman, 1991) with two regions, the transportation
cost parameter is the embodiment of geography. In an abstract two-region setting, the
distance between hypothetical regions is normalized to unity and “dimensionality” is
captured by transport costs, without which there is absolutely no role for geography.
Subsequent developments of the original CP model have provided qualitatively different
and more realistic results compared to Krugman’s CP model. Notwithstanding, these
more recent NEG models do not offer a more substantive analysis when it comes to the
role of space (Garretsen and Martin, 2010). In reality, the depiction of geographical
scale has to take account of the fact that it cannot be represented in terms of just
transport costs, and is more complex than the simple geometries used in NEG theory
to portray geography. According to Harvey (1985), a region pertains to a bounded
geographical unit that is characterized by its own unique economic, social and cultural
“structured coherence”. It turns out that regional spaces are rarely structurally coherent
or contiguous, but are rather characterized by economic, social, cultural and spatial
discontinuities. Moreover, regions are produced and modified by both economic and
social structures operating over time.
It is true that NEG models internalize location into the economic process. In fact,
growth in NEG models affects the distribution of economic activities and vice versa
(recall Fujita and Thisse, 2002; Baldwin and Martin, 2004). However, as geographers
would argue, regions in NEG models remain spaceless entities: they have no spatial
extent and thus no internal spatial structure. While this may be true, at least to some
extent, this fact has also already been acknowledged by some NEG theorists. In fact,
Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2011) not only are aware of this but also emphasize the
role of urban hierarchy formation and the spatial sorting of heterogeneous individuals
across cities as potential paths for the development of NEG. Moreover, some NEG
models allow for regions to differ in size. Notwithstanding, these differences are always
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exogenous (or pre-given), fixed and purely quantitative, thus belonging to an absolute
spatial frame.
All things considered, one may argue that NEG treats the economic landscape in
the form of an abstract geometric space. Similarly, history and time in NEG are also
circumscribed in the sense that focus lies on equilibrium outcomes and local stability
analysis, rather than on real time, or history (Martin, 1999; Boschma and Frenken, 2006;
Garretsen and Martin, 2010). More emphasis should be placed on novelty, selection,
adaptation and self-organization, as these processes stimulate and form the ongoing
evolution of the space economy. However, instead of an evolutionary approach, NEG
treats innovation and technological change as determinants of the extent of spatial
agglomeration while neglecting its impact on the nature of economic activity.
2.3.5 The role of the computer: empirical work and policy
implications
The computer has long been an essential tool to study NEG models, due to their
inherent intractability or lack of closed form solutions (Neary, 2001). Fujita and Thisse
(2009) argue that we do not need to use the computer if the goal is to study the
qualitative properties of equilibria. Moreover, they argue that recent developments
have come to confirm Krugman’s numerical results (Fujita et al., 1999; Robert-Nicoud,
2005; and Mossay, 2006). Thus, they argue, the computer is no longer needed in NEG.
Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2011) think differently on this matter. They point out
that serious calibration is rarely done in NEG and conjecture that this may be one
explanation for the under-representation of NEG in top journals of economic theory.
Moreover, most NEG models lack policy implications, thus causing many researchers
in the field to refrain from prescribing policy recommendations. This issue is closely
related to the aforementioned lack of serious model calibration, and also lack of useful
empirical work.
The concern of Fujita and Mori (2005) toward the role of the computer in NEG is
more closely related to the opinion of Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2011). They find
that the use of the computer for numerical simulations is rare in NEG and that the
recent developments in computer technology may and should turn this around. While
it is still important to continue providing analytically solvable and tractable models,
the limitations in terms of richness and completeness this imposes on NEG modelling
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means that going beyond a symmetric 2-region and 2-industry framework model of trade
and geography requires the use of the computer to attain useful empirical analyses and
policy implications.
While abstractions from a realistic geometrical space have been common practice in
NEG (as identified in Section 3.4), the recent and increasing surge of sophisticated com-
putational methods, together with the availability of geographical data, has given rise
to analyses based on models of agglomeration externalities with explicit geographical
space, such as Redding and Sturm (2008), and Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
2.3.6 Myopic migration and multiple equilibria selection
One concern in NEG relates to the excessive use of evolutionary dynamics to model
migration in most CP models. Under this specification, mobile workers only care about
current utility levels, something that is not consistent with fully rational forward-looking
behaviour. Therefore, there is a need for a dynamic process that mimics observed
migration behaviour of workers. More importantly, one would like to know if Krugman’s
results are robust to a more realistic formulation of the dynamic process.
For specifications such as the widely used replicator dynamics,1 the critique is that
agents are myopic, i.e., they base their location decisions solely on current utility dif-
ferentials. Under myopic dynamics and through the analysis of local stability, the
standard CP model predicts two possible outcomes: full agglomeration and symmetric
dispersion. Moreover, since migration is a continuous process, individual location revi-
sions are implicitly burdened by frictions (Oyama, 2009), and a core-periphery pattern,
once achieved, may not be upset. If agglomeration is stable, however, there is no endoge-
nous mechanism able to select among the multiple stable agglomeration configurations,
the resulting long-run outcome being determined by historical initial advantages. In
reality, notwithstanding, it seems reasonable to claim that agents are also concerned
with expected future utility rather than current utility levels. In this case, future loca-
tion configurations matter and self-fulfilling expectations may drive the economy from
one core-periphery pattern to another (Oyama, 2009).
Suppose workers have a common belief about the future of the space-economy. Pro-
1See Fujita et al. (1999) for a more comprehensive description.
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vided that workers care enough about the future, it is possible that workers in a region
with a currently larger market will migrate to the currently smaller region, thus rever-
sing the historically inherited advantage of the larger region. For this to happen, we
need only consider that the currently larger region actually has a lower endowment of
immobile workers compared to the other. Then, because workers value future utility
enough, they anticipate that their overall discounted utility will be higher if they all
migrate to the region with more immobile workers. These theoretical findings have
been confirmed by Oyama (2009), who has incorporated self-fulfilling expectations in
a mixed setup of the FC model (Marting and Rogers, 1995) with logarithmic quasi-
linear utility and multiple regions (as in Pflüger, 2004). This builds on the literature
concerning the selection of equilibria through the consideration of absorbing states and
global accessibility. In Oyama’s model, each entrepreneur builds expectations about the
future path of the distribution of entrepreneurs and chooses to locate in a region that
maximizes his expected discounted indirect utility. There is a feasible path along which
a revising agent optimizes against the future location pattern of industry. The statio-
nary states of this path are the equilibrium states of a societal game with a continuum
of homogeneous players and correspond to the spatial equilibria of the static model.
However, there may be also perfect foresight paths that escape from a stationary state
when the degree of migration friction is low enough. That state is thus considered as
unstable and motivates the following stability concepts, due to Matsui and Matsuyama
(1995): a given state is absorbing if any perfect foresight path converges to it for an
initial state close enough to it; and is globally accessible if there exists a perfect foresight
path converging to the state, given any initial condition. An additional assumption is
that trade costs depend only on the destination country, i.e., they are predominantly
destination-specific.
One main conclusion concerns agglomeration configurations. If trade barriers are
low enough, and, if a region has a larger market size and/or higher trade barriers, then
the state corresponding to full agglomeration in that region is absorbing and globally
accessible. A direct implication of this result is that full symmetry deems the choice of
forward looking expectations and myopic migration for the dynamics irrelevant. In this
case, initial advantages and history necessarily matter. With exogenous asymmetries,
however, allowing for perfect foresight dynamics enables one to select a unique equili-
brium through the consideration of global stability which is not possible if agents are
myopic. This globally stable equilibrium corresponds to full agglomeration in the region
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which is most relatively protected or has the potentially largest market size, whatever
the initial state. The policy implications in terms of trade policy under forward-looking
expectations are straightforward. A country looking to attract industry may have in-
centives to increase its trade barriers, thus inducing relocation of firms toward it. This
is not possible with myopic migrants, inasmuch as each agglomeration state is locally
stable under myopic dynamics.
Oyama’s and subsequent frameworks still lack explicit modelling of the formation
of expectations, something that could be relevant for policy issues. Though more re-
alistic than the standard replicator dynamics and other specifications imported from
evolutionary game theory, there is still some lack of explicit dynamic modelling based
on microfoundations.
2.4 Breaking through the strait-jacket
Having sought to describe the state of the art and the new directions for future deve-
lopments of NEG, we now present a class of recent contributions that address, to some
extent, some of the issues raised in the previous section.
2.4.1 Individual heterogeneity
A new explored path of research in NEG takes account of heterogeneity at the consumer
and firm level. One can claim that the typical Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition,
which continuously dominates NEG, has been enriched with firm heterogeneity, an
attractive feature that allows us to say something about firms, industry dynamics and
selection processes (see, e.g., Ottaviano, 2012). Differences in productivity at the firm
level have some clear implications for the spatial distribution of industry. There are two
empirical facts that have remained unexplained by NEG models: the spatial sorting
of heterogeneous individuals across cities and an explanation for an urban hierarchy
following the rank-size rule. According to Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2011), factor
heterogeneity and urban ingredients are important for future developments of NEG.
NEG should build on a stronger role of firm and consumer heterogeneity, in com-
plement with imperfect competition and increasing returns at the firm level. The base
for this argument can be summed up in the setup used by Ottaviano (2011), with a
simple two symmetric regions, two firms model. As usual, under differentiated pro-
ducts, costly transportation and agglomeration economies, endogenous concentration
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in one region driven by a self-sustaining process occur whenever market size and cost-
of-living advantages are enough to offset the competitive stress of co-location, for a low
enough level of transportation costs. According to Ottaviano (2011), this setup could
be enriched once we account for efficiency differences at the firm level and study their
interaction with the differences in production costs and market size. If, for instance,
location space is heterogeneous, a less efficient firm would have more incentives to avoid
tougher competition and would thus locate in the less advantageous location. As a re-
sult, firm heterogeneity acts as an additional dispersion force, the more so the higher
the transport costs and the lower the differentiation between both firms’ products. The
aforementioned example focuses on technological differences, but the argument could
be extended to differences in quality of the products offered by the firms. Thus, whe-
reas horizontal differentiation acts as an agglomeration force, vertical differentiation
clearly favours dispersion outcomes. The former is usually captured by NEG models by
the parameter referring to the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The latter
could be accounted for by some sort of degree of firm heterogeneity. Hence, we would
have an additional microeconomic parameter contributing to the determination of the
geographical distribution of industry.
Heterogeneity in firm efficiency does not always lead to more dispersive outcomes.
In fact, Ehrlich and Seidel (2013) argue that higher discrepancies in firms’ total factor
productivity, through self-selection, raise the number of exporting firms and thus foster
the agglomeration of economic activities.
While heterogeneity across agents has been traditionally dealt with in urban econo-
mics (see, e.g., Duranton and Puga, 2004), it could further add to the understanding of
agglomeration economies. Some attempts to study how micro-heterogeneity influences
some key results of most NEG models are those of Baldwin and Okubo (2006, 2009),
Nocke (2006), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Okubo et al. (2010).
Another important source of individual heterogeneity lies at the consumer level. In
papers such as Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), Murata (2003), Mossay (2003), Combes et
al. (2008) and Redding (2016), heterogeneity is incorporated by considering that prefe-
rences for residential location are idiosyncratic to each individual. The premise is that
each location has its own specific characteristics, be it climate, culture or provision of
public infrastructures, which are perceived differently by each individual (Rodríguez-
Pose and Ketterer, 2012). These individual specific amenities are coupled with regional
asymmetries in the form of location specific amenities, generating asymmetries in equili-
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brium real wages across different locations, thus allowing for a broader range of spatial
configurations. Region specific amenities translate into first nature advantages, i.e.,
exogenous asymmetries which make a region more attractive compared to another for
all individuals. However, even if regions are otherwise completely symmetric, individual
idiosyncrasies, by constituting an actual dispersive force, may help explain why some
locations are more industrialized than others. This type of heterogeneity is included
in NEG models by considering that migration responds to the realization of a random
unobserved variable. In order to keep the analysis tractable, probabilistic migration is
usually modelled according to the Logit model by MacFadden (1974), as in Tabuchi
and Thisse (2002), Murata (2003), Combes et al. (2008), or Akamatsu et al. (2012).
However, the qualitative structure of spatial distributions remains by and large invari-
ant under the Logit specification. Consequently, by considering variations in the scale
parameters that govern the particular Logit models, instead of allowing for the distri-
bution of preferences itself to change, predictions about the influence of heterogeneity
on NEG are contained within a limited scope. This should motivate the deepening
of the connection between NEG and the study of residential location choice in order
to better understand the influence of heterogeneity in preferences for location on the
spatial distribution of economic activities.
2.4.2 Beyond CES preferences
Some developments in NEG have sought to overcome the lack of pro-competitive effects
and variable elasticity substitution envisaged by the Dixit-Stiglitz setup. Ottaviano et
al. (2002) address these problems by considering a quasi-linear utility function with
quadratic sub-utility and linear additive transport costs. Their model, while retaining
the main qualitative properties of Krugman’s original model, is able to account for
pro-competitive market effects; particularly, profit maximizing prices are decreasing in
market size. Moreover, additive transportation costs are useful to study the relations-
hip between agglomeration and pricing decisions (Ottaviano, 2000). Other theoretical
contributions have been developed recently with a focus on pro-competitive effects (see,
e.g., Behrens, 2005). Another contribution worth mentioning in this regard is the class
of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models analysed by Behrens and Murata
(2007). They show that additively quasi-separable preferences yield constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA); the latter allows for profit maximizing prices as a decreasing
function of market size.
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The paper by Zhelobodko et al. (2012) deals with a more general model of mono-
polistic competition with symmetric additively separable preferences. The main aim of
the paper is to develop a general model that encompasses the CES as a special case, but
that allows for a better description of real world markets and issues brought out by oli-
gopoly theory, while being tractable enough to enable the study of market equilibrium
properties. The framework in the paper has the attractive feature of precluding any
specific functional form for utility functions. The only requirement is that the utility
be concave so as to guarantee that consumers are lovers of variety. Such a specification
allows them to deal with different patterns of substitution through the concept of re-
lative love for variety (RLV) which is tantamount to the elasticity of marginal utility.
The RLV measures consumers’ attitude toward variety loving. It is the inverse of the
elasticity of substitution associated with the consumption level of a given good.2 When
preferences display an increasing (decreasing) RLV, consumers care less (more) about
variety when their consumption level is lower. The concept of relative love for variety in
this framework is so important that identifiable opposite market outcomes depend on
the RLV. If it is increasing, the market generates pro-competitive effects, i.e., a larger
market size leads to lower equilibrium prices. If it is decreasing, the market generates
price-increasing (anti-competitive) effects: a larger market size leads to higher market
prices because the elasticity of substitution now decreases. For the CES case (constant
RLV), competitive effects are completely washed out. These results seem to hold under
a framework with several sectors, heterogeneous firms, and specific utility functional
forms such as the quadratic and translog utility. As a result, this general monopolistic
competition model provides a new application to NEG models, with the particularity
that its results hold under at least some utility specifications. Also, being able to ac-
count for heterogeneity among producers, it conveniently allows to tackle some of the
problems discussed in the previous subsection.
2.4.3 Towards a multi-regional framework
As argued in section 3, one relevant issue in NEG theory is that most results are mainly
restricted to two-region models. Firstly, the 2-region framework is oversimplifying as
2It follows that the CES is the special case of a constant RLV.
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it overlooks the potential variability of market access across multiple regions (Fujita
and Thisse, 2009), along with other complex interdependencies that may arise from
more extensive regional networks (Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Mori, 2005; Behrens
and Robert-Nicoud, 2011; Tabuchi, 2014). Two main issues, raised by Akamatsu et
al. (2012), pertain to the lack of explanation of different agglomeration patterns than
that of full concentration in one region, and the fact that these models are not able to
account for spatial interactions in a well defined sense.
There have been a series of extensions of NEG models to a multi-regional set-up
so far. Some focus on the heterogeneity in location space, by considering stylized ge-
ometries such as the “racetrack economy”, where regions are equally spaced around a
circumference (Krugman, 1993; Fujita et al., 1999; Picard and Tabuchi, 2010; Castro
et al., 2012; Ikeda et al, 2012; Mossay, 2013). Ago et al. (2006) studied equally spaced
regions along a line segment, while Ikeda and Murota (2014) considered hexagonal con-
figurations. Others, such as Barbero and Zofío (2012), have tried to discern about the
role of different space topologies to explain the locational advantages of some regions.
Other contributions focus on providing new analytical and numerical approaches
that make the inherently cumbersome multi-dimensional models more tractable. For
instance, Akamatsu et al. (2012) combine spatial discounting matrices and Fourier
transformations with discrete choice theory and a racetrack economy. Their aim is to
provide a complete gallery of the process of agglomeration patterns in Core-Periphery
models as transportation costs fall steadily over time, starting from a very high va-
lue at which only the symmetrically dispersed outcome is a stable equilibrium. In a
multi-regional setup, the first critical value for the transportation costs under which the
agglomeration structure emerges, i.e., the first bifurcation occurs, is obtained analyti-
cally. While this bifurcation is the only one in most 2-region CP models, in this n-region
model, the spatial configuration of industry further evolves with further decreases in
transport costs, giving rise to a second bifurcation. At each bifurcation, the number of
regions in which firms locate is reduced by half and the spacing between each pair of
adjacent “core” regions doubles after each bifurcation. This gives rise to what is called
spatial period doubling bifurcation.3 As a result, the economy may eventually converge
3A feature which is also present in Ikeda et al. (2012).
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to a scenario of full agglomeration in a single region for some level of transportation
costs. However, this only happens if consumers have homogeneous preferences toward
location patterns. If preferences are heterogeneous, it is shown that a bifurcation may
occur for some transport cost level that deems some agglomeration unstable and reverts
to the uniform distribution of the fully symmetric outcome. Furthermore, repetitions
of agglomeration and full dispersion may be observed, as is shown through some simu-
lations depicted in the paper. This lends support to the idea of a bell-shaped spatial
development curve found in previous 2-region CP models.
Fabinger (2015) introduces an analytical method based on finding roots for a two-
dimensional function that holds for a fairly general class of agglomeration models. When
space is discrete instead of continuous, he is able to account for equilibria exhibiting
asymmetries in the distributions of multiple cities with varying extensions and popula-
tion densities, whose properties can be explained in terms of their sensitive dependence
on initial distributions. In other words, discretizing space allows to interpret equilibrium
properties in the light of deterministic chaos theory.
Extending beyond the 2-region framework is particularly useful if it is susceptible
to empirical validation. In the early decades of NEG, multi-regional models have been
seldom subject to empirical testing. However, with the advent of computer sophisti-
cation and the increasing availability of disaggregated data, noteworthy contributions
have been made in recent years. Some worth mentioning are the works by Davis and
Weinstein (2002), Niebuhr (2006), Redding and Sturm (2008), and Allen and Arkolakis
(2014). Bosker et al. (2010) show that most conclusions from 2-region NEG models
hold under more realistic settings. This includes not only the extension to the equi-
distant multi-regional case (Puga, 1999), but also the consideration of non-equidistant
regions. A notable difference, however, is that, in the second case, exogenous asym-
metries give rise to the possibility of spatial distributions other than agglomeration or
dispersion. Recently, Tabuchi (2014) has used a multi-regional version of Krugman’s
original CP model to show that it can account for the historical trend of agglomeration
in the capital regions over the past few centuries. Behrens et al. (2004) test the home
market effect in a multi-country economy by extending the model by Krugman (1980).
They find evidence that the extended model predicts a home market effect only after
accounting for the impact of countries’ differential access to world market on actual
production and trade, and find that the home market effect is indeed strong in the
world trade data.
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2.4.4 Linking knowledge and culture to economics
Throughout the last decades there has been a narrow focus of NEG on pecuniary ex-
ternalities through linkage effects. Other possible sources of agglomeration economies
such as knowledge externalities and technological spillovers are left out. Fujita and
Mori (2005) argue that this is done out of convenience. Such a narrow focus enables
researchers to design a microfounded model based on the firms’ perspective using mo-
dern tools of economic theory. However, it is true that further development in NEG
requires modelling the creation and transfer of knowledge. In particular, the role of K-
linkages has become increasingly relevant in NEG literature. Building upon pioneering
works such as Berliant and Fujita (2008, 2009 and 2012), one should hope that a new
comprehensive NEG theory fully integrates the linkage effects among consumers and
producers and K-linkages in space. According to Fujita (2007), geography is an essen-
tial feature of knowledge creation and diffusion. For instance, people residing in the
same region interact more frequently and thus contribute to develop the same, regional
set of cultural ideas. However, while each region tends to develop its unique culture, the
economy as a whole evolves according to the synergy which results from the interaction
across different regions (i.e., different cultures). That is, according to Duranton and
Puga (2001), knowledge creation and location are inter-dependent. Berliant and Fujita
(2012) developed a model of spatial knowledge interactions and showed that higher
cultural diversity, albeit hindering communication, promotes the productivity of kno-
wledge creation. This corroborates the empirical findings of Ottaviano and Peri (2006;
2008). Ottaviano and Prarolo (2009) show how improvements in the communication
between different cultures fosters the creation of multicultural cities in which cultural
diversity promotes productivity. This happens, they argue, because better communica-
tion allows different communities to interact and benefit from productive externalities
without risking losing their cultural identities. Berliant and Fujita (2011) take a first
step towards using a micro-founded R&D structure to infer about its effects on econo-
mic growth. They find that long-run growth is positively related to the effectiveness
of interaction among workers as well as the effectiveness in the transmission of public
knowledge.
Therefore, combining the typical pecuniary externalities in NEG models with the
spatial diffusion of knowledge spawned from intra-regional and inter-regional interacti-
ons alike is important if we want to infer about an eventual circular causality between
migration and the circulation of knowledge. In other words, NEG may shed light on the
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importance of knowledge exchanged between different regions through trade networks
compared to “internally” generated knowledge.
Besides the importance of heterogeneity in knowledge, it is also important to dis-
cern about the relatedness of variety. This relatedness measures the cognitive proximity
and distance between sectors that allows for a higher intensity of knowledge spillovers.
According to Frenken et al. (2007), a higher related variety increases the inter-sectoral
knowledge spillovers between sectors that are technologically related. This potentially
adds a new dimension to the role of heterogeneity and location in the creation and
diffusion of knowledge. Tavassoli and Carbonara (2014) have tested the role of kno-
wledge intensity and variety using regional data for Sweden and found evidence that
the different types of cognitive proximity have an important weight. This confirms the
relevance of disentangling between these different concepts in order to infer about the
spatial determinants of innovation and knowledge creation.
The incorporation of knowledge creation and diffusion into NEG could also benefit
from the introduction of agglomeration mechanisms in endogenous growth models with
innovation. Particularly, innovations that affect quality or a firm’s cost efficiency are
usually driven by stochastic processes. Typically, the production of knowledge involves
some sort of uncertainty. Therefore, we can think of quality as a proxy, or at least a
function, of a given firm’s stock of knowledge. In the literature following Schumpete-
rian growth models such as Aghion and Howitt (1992), Young (1998), Howitt (1999), or
more recently Dinopoulos and Segerstorm (2010), innovations occur with a probability
that depends on factors such as the amount of the firm’s research effort, the common
pool of public knowledge available to all firms, and the individual firm’s quality level.
Introducing geography and worker mobility in these models allows the success of inno-
vations to depend also on the magnitude of regional interaction through the exchange
of ideas between workers and producers alike among regions. If each region holds its
own set of ideas, or culture, then more localized spillovers translate into higher related
variety, as innovation benefits more from a regional common pool of ideas. However,
the interaction between researchers hailing from different cultures is also important for
innovation. This adds a potential new role for transportation costs in NEG. For in-
stance, higher trade integration, as usually captured by lower transport costs, is likely
to foster the inter-regional communication between researchers, thus adding relevance
to the interaction between researchers from different regions. If cognitive proximity
is relatively less important than the interaction between different cultures, then this
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unrelated variety implies that lower transport costs are likely to induce the dispersion
of economic activities.
2.5 Concluding remarks
In this survey we have sought to make a description of recent contributions to the field,
which may be separated in two different groups. The first group describes the literature
which provides an overall assessment of early and recent contributions in the field of
NEG. After considering the state of the art, what these works share in common is the
fact that they seek to critically and prospectively point out the theoretical limitations
in the field and provide new insights for the future research and development of NEG.
The second group belongs to a selection of works that we feel provide new path-breaking
contributions by, intentionally or not, tackling many of the issues raised by the review
articles in the former group. A part of the literature on which this survey is lacking is
that concerning recent contributions in NEG which deal with the inter-disciplinarity be-
tween NEG and other fields, such as urban economics and proper economic geography.
Other issues that have been conveniently left out of this reading are those relating to
the exclusion of more sectors other than the typical agricultural non-skilled and manu-
facturing skilled sectors, and those related with the explicit modelling of transportation
costs. Of course, this does not reflect any lack of consideration toward those issues, but
rather reflects the broad and extensive area of new avenues of research that will be able
to maintain NEG as a yet vibrant and dynamic field.
Another concern that has been raised by researchers, mainly those outside NEG,
is the lack of inter-disciplinarity between the economics and geography profession. On
account of these critiques, NEG is many times referred to as being too narrowly focused,
thus neglecting important issues that are determinant if new important insights are to
be achieved.
To sum up all of the recent contributions, while still being able to provide a fair
enough description of the contents of those papers, would be unimaginable. Instead
of a very general and superficial look, the aim of this survey is to provide a somewhat
extensive comprehension on the topics and papers covered by it. Other excellent reviews
on the literature on NEG models are provided in works such as Fujita et al. (1999),
Fujita and Thisse (2002), Baldwin et al. (2003), Henderson and Thisse (2004), Combes
et al. (2008) and Brakman et al. (2009). As a final remark, it cannot be overemphasized
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that there is still room for further developments in NEG; this, however, is only possible
if we keep trying to break through the conceptual strait-jacket strapping the field of
new economic geography.
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Chapter 3
The Footloose Entrepreneur Model
with an arbitrary number of
equidistant regions
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3.1 Introduction
The secular tendency for spatial agglomeration of economic activity is well known and
has always been a matter of profound debate. Recent developments have allowed a more
rigorous treatment of such phenomena, with recourse to microeconomic foundations.1
The benchmark in this literature is the Core-Periphery (CP) model, introduced by
Krugman (1991).
Many issues have been raised in recent literature about the shortcomings of New
Economic Geography, mainly due to the transversality of some crucial assumptions
across many models which do not allow for new meaningful insights and breakthroughs.
Not least important of these issues is the dimensionality problem; in particular that of
the 2-region framework.
Theoretical insights on a model with three or more regions are interesting for diffe-
rent reasons. One reason is the theoretical understanding of interdependencies among
many regions to guide empirical studies. The other stems from the fact that a two-
region set-up overlooks the variability of market access across regions (Fujita and Thisse,
2009).2 Another insight relates to the more complex impacts that may arise from a
multi-regional set-up compared to a two-region one (Fujita and Mori, 2005; Fujita and
Thisse, 2009; Behrens and Robert-Nicoud, 2011). As pointed out by Fujita et al. (1999),
the consideration of only two regions stems from the advantage of dealing with more
tractable problems, although it seems implausible that the geographical dimension of
economic activity can be reduced to a 2-region framework. It is important, therefore,
to understand to what extent the main conclusions that were obtained using 2-region
models extend to models with more regions.
This motivated a number of different studies that try to overcome the over-simplistic
dimensionality of the two-region set-up. Castro et al. (2012) study a 3-region version
of the CP model by Krugman (1991). Comparing the behaviour of the 3-region model
relatively to the 2-region model, their main conclusion was that the additional region
favours the agglomeration of economic activity and hinders the dispersion of economic
1See Fujita et al. (1999), Ottaviano et al. (2002), Baldwin et al. (2004), Robert-Nicoud (2005) and
the references therein.
2Of course, the latter issue clearly departs from models with symmetric transportation costs across
regions.
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activity. The paper by Akamatsu et al. (2012) seeks to explain spatial agglomeration
in a CP model with 2n regions. They provide a description of the process of particular
agglomeration patterns in the CP model as transportation costs steadily decrease over
time, giving rise to the conjecture of spatial period doubling bifurcation, which they later
prove analytically. According to this result, the number of regions in which firms locate
is reduced by half and the spacing between each pair of adjacent “core” regions doubles
after each bifurcation. Oyama (2009) has incorporated self-fulfilling expectations in
migration decisions in a multi-regional variant of the CP model to allow for global
stability in just one core region in the presence of asymmetries or trade barriers. Tabuchi
and Thisse (2011) study the rise of a hierarchical system of central places in a multi-
location space. Barbero and Zofío (2012) considered different network topologies in
order to show how locational advantages due to more heterogeneous configurations
enforces the likelihood of agglomeration in regions that are best located. The role of
heterogeneous distances between regions has also been addressed in other frameworks
such as the racetrack economy (Krugman, 1993; Fujita et al., 1999; Picard and Tabuchi;
2010; Mossay, 2013), equally spaced regions on the line segment (e.g. Ago et al., 2006)
or hexagonal distributions such as in the monograph by Ikeda and Murota (2014).
Other recent contributions concerning NEG models with more than 2 regions include
works such as Behrens et al. (2006), Akamatsu and Takayama (2009), Ikeda et al.
(2012), Forslid and Okubo (2012), Fabinger (2015) and Commendatore et al. (2015a).3
Some of the inherent technical difficulties that stem from the extension of a 2-region
model to a multiregional framework call for a base model that is more tractable than
the original CP model (Krugman, 1991). An analytically solvable version of the CP
model, dubbed the Footloose Entrepreneur (FE) model, was developed by Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003). The only difference with respect to the original CP model is that,
in the FE model, the variable input in the mobile sector is immobile labour instead of
mobile labour. The role of mobile (footloose) labour becomes limited to the fixed input
(entrepreneurship) in the mobile sector. This subtle modification renders the model
analytically solvable because the marginal production cost becomes independent of the
spatial distribution of economic activity.
3For a more comprehensive and insightful overview of some of the main contributions concerning
multiregional NEG models, see Commendatore et al. (2015b).
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This motivates us to consider a n-region version of the analytically solvable FE
model as it allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the regional utility level as
a function of the spatial distribution of economic activity.4 In Tabuchi (2014), the
author develops a multi-regional model based on Fujita et al. (1999) with exogenous
asymmetries both in trade costs and in the distribution of the immobile workers and
finds that it is able to predict the historical tendency of agglomeration in the capital
regions. The paper focuses on a limit analysis of transportation costs (i.e., autarky and
near free trade), whereas our set-up, by considering equidistant regions, allows us to
characterize analytically the stability of equilibria.
Our main finding is that, as the number of regions increases, agglomeration becomes
more likely while dispersion becomes less likely. More precisely, we conclude that: (i)
the set of parameter values for which agglomeration is stable in an economy with n
regions is contained in the set of parameters for which it is stable in an economy with
n + 1 regions; and (ii) the set of parameter values for which dispersion is stable in an
economy with n+ 1 regions is contained in the set of parameters for which it is stable
in an economy with n regions. This is an improvement on the results of Castro et al.
(2012). This happens because, when unskilled workers are evenly distributed among
regions, more regions implies less immobile consumers in each region and, therefore,
lower local demand. As a result, a large region becomes relatively more attractive as
the market-size effect becomes stronger relative to the market-crowding effect, which
induces agglomeration.
We also present numerical evidence that strongly suggests that partial dispersion
(i.e., symmetric dispersion across m regions, with m < n) is never stable, whatever the
parameter values. Our simulations additionally indicate that locational hysteresis is a
persistent feature of the FE model with an arbitrary number of regions, but disappears
as n tends to infinity because agglomeration becomes the only possible stable equili-
brium. The scope for simultaneity of stability of dispersion and agglomeration, as given
by an interval in the level of transportation costs, seems to attain a maximum for some
n.
4Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Pflüger (2004) have also built analytically solvable CP models by
considering quasi-linear preferences and are therefore also good potential candidates for a multi-regional
extension.
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As in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), we introduce exogenous regional asymmetries
in our n-region version of the FE model by considering regional heterogeneity in the
endowment of unskilled labour across regions. By studying the stability conditions for
agglomeration, we find that an increase (decrease) of unskilled labour in the core region
(peripheral regions) leads to the strengthening of agglomeration similar to the increase
in the number of regions in the symmetric case. This is achieved through an analysis
of skilled labour wages providing further insight into the agglomeration mechanism for
a finite number of regions.
We conclude that the impact of considering additional regions in the FE model is
analogous to that of considering additional regions in the CP model. In this sense, the
FE model behaves similarly to the CP model (as desired by its creators). Even though
the FE model is more tractable than the CP model as the number of regions increase,
we still feel the need for a base model yet more tractable, more easily extensible to a
higher number of regions than the ones that have been used so far. This however is
beyond the scope of this article.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we underline
the main assumptions of the FE model with n regions. In Section 3, we obtain the
general expressions for nominal and real wages as functions of the spatial distribution
of the entrepreneurs. In Section 4, we address the dynamics of the model and find the
stability conditions for three possible kinds of equilibria: agglomeration, total dispersion
and partial dispersion. We also discuss how each of these outcomes becomes more or
less likely as the parameters of the model change. In Section 5, we assess the effect
of increasing the number of regions on the behaviour of the FE model. In Section 6,
we allow for exogenous heterogeneity in the unskilled immobile labour factor in the FE
model and determine a more general local stability condition for agglomeration in order
to study how the spatial distribution of farmers is likely to influence the agglomerative
outcome. In Section 7, we make some concluding remarks.
3.2 Economic environment
The economy is composed by n ≥ 2 regions that are assumed to be structurally identical
and equidistant from each other. The framework is exactly as that of the 2-region FE
model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), except for the fact that an arbitrary number
of regions is considered instead of only two.
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The total endowments of entrepreneurs and unskilled labour are, respectively, H(n)
and L(n).5 Entrepreneurs can move freely between regions: ∑ni=1Hi = H(n); while
unskilled workers are immobile and assumed be evenly spread across the n regions:
Li = L(n)n ,∀i.
The representative consumer of region i has the usual Cobb-Douglas utility function:
Ui = Xµi A
1−µ
i , (3.1)
where Ai is the consumption of agricultural products in region i and Xi is the con-
sumption of a composite of differentiated varieties of manufactures in region i, defined
by:
Xi =
[ˆ
sN
di(s)
σ−1
σ ds
] σ
σ−1
, (3.2)
where di(s) is the consumption of variety s of manufactures in region i, N is the
mass of existing varieties, and σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between
different varieties of manufactures. From utility maximization, µ ∈ (0, 1) is the share
of expenditure in manufactured goods.
Production of a variety of manufactures requires, as inputs, α units of entrepreneurs
and β units of unskilled labour for each unit that is produced. Therefore, the production
cost of a firm in region i is:
Ci(xi) = wiα + wLi βxi, (3.3)
where wi is the nominal wage of skilled workers in region i and wLi is the nominal wage
of unskilled workers in region i.
Trade of manufactures between two regions is subject to iceberg costs τ ∈ (1,+∞).
Let τij denote the number of units that must be shipped at region i for each unit that is
delivered at region j. Since the regions are assumed to be equidistant from each other,
5The dependence of these endowments on the number of regions increases the generality of the
comparison between models with different numbers of regions.
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we have the following trade cost structure:
τij = 1, if j = iτij = τ, if j 6= i.
The agricultural good is produced using one unit of unskilled labour for each unit that
is produced (constant returns to scale), and is freely traded across regions.
3.3 Short-run equilibrium
Let pji(s) and dji(s) denote the price and demand in region i of a variety, s, that is
produced in region j. Utility maximization by consumers in region i yields the following
aggregate regional demand:
dji(s) =
pji(s)−σ
P 1−σi
µYi, (3.4)
where Pi is the regional price index of manufactures, associated with (3.2):
Pi =
 n∑
j=1
ˆ
sN
pji(s)1−σds

1
1−σ
, (3.5)
and Yi is the regional income:
Yi = wiHi + wLi
L(n)
n
, (3.6)
Turning to the supply side and starting with the agricultural sector, absence of transport
costs implies that its price is the same everywhere (pA1 = ... = pAn ). Furthermore, under
perfect competition, we have marginal cost pricing: pAi = wLi ,∀i. Consequently, there is
unskilled workers’ wage equalization among regions: wL1 = ... = wLn . Hence, by choosing
the agricultural good as numeraire, we can set pAi = wLi = 1, ∀i. We assume that the
non-full-specialization (NFS) condition (Baldwin et al., 2004) holds, guaranteeing that
agriculture is active in all regions even if all manufacturing activity takes place in a
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single region.6 This is guaranteed if we assume that:
µ <
σ
n(σ − 1) + 1 . (3.7)
.
In the industrial sector, given the fixed cost in (3.3), the number of varieties manufac-
tured in region i is vi = Hi/α. A manufacturing firm in region i facing the total cost in
(3.3) maximizes the following profit function:
pii(s) =
n∑
j=1
pij(s)dij(s)− β
 n∑
j=1
τijdij(s)
− αwi. (3.8)
Total supply to region j 6= i, including the fraction of product that “melts”, is equal
to τdij(s). The first order condition for maximization of (3.8) yields the same pricing
equation as that of the 2-region model by Forslid and Ottaviano:
pij(s) = τijβ
σ
σ − 1 . (3.9)
Note that pij(s) is independent of s, which implies that dij(s) also is. All varieties
produced in region i are sold at the same price and are equally demanded in region j.
Using (3.9), the CES price index (3.5) becomes:
Pi = α
1
σ−1β
σ
σ − 1
 n∑
j=1
φjiHj

1
1−σ
, (3.10)
where φij ≡ τ 1−σij ∈ (0, 1) represents the “freeness of trade” between regions i and j.
Absence of entry barriers in the manufacturing industry translates into zero profits
in equilibrium. Operating profits must totally compensate fixed costs, which are equal
6This condition requires world expenditure on agricultural goods to be greater than the total
production of agricultural goods in all regions except one, i.e., (1− µ)∑ni=1 Yi > n−1n L(n).
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to the wages paid to the entrepreneurs:
αwi =
n∑
j=1
pijdij − β
n∑
j=1
τijdij,
which becomes, considering the prices in (3.9):
wi =
βxi
α(σ − 1) , (3.11)
where xi ≡ ∑nj=1 τijdij is the total production by a manufacturing firm in region i.
Using (3.4), (3.9) and (3.10), we obtain an expression for xi that depends on regional
incomes and on the number of firms in each region:
xi =
µ(σ − 1)
αβσ
n∑
j=1
φijYi∑n
m=1 φmjvm
. (3.12)
Replacing (3.12) in (3.11), and given that vi = Hi/α, we obtain:
wi =
µ
σ
n∑
j=1
φijYj∑n
m=1 φmjHm
. (3.13)
By (3.6), regional income equals:
Yi =
L(n)
n
+ wiHi. (3.14)
The spatial distribution of entrepreneurs can be described, in relative terms, by the
vector h ≡ (h1, ..., hn), where hi ≡ HiH(n) ,∀i. The fraction of entrepreneurs in region n
may be omitted because it is implicit in the other fractions: hn = 1−∑n−1i=1 hi.
The price index of manufactures, Pi, becomes, after (3.10):
Pi(h) =
βσ
1− σ
(
α
H(n)
) 1
σ−1
 n∑
j=1
φjihj

1
1−σ
. (3.15)
Using (3.13) and (3.14), we obtain a system of n equations that determines the nominal
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wages in each region:
wi =
µ
σ
n∑
j=1
φij
[
L(n)
nH(n) + wjhj
]
∑n
m=1 φmjhm
, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} . (3.16)
For illustrative purposes, we present the closed-form solution for the equilibrium nomi-
nal wages of the entrepreneurs as a function of their spatial distribution for n = 3.
Proposition 3.1. When n = 3, the nominal wages of entrepreneurs in region i are
given by:
wi =
µL
3σH(n)
 3∑
j=1
φij
rj
+ µ
σ
φ (φ− 1) ∑k 6=i hk∏
k 6=i rk
+ φ
2 − 1
ri
∑
k 6=i
hk
rk
+ µ2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) 1
ri
∏
k 6=i
hk
rk

1− µ
σ
3∑
j=1
hj
rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(1− φ2)
(
h1h2
r1r2
+ h1h3
r1r3
+ h2h3
r2r3
)
− µ
3
σ3
(2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1)
3∏
j=1
hj
rj
,
(3.17)
where rj ≡
3∑
m=1
φmjhm.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since agents spend a fraction µ of their income on manufactures, whose price index
is Pi, and the price of agricultural goods is unity, the real wage or indirect utility level
of entrepreneurs is given by:
ωi = wi/P µi . (3.18)
3.4 Long-run equilibria and stability
Entrepreneurs migrate to the region that offers them the highest real wage or indirect
utility (3.18). For concreteness, we consider replicator dynamics: the flow of entrepre-
neurs to a region is proportional to the difference between the region’s real wage and
the weighted average real wage and to the number of entrepreneurs in the region.
Formally, the dynamics are described by the following system of n − 1 ordinary
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differential equations defined in the simplex ∆ ≡
{
h ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 hi = 1
}
:7

h˙1 = (ω1 − ω¯)h1
...
h˙n−1 = (ωn−1 − ω¯)hn−1
, hi ∈ [0, 1] , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, (3.19)
where ω¯ ≡ ∑ni=1 hiωi is the weighted average real wage. Migration to the omitted region
in (3.19) is, consistently, given by h˙n = −∑n−1i=1 h˙i = (ωn − ω¯)hn.
In this dynamical system, migration to empty regions has to be started exogenously.
If a region is empty, hi = 0, then the corresponding differential equation for the dyna-
mics yields h˙i = 0, which means that the region remains empty. Hence, the boundary
of the simplex is invariant for the dynamics.
Direct substitution in equations (3.19) shows that the configurations:
h ∈
{
(1, 0, ..., 0) ,
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
,
(
1
m
, ..., 1
m
, 0, ..., 0
)}
and their permutations are equilibria. The equilibria represented by (1, 0, ..., 0) and its
permutations correspond to full agglomeration of industry in one of the regions while
the others remain empty. This outcome is called agglomeration or concentration. The
second configuration describes an even distribution of industry among the n regions.
This outcome is called total dispersion. The last configuration represents an even dis-
tribution of industry among only m of the n regions, while the remaining regions are
deprived of industry. This is what we call partial dispersion.
The description of the dynamics relies on the study of the stability of the afore-
mentioned equilibria. The stability of each equilibrium is preserved by permutation so
that the same stability conditions hold for agglomeration or partial dispersion in any
of the regions. Equilibria are stable if, after some small exogenous migration of skilled
workers to any of the regions, the spatial distribution of skilled workers is pulled back
7Note that, even though the spatial distribution of entrepreneurs can be described using n − 1
coordinates, we sometimes use all n coordinates for the sake of clarity.
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to the initial one.8
3.4.1 Stability of total dispersion
Since total dispersion is an interior configuration, its stability is given by the sign
of the real part of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the system in (3.19) at
h =
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
.
This matrix has a repeated real eigenvalue with multiplicity n − 1, which is given
by (see Appendix B):
α ≡ ∂ωi
∂hi
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
. (3.20)
Total dispersion is stable if α is negative. This occurs if and only if :
∂wi/∂hi
wi
<
∂P µi /∂hi
P µi
,
which means that the stability of dispersion can be described in terms of semi-elasticities.
Entrepreneurs remain equally dispersed across the n regions if a migration of entre-
preneurs to a region induces a percentage change in the nominal wage smaller than the
corresponding percentage change in the real prices. In this case, the loss in purchasing
power due to an increase of the share of entrepreneurs, hi, leads to an exodus from that
region until the initial share of entrepreneurs is restored, that is, until hi = 1n .
Proposition 3.2. Total dispersion is a stable configuration if:9
φ < φb ≡ (σ − µ)(σ − 1− µ)
µ2 + σ(σ − 1) + µ(2σ − 1)(n− 1) . (3.21)
Proof. See Appendix B.
8For configurations in the interior of the simplex, stability depends on the sign of the real part of
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix for the dynamics. For configurations on the boundary, such as
agglomeration and partial dispersion, stability depends on the sign of the difference between the real
wage in the populated regions and the empty regions.
9For a necessary condition, replace “<” with “≤”.
41
Low transportation costs (high φ) discourage dispersion. Following Fujita et al. (1999),
we call break point the critical value φb which is such that α(φb) = 0.
Note that if φb is negative, total dispersion is not stable for any value of φ. We rule
out this possibility throughout the paper by assuming:
σ > µ+ 1, (3.22)
commonly referred to as the no black-hole condition.10 With φb > 0, there always exists
a level of transportation costs above which dispersion is stable (given the values of µ
and σ). On the other hand, the fact that φb < 1 means that there always exists a level
of transportation costs below which dispersion is unstable.
Observing that the derivative of φb with respect to µ is negative, we conclude that
a higher fraction of spending on manufacturing discourages total dispersion. In the
extreme case in which µ tends to zero, φb approaches unity, rendering total dispersion
stable.
The effect of σ can be understood by noting that when σ tends to infinity, φb
approaches unity. This means that if the preference for variety is sufficiently low (i.e.,
if σ is sufficiently high), dispersion is stable.
Total dispersion is always a stable outcome when we are either approaching an
economy absent of industry or an economy in which consumers give almost no value to
variety in consumption of manufactures. This fits well with intuition.
3.4.2 Stability of agglomeration
Agglomeration, (h1, h2, ..., hn) = (1, 0, ..., 0), is a corner solution on a vertex of the
simplex. At such an equilibrium, by symmetry, the real wages in the empty regions
are equal. Given the absence of entrepreneurs in all regions except one, the weighted
average real wage is simply ω¯ = ω1.
10If agents have a very strong preference for variety (σ < 1 + µ), total dispersion is never a stable
equilibrium, for any magnitude of the transportation costs.
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Lemma 3.3. Agglomeration in region i is a stable configuration if:11
ωi > ωj, ∀j 6= i.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let h2 = ... = hn = 0. Then, ω¯ = ω1, that is, the
weighted average real wage is the same as the real wage in region 1. That ω1 > ωj is
sufficient for agglomeration to be stable follows from the fact that entrepreneurs migrate
to regions with higher real wages, together with continuity of real wages with respect
to the spatial distribution. Thus, if an empty region, j, has a lower real wage than
region 1, a small exogenous migration of entrepreneurs from region 1 to region j will
be followed by their return to region 1.
If the other regions are to remain empty over time, then there can be no incentives
for entrepreneurs to migrate. That is, the indirect utility of entrepreneurs must be
higher in region 1 than in the other regions:
w1
P µ1
>
w2
P µ2
⇔ w1
w2
>
(
P1
P2
)µ
⇔ w1
w2
> φ
µ
σ−1 .
Since φ
µ
σ−1 < 1, a sufficient condition for the stability of agglomeration is that the
nominal wage is higher in the core than in the periphery.
Proposition 3.4. Agglomeration is a stable equilibrium if:12
SP (φ) ≡ (σ − µ)(1− φ)2 + nφ
[
σ(1− φ− µσ−1 )− µ(1− φ)
]
< 0. (3.23)
Since SP (φ) is a convex function and we have SP (0) > 0, SP (1) = 0 and SP ′(1) > 0,
the function SP (φ) has exactly one zero in φ ∈ (0, 1). This value, denoted φs, is the n-
region FE model’s sustain point, i.e., it is the threshold of φ above which agglomeration
is a stable equilibrium. If the “freeness of trade” parameter is high enough (i.e., if
transport costs are low enough), agglomeration is stable. This is because low transport
11For a necessary condition, replace “<” with “≤”.
12For a necessary condition, replace “<” with “≤”.
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costs imply that price indices become relatively higher in the regions that are deserted
and thus real wages become relatively lower.
One can also verify that SP (φ) becomes positive as σ approaches infinity or as µ
approaches zero.13 Therefore, limσ→∞ φs = limµ→0 φs = 1. For a given φ ∈ (0, 1),
agglomeration becomes unstable for a sufficiently high σ or a sufficiently low µ. One
limit case (µ→ 0) refers to a situation of absence of the manufacturing sector, because
µ is the fraction of expenditure on manufactures. The other (σ → +∞) corresponds to
the manufacturing sector operating under perfect competition, since σ close to infinity
means that variety of manufactures is not valued by consumers. It is as if manufactures
were a homogenous good.
3.4.3 Stability of partial dispersion
We now address the stability of configurations in which entrepreneurs are equally dis-
persed across m regions, with 1 < m < n, while the remaining n−m regions are empty.
Such configurations are always equilibria of the dynamical system (3.19). For simplicity,
we focus on the possibility of dispersion across two regions, i.e., of the configuration
h =
(
1
2 , 0, ..., 0,
1
2
)
and its permutations.
Lemma 3.5. Partial dispersion is stable if:14
ωi (hp) > ωj (hp) and
∂ωi
∂hi
(hp) < 0, i = {1, n} ,∀j 6= i (3.24)
where hp =
(
1
2 , 0, ..., 0,
1
2
)
.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Let γ ≡ ωi (hp) − ωj (hp) and β ≡ ∂ωi
∂hi
(hp). From Lemma 3.5, after some manipu-
lation, we obtain the following result.
13Note that limµ→0 SP (φ) = σ(1 − 2φ + φ2) > 0 and limσ→∞ SP (φ) = limσ→∞ σ(1 − 2φ + φ2) >
0 = +∞.
14For necessary conditions, replace “>” with “≥”.
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Proposition 3.6. Partial dispersion is stable if β < 0 and γ > 0, where:15

γ ≡ σ(1 + φ)
[
1− φ1− µσ−1
(
1+φ
2
) µ
σ−1
]
n− [2σ + µ(n− 2)] (1− φ)(2φ+ 1).
β ≡ µ(σ + 3σφ− 2φ)n− µ2(1− φ)n− µ(1− φ)− 2σ(σ − 1− µ)(1− φ)
(3.25)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Partial dispersion appears to be unstable for all parameter values. However, be-
cause of the non-linearity of γ(φ), this appears to be impossible to prove analytically.
Numerical inspection of both conditions in (3.25) suggests that these are never simulta-
neously met, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 for the case of three regions. This conclusion is
not surprising, since partial dispersion has also been numerically shown to be unstable
in the 3-region CP model by Castro et al. (2012).
Figure 3.1 – Parameter regions in which β ≤ 0 and γ ≤ 0 for n = 3. These
do not seem to overlap, indicating that the two stability conditions are never
simultaneously satisfied.
The consideration of a greater number of regions seems to reinforce this conclusion.
The derivative of β with respect to n is positive and the derivative of γ with respect
15For necessary conditions, replace “<” with “≤”.
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to n also appears, from numerical inspection, to be positive. We thus conjecture that
partial dispersion is never stable for any number of regions.
3.5 Impact of the number of regions
A reason to build a n-region model is to be able to understand the impact of the number
of regions on the behaviour of the FE model. Castro et al. (2012) proved that, in an
extension of Krugman’s CP model to three regions, more regions favour agglomeration
as an outcome. Here, we obtain a stronger result in the same direction.
Proposition 3.7. The parameter region for which agglomeration is stable in the FE
model with n+ 1 regions contains that of the FE model with n regions.
Proof. The derivative of SP in (3.23) with respect to n is negative. This implies that
an increase in the number of regions decreases φs, for any given values of the remaining
parameters.
In other words, an increase in the number of regions favours stability of agglome-
ration in the FE model. Figure 3.2 illustrates this effect. The following result provides
an explanation for why this happens.
Proposition 3.8. Comparing agglomeration in the FE model with n + 1 regions and
in the FE model with n regions, we find that: (i) the ratio between price indices in the
core and in the periphery are the same; (ii) the ratio between nominal wages in the core
and periphery is higher in the model with n+ 1 regions.
Proof. See Appendix D.
An entrepreneur who migrates to the periphery will find a cost-of-living that is
independent of the number of regions, but the size of the internal market is smaller
compared to the core if there are more regions because the fraction of unskilled workers
that live there is smaller. All the other entrepreneurs and the remaining unskilled
workers would constitute the external market. Given the existence of transportation
costs to the other regions, this entrepreneur will face a lower relative global demand in
a model with more regions, and, therefore, will earn a lower nominal wage. This leads
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Figure 3.2 – The region in parameter space where SP2 < 0 is painted in red (more
opaque), while the region in which SP3 < 0 is painted in blue (less opaque). The
blue region contains the red one, illustrating that agglomeration in the 3-region
model is more likely than in the 2-region model.
to the fact that agglomeration is more likely in a model with more regions. In the limit,
when the number of regions tends to infinity, agglomeration is always stable.
We are also able to compare the stability conditions of total dispersion in the FE
model with n regions and the FE model with n+ 1 regions.
Proposition 3.9. The parameter region for which total dispersion is stable in the FE
model with n regions contains that of the FE model with n+ 1 regions.
Proof. Observe that φb in (3.21) decreases as the number of regions increases. This
means that an increase in the number of regions makes total dispersion less likely to be
stable.
We conclude that an increase in the number of regions hinders stability of total
dispersion. After a small deviation from total dispersion, the market-size effect and
the market-crowding effect in the larger region becomes stronger (resp. weaker) as the
number of regions increases, because each of the smaller regions individually faces a
lower local demand given less unskilled workers. Therefore, as the number of immobile
workers per region decreases, so diminishes its role as a dispersive force. In the limit,
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when the number of regions tends to infinity, total dispersion is never stable because
the amount of immobile workers in each region becomes negligible.
3.5.1 Numerical evidence of locational hysteresis
One feature of the 2-region CP and FE models is the existence of a subcritical pitchfork
bifurcation. This kind of bifurcation implies that there are values of the freeness-of-trade
parameter, φ ∈ (φs, φb), for which total dispersion and agglomeration are simultaneously
stable. Therefore, the long-run distribution of economic activity depends on the initial
distribution of economic activity. The model exhibits locational hysteresis.
3.5.1.1 In the 3-region FE model
Regarding the 3-region FE model, numerical inspection of the stability conditions of
total dispersion and agglomeration in (3.21) and (3.23) suggests that, with n = 3 and
any pair (µ, σ), we have φs < φb.16 This implies that there exist values of φ for which
both total dispersion and agglomeration are stable equilibria, because agglomeration is
stable for φ > φs and total dispersion is stable for φ < φb. This means that the 3-region
FE model also exhibits locational hysteresis.
Figure 3.3 illustrates this by plotting the surfaces SP = 0 and α = 0. However,
it also shows that the parameter region for which total dispersion and agglomeration
are simultaneously stable is relatively small. The distance between φs and φb seems to
be bigger for parameter values near the no black-hole condition and to decrease as σ
increases or µ decreases.
One thing that is possible to establish analytically is the existence of an open subset
in parameter space (φ, σ, µ) in which both total dispersion and agglomeration are stable
outcomes. Consider the point in parameter space (φ, σ, µ) =
(
3
5 , 5,
2
5
)
. At this point, we
have α < 0 and SP < 0. Therefore, both total dispersion and agglomeration are stable
equilibria. Since α and SP are continuous functions of (φ, σ, µ), they remain negative
in an open neighbourhood of
(
3
5 , 5,
2
5
)
.
16If both equilibria are to be simultaneously stable, we must have SP (φb) < 0, ∀(µ, σ). This seems
to be the case. However, nonlinearity of SP (φ) prevents us from demonstrating this analytically.
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Figure 3.3 – Surfaces SP = 0 (top) and α = 0 (bottom) in parameter space.
Agglomeration and total dispersion are both stable between the two surfaces,
where we have SP < 0 and α < 0.
3.5.1.2 In the n-region FE model
In the n-region FE model, it also seems that, for any given values of n, µ and σ, there
always exist values of the freeness-of-trade parameter that render total dispersion and
agglomeration simultaneously stable, i.e., we always have φs < φb.
Using the analytical expressions for α and SP in (3.21) and (3.23) for a grid of values
of µ, σ we have always obtained a region in (n, φ) space where we have simultaneity of
agglomeration and dispersion.
Our results are summarized in the pictures portrayed in Figure 3.4 and Figure
3.5. They depict α and SP , in (φ, n) space and (φ, n, µ) space, respectively.17 In
the former, we set both µ and σ. The region between the dashed lines corresponds to
both SP (φ, n) < 0 and α(φ, n) < 0, which implies simultaneity of agglomeration and
total dispersion. The pictures show strong evidence that this simultaneity always exists
whatever the number of regions. Moreover, the scope for simultaneity, captured by the
17The choice to fix σ was due to the fact that our simulations evidenced invariance of the results in
the choice of values for this parameter.
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Figure 3.4 – Depiction of α(φ, n) and SP (φ, n). Between the dashed lines we
have α(φ, n) < 0 ∩ SP (φ, n) < 0, thus φs < φb and there is locational hysteresis.
Parameter values: σ = 5, µ = 0.4;
difference φb−φs, seems to be very low, either when there are very few regions or when
there are too many.
Figure 3.5 – Depiction of the surfaces α(φ, n, µ) = 0 and SP (φ, n, µ) = 0 for σ = 4.
Between the surfaces we have α(φ, n, µ) < 0 ∩ SP (φ, n, µ) < 0, thus φs < φb and
there is locational hysteresis.
The latter picture only fixes σ and contains the surfaces α(φ, n, µ) = 0 and SP (φ, n, µ) =
0. In between, α and SP are both negative, so agglomeration and dispersion are both
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stable. For given µ, σ and n, evidence suggests that SP (φb) < 0; thus, there always
exist values of φ for which total dispersion and agglomeration are simultaneously sta-
ble. In this sense, temporary decreases in transport costs below the sustain point may
trigger agglomeration in one region permanently.
3.6 Agglomeration under exogenous regional hete-
rogeneity
In this section we let the regions differ in terms of their endowments of farmers. As a
result, we are introducing exogenous regional differences such that now each Li may be
different from Lj, i 6= j. Take full agglomeration in region i. From (3.15), regional price
indices remain unchanged compared to the symmetric case: Pi = βσ1−σ
(
α
H(n)
) 1
σ−1 ; Pj =
βσ
1−σ
(
α
H(n)φ
) 1
σ−1 . Nominal wages are determined by (3.13) and by the adapted version
of (3.14):
Yi = Li + wiHi. (3.26)
We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.10. Agglomeration in region i is stable if:
wi
maxLj∈S\{i} {wj}
> φ
µ
σ−1 .
Proof. Since regional prices are remain unchanged, Lemma 3.3 asserts that agglomera-
tion is stable if:
wi
P µi
> max
Lj∈S\{i}
{
wj
P µj
}
⇔ wimaxLj∈S\{i} {wj}
>
(
Pi
Pj
)µ
⇔ wimaxLj∈S\{i} {wj}
> φ
µ
σ−1 ,
concluding the proof.
Proposition 3.11. Agglomeration is stable under exogenous asymmetries if:
AA ≡ σφ− φ µσ−1
lm (µ (φ2 − 1)+ σ)+ n∑
j 6=i,m
ljφ(µ(φ− 1) + σ) + liσφ2
 < 0, (3.27)
where lm = (max {Lj}) /L(n); lj = Lj/L(n), for j 6= {i,m}; and li = Li/L(n).
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Proof. See Appendix E.
The peripheral region with the highest nominal wage wm is the region with the hig-
hest fraction of farmers (see Appendix E). Inspection of (3.27) shows that agglomeration
becomes more likely as Li increases, and less likely as Lm and Lj decrease.
From Appendix E, we get the entrepreneur’s nominal wage at the core region:
wi =
µL(n)
H(n)(µ− σ) =
µ
(
lm +
∑n
j 6=i,m lj + li
)
H(µ− σ) . (3.28)
The entrepeneur’s nominal and real wage at the core is the same as if the regions
were symmetric but now L is distributed differently across the regions. An increase in
the number of farmers in any of the regions impacts the core’s nominal wage with the
same positive magnitude, as can be seen from (3.28).
From the proof of Proposition 6.2 (see Appendix E), the highest peripheral nominal
wage, wm ≡ max {wj} is given by:
wm =
µ
(
lm (µ (φ2 − 1) + σ) +∑nj 6=i,m ljφ(µ(φ− 1) + σ) + liσφ2)
Hσφ(σ − µ) . (3.29)
After careful inspection of (3.29), an increase in the number of farmers in any region
also increases wm, but increases in the number of farmers in the peripheral regions has
a higher impact.
Let us now take the nominal wage ratio using (3.28) and (3.29):
wi
wm
=
(
lm +
∑n
j 6=i,m lj + li
)
σφ
lm (µ (φ2 − 1) + σ) +∑nj 6=i,m ljφ(µ(φ− 1) + σ) + liσφ2 .
The wage ratio is increasing in li and decreasing in lm and lj, as expected, which makes
agglomeration more (less) likely as li (resp. lm, lj) increases. The economic intuition
does not stray from that given in section 5. In fact, the present case encompasses
the symmetric one, as an increase in li or a decrease in lm decreases the entrepreneur’s
relative nominal (and real) wage in the periphery m, i.e., the periphery with the highest
nominal (real) wage. Analogous reasoning in the symmetric case would be to consider
an increase in the number of regions and resulting decrease in a periphery’s lj = 1/n.
Both cases lead to a strengthening of the agglomerative outcome.
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3.7 Conclusion
Building on the 2-region FE model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), we have obtained
both analytical and numerical results from a FE model with an arbitrary number of
equidistant regions. We have shown that an increase in the number of regions, other
things being equal, favours stability of agglomeration and hinders stability of total
dispersion. This happens because the amount of immobile unskilled workforce per
region decreases which in turn diminishes its role as a dispersive force. In the limit,
when the number of regions tends to infinity, agglomeration becomes the unique stable
equilibrium.
Upon introducing exogenous asymmetries in the regional distribution of unskilled
labour, we have concluded that market size effects operate through the nominal (hence
real) wages in a way such that an increase in unskilled labour in the core region streng-
thens the stability of agglomeration. The same happens if unskilled labour in the
peripheral regions is decreased. This is what actually happens in the symmetric case
when the number of regions increases.
We have also provided numerical evidence that strongly suggests that dispersion
of entrepreneurs between two regions is never stable in a model with more than two
regions, where it corresponds to an outcome of partial dispersion.
Finally, we have found numerical evidence in that, for every triple (µ, σ, n), there
exists φ ∈ (0, 1) where agglomeration and total dispersion can be simultaneously stable,
though this outcome is relatively unlikely. This means that, like the 2-region model, the
FE model with more regions exhibits a core-periphery pattern based on a “subcritical
pitchfork” bifurcation. The scope for multiplicity of equilibria seems to be lower if the
number of regions is either very high or very low.
These results are in the same direction as those obtained by Castro et al. (2012)
for the CP model with three regions. Through the more tractable framework of the
FE model we were able to obtain explicit solutions for the wages of entrepreneurs and
show that most key features of Krugman’s seminal CP model are likely to hold in a
multi-regional set-up.
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3.A - Nominal wage in the 3-region model
Proof of Proposition 3.1. After (3.13) and (3.14), for n = 3, we have the following
linear system of equations:
w1
(
1− µ
σ
H1
R1
)
− w2
(
µ
σ
φH2
R2
)
− w3
(
µ
σ
φH3
R3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
(
1
R1
+ φ
R2
+ φ
R3
)
w1
(
−µ
σ
φH1
R1
)
+ w2
(
1− µ
σ
H2
R2
)
− w3
(
µ
σ
φH3
R3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
(
φ
R1
+ 1
R2
+ φ
R3
)
w1
(
−µ
σ
φH1
R1
)
− w2
(
µ
σ
φH2
R2
)
+ w3
(
1− µ
σ
φH3
R3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
(
φ
R1
+ φ
R2
+ 1
R3
)
,
where Rj ≡
3∑
m=1
φmjHm. This may be written in matrix form as AW = B, where A stands
for the coefficients matrix, W the vector of nominal wages wi, while B is the column
vector of independent terms in the right-hand side of the system of equations above.
Applying Cramer’s Rule, the solution to this system is of the following form:
wi =
Dwi
D
,
where the denominator D stands for the determinant of matrix A and Dwi is the
determinant of the matrix obtained by replacing the i-th column of A by the column
vector B. We have:
D = 1− µ
σ
3∑
j=1
Hj
Rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(
1− φ2)(H1H2
R1R2
+ H1H3
R1R3
+ H2H3
R2R3
)
− µ
3
σ3
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) 3∏
j=1
Hj
Rj
.
For i = 1, Dw1 is given by:
Dw1 =
µ
σ
L
3

 3∑
j=1
φ1j
Rj
+ µ
σ
[
φ (φ− 1) H2 +H3
R2R3
+ φ
2 − 1
R1
(
H2
R2
+ H3
R3
)]
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) H2H3
R1R2R3
}
The expression for the nominal wage in region 1 is:
w1 =
µ
σ
L
3
{∑3
j=1
φ1j
Rj
+ µ
σ
[
φ (φ− 1) H2 +H3
R2R3
+ φ
2 − 1
R1
(
H2
R2
+ H3
R3
)]
+ µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1
) H2H3
R1R2R3
}
1− µ
σ
∑3
j=1
Hj
Rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(1− φ2)
(
H1H2
R1R2
+ H1H3
R1R3
+ H2H3
R2R3
)
− µ
3
σ3
(2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1)
∏3
j=1
Hj
Rj
.
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Generically,
wi =
µ
σ
L
3

3∑
j=1
φij
Rj
+ µ
σ
φ (φ− 1)
∑
k 6=i
Hk∏
k 6=i
Rk
+ φ
2 − 1
Ri
∑
k 6=i
Hk
Rk
+ µ2σ2 (2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) 1Ri∏
k 6=i
Hk
Rk

1− µ
σ
3∑
j=1
Hj
Rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(1− φ2)
(
H1H2
R1R2
+ H1H3
R1R3
+ H2H3
R2R3
)
− µ
3
σ3
(2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1)
3∏
j=1
Hj
Rj
.

3.B - Jacobian and total dispersion
As a prerequisite to Proposition 3.2, establishing the stability of total dispersion, we
have the following Lemma.
Lemma. B.1 Concerning total dispersion: (i) The Jacobian matrix of the system in
(3.19) has a repeated real eigenvalue with multiplicity n− 1 given by:
α ≡ ∂ωi
∂hi
(
1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
,
and (ii) the equilibrium is stable if α is negative.
Proof. An element of the Jacobian is given by:
Jii =
∂ωi
∂hi
− ∂ω¯
∂hi
.
We will show that ∂hiω¯ = 0, ∀i at total dispersion.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that ∂h1ω¯ > 0. Then ω¯( 1n + ε,
1
n
, ...., 1
n
) >
ω¯( 1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
) > ω¯( 1
n
− ε, 1
n
, ...., 1
n
).18 However, the model’s symmetry asserts that ω¯
is invariant in the permutation of any hi and hj, i 6= j, and thus also h1 and hn. Hence,
ω¯( 1
n
− ε, 1
n
, ...., 1
n
) > ω¯( 1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
), and we arrive at a contradiction. As a result, we
have J11 = ∂h1ω1.Moreover, symmetry implies that ∂h1ω1 = ∂h2ω2 = . . . = ∂hn−1ωn−1 at
18Changes in any hi are reflected symmetrically in hn , which is however only implicitly defined.
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total dispersion. This leads to the conclusion that J11 = J22 = . . . = Jn−1,n−1, implying
that Jii = α = ∂hiωi.
We will next show that all elements outside the main diagonal are zero at total
dispersion. An element outside the main diagonal is given by:
Jij =
∂ωi
∂hj
− ∂ω¯
∂hj
We have seen that ∂hiω¯ = 0 at total dispersion. Assume, again by way of contra-
diction, that ∂h2ω1 > 0 at total dispersion. It must follow that ω1( 1n ,
1
n
+ ε, 1
n
, ...., 1
n
) >
ω1( 1n ,
1
n
, ..., 1
n
) > ω1( 1n ,
1
n
− ε, 1
n
, ...., 1
n
). However, the real wage ω in one region is inva-
riant in the permutation of coordinates in any of the other n − 1 regions. Therefore
we have ω1( 1n ,
1
n
+ ε, 1
n
, ...., 1
n
) = ω1( 1n ,
1
n
− ε, 1
n
, ...., 1
n
) and arrive at a contradiction. It
must follow that ∂h2ω1 = 0. Symmetry established analogous results for every ∂hjωi at
total dispersion. As a result, we have Jij = 0,∀i 6= j. Hence, the Jacobian matrix at
total dispersion is a scalar multiple of the identity, αI, where:
α ≡ ∂ωi
∂hi
(
1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
.
Thus, α is the n − 1 repeated eigenvalue of the matrix. The symmetric equilibrium is
stable if it is negative, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We compute ∂w1/∂h1 at total dispersion while avoiding
having to solve a system of n− 1 linear equations using just two wage equations from
(3.16), e.g., for w1 and wn. The reason is that, after lemma B.1, there are n− 2 wages
equal to wj for which ∂wj/∂h1 = 0. As a result, we still have w1 and wn that depend
on h1. We have:

w1
(
1− µ
σ
h1
r1
)
− (n− 2)wj µ
σ
φ
(
1/n
rj
)
− wn
(
µ
σ
φ
2
n
− h1
rn
)
= 1
H(n)
µ
σ
L(n)
n
(
1
r1
+ (n− 2) φ
rj
+ φ
rn
)
−w1
(
µ
σ
φ
h1
r1
)
− (n− 2)wj µ
σ
φ
(
1/n
rj
)
+ wn
(
1− µ
σ
2
n
− h1
rn
)
= 1
H(n)
µ
σ
L(n)
n
(
φ
r1
+ (n− 2) φ
rj
+ 1
rn
)
,
(3.30)
where r1 = h1 + φn−2n + φ
(
2
n
− h1
)
, rj = 1n +
(n−1)φ
n
and rn = h1φ− h1 + (n−2)φn + 2n .
Using any of the equations in (3.30) we can easily find the nominal wage at total
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dispersion:
wi( 1n ,
1
n
, ..., 1
n
) = µL(n)
H(n)(σ − µ) .
In order to compute the derivative ∂h1w1, we should first solve the second equation in
(3.30) for wn and replace it in the first one to obtain:
w1 = −
µ (h1(φ− 1)− φ)
(
(n− 2)φwj (−h1n(φ− 1)(µ− σ) + 2µ(φ− 1) + σ((n− 2)φ + 2)) + L(n)H(n)n(h1(φ−1)−φ)Φ(h1, φ, n)
)
((n− 1)φ + 1) (h1(φ− 1) (h1n− 2) (µ− σ)(φ(µ + σ) + µ− σ) + σφ(σ((n− 2)φ + 2)− 2µ))
,
where:
Φ(h1, φ, n) ≡ h1n(φ− 1)
(
−h1(n− 2)n(φ− 1)φ(µ− σ) + µ + µ
(
n
2 + n− 5
)
φ
2 − µ(n− 4)φ− σ(φ− 1)((n− 3)φ− 1)
)
−
−2µ(φ− 1)(φ(((n− 1)n− 1)φ + n) + 1) + σ(φ(n(−φ(((n− 3)n + 3)φ + 3(n− 2))− 3)− 2φ + 4)− 2.
This, together with the knowledge that ∂wj/∂h1 = 0 at total dispersion enables us to
find ∂w1/∂h1 at total dispersion. After some manipulation, we get:
∂w1
∂h1
( 1
n ,
1
n , ...,
1
n
)
= µL(n)n(φ− 1)(µ+ µ(n− 1)φ+ σ(φ− 1))
H(n)(µ− σ)((n− 1)φ+ 1)(µ(φ− 1) + (n− 1)σφ+ σ) .
By (3.15), we have:
∂P µ1 /∂h1
P µ1
= µn(φ− 1)(σ − 1)((n− 1)φ+ 1) .
We can then compute the derivative of the real wage in region 1 with respect to h1 :
∂ω1
∂h1
( 1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
) =
µL(n)n(φ− 1)
(
µ2(φ− 1) + µ(2σ − 1)((n− 1)φ+ 1) + (σ − 1)σ(φ− 1)
)
H(n)(σ − 1)(µ− σ)((n− 1)φ+ 1)((µ+ (n− 1)σφ+ σ − µ)) .
Note that the denominator is negative as is the factor (φ−1) in the numerator. Hence,
the sign of the derivative is equal to the sign of:
BP (φ) ≡ µ2(φ− 1) + µ(2σ − 1)((n− 1)φ+ 1) + (σ − 1)σ(φ− 1)
which is a linear function of φ with positive coefficient. Equating BP (φ) to zero and
solving for φ gives us:
φb ≡ (µ− σ)(µ− σ + 1)
µ2 + µ(n− 1)(2σ − 1) + (σ − 1)σ ,
and total dispersion is stable if φ is below this threshold, thus concluding the proof.
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3.C - Jacobian and partial dispersion
The following result concerns partial dispersion (but can also be applied to total dis-
persion).
Lemma. C.1 Configurations of the form hj = 1−hi2 , with 0 ≤ hi ≤ 1, satisfy ∂ω¯∂hj = 0.
Proof. We may look at configurations of the form (b, ..., b, a, a), where a = (1 − b)/2
and b ∈ [0, 1]. Note that if b = 1/n we have full dispersion. Assume, without loss of
generality, that i = 2. Suppose ∂ω¯
∂h2
(b, ..., b, a, a) 6= 0. Assume it is positive. Then
ω¯(b, ..., b, a+ ε, a− ε) > ω¯(b, a, a).
But, ω¯ is invariant by the permutation that interchanges identically populated regions
and therefore
ω¯(b, ..., b, a− ε, a+ ε) > ω¯(b, a, a)
indicating that ∂ω¯
∂h2
< 0, which contradicts the assumption and finishes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. First, since hj = 0 for j = {2, ..., n−1}, by similar arguments
as those in the proof of Lemma 3.3, we have the following necessary condition for
stability of partial dispersion:
ω1 > ωj.
Second, we need to ensure not only that hj will remain zero but also that both h1
and hn will remain at 12 . If any of the skilled workers migrates, e.g. to region 2, we
need them to want to return to region 1 (symmetry implies the same in the opposite
direction). This is achieved when an increase in h1 leads to a decrease in the difference
between the real wage ω1 and the real wage average ω¯:
∂ω1
∂h1
(
1
2 , 0
)
− ∂ω¯
∂h1
(
1
2 , 0
)
< 0.
However, since we have h1 = 1−h22 at
(
1
2 , 0
)
, Lemma 3.7 asserts that ∂ω¯
∂h1
(
1
2 , 0
)
= 0. As
a result, the second condition reduces to
∂ω1
∂h1
(hp) < 0.
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If the first condition fails to hold, partial dispersion is unstable. 
Proof of Proposition 3.6. First, we determine the nominal wages in regions 1 and
n at partial dispersion. For regions 1 and n we use equation (3.16) to get:
w1 (hp) = wn (hp) =
µL(n)
H(n)(σ − µ) .
As for the other j regions we have:
wj (hp) =
µL(n)
(
n
(
2µφ2
σ−µ + φ+ 1
)
+ 2(φ− 1)(2φ+ 1)
)
H(n)nσφ(φ+ 1) .
Then, the first condition for stability of partial dispersion requires:
w1
wj
>
(
P1
Pj
)µ
⇐⇒
nσφ(φ+ 1)
µ(n− 2)(φ− 1)(2φ+ 1) + σ ((n− 2)φ+ n+ 4φ2 − 2) >
( 2φ
1 + φ
) µ
σ−1 ⇐⇒
µ(n− 2)(φ− 1)(2φ+ 1) + σ
[
2(φ− 1)(2φ+ 1)− n(φ+ 1)
(
φ2
µ
1−σ
(
φ
φ+ 1
) µ
1−σ − 1
)]
< 0.
Rewriting it, we obtain:
γ ≡ σ(1 + φ)
[
1− φ1− µσ−1
(1 + φ
2
) µ
σ−1
]
n− [2σ + µ(n− 2)] (1− φ)(2φ+ 1) < 0,
thus concluding the first part of the proof.
In order to determine the second condition, we follow an approach analogous to that
of the proof of Proposition 3.2 in Appendix B, selecting two wage equations from (3.16)
and using lemma B.1 to state that only w1 and wn depend on h1:
w1
(
1− µ
σ
h1
h1 + φ(1− h1)
)
− wn
(
µ
σ
φ(1− h1)
φh1 + 1− h1
)
= µL(n)
σnH(n)
( 1
h1 + φ(1− h1)
+ n− 2 + φ
φh1 + 1− h1
)
wn
(
1− µ
σ
1− h1
φh1 + 1− h1
)
− w1
(
µ
σ
φh1
h1 + φ(1− h1)
)
= µL(n)
σnH(n)
(
φ
h1 + φ(1− h1)
+ n− 2 + 1
φh1 + 1− h1
)
Solving the second equation for wn and replacing in the first we obtain w1 as a function
of h1 :
w1 =
µL (h1(φ− 1) (h1(n− 2)(φ− 1)(µ− σ) + µ(−2nφ + n + 3φ− 3) + (n− 3)σ(φ− 1)) + µ(φ− 1)((n− 1)φ + 1) + σφ(n + φ− 2) + σ)
Hn ((h1 − 1)h1(φ− 1)(µ− σ)(φ(µ + σ) + µ− σ) + σφ(σ − µ))
.
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Taking the derivative with respect to h1 we get:
∂w1
∂h1
=
µL(φ− 1)
(
−2h1
(
φ2(µ + σ)− µ + σ
)
+ h21(φ− 1)(φ(µ + σ) + µ− σ) + φ2(µ + σ)− µ + σφ + σ
)
(µ + µ(n− 1)φ + σ(φ− 1))
H(n)n(µ− σ) (σφ− (h1 − 1)h1(φ− 1)(φ(µ + σ) + µ− σ)) 2
,
which, evaluated at h1 = 1/2, yields:
∂w1
∂h1
(hp) = 4µL(n)(φ− 1)(µ+ µ(n− 1)φ+ σ(φ− 1))
H(n)n(φ+ 1)(µ− σ)(φ(µ+ σ)− µ+ σ) .
Differentiating the price index, by (3.15):
∂P µ1 /∂h1
P µ1
(hp) = 2µ(φ− 1)(σ − 1)(φ+ 1) .
Finally, we can compute the derivative of the real wage in region 1 with respect to h1
at partial dispersion:
∂ω1
∂h1
(hp) =
2(φ− 1)
(
− µ
σ−1 − 2(µ+µ(n−1)φ+σ(φ−1))n(φ(µ+σ)−µ+σ)
)
φ+ 1 ,
which is negative if and only if:
β ≡ µ2n(φ− 1) + µ(σ(3nφ+ n− 2φ+ 2)− 2nφ+ 2φ− 2) + 2(σ − 1)σ(φ− 1) < 0,
which gives us the second condition, concluding the proof. 
3.D - Comparing models
Proof of Proposition 3.8. In the n-region model, the core-periphery price index
ratio equals: (
Pi
Pj
)µ
= φ
µ
σ−1 ,
which does not depend on the number of regions and proves part (i) of the proposition.
The nominal wage in the core region i is given by:
wi =
µL(n)
(σ − µ)H(n) .
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The peripheral nominal wage is equal to:
wj =
µL(n)(µ(φ− 1)((n− 1)φ+ 1) + σφ(n+ φ− 2) + σ)
H(n)nσφ(σ − µ)
The wage ratio is given by:
wi
wj
= nσ
µ(φ− 1)((n− 1)φ+ 1) + σφ(n+ φ− 2) + σ ,
which one can check to be increasing in n, as:
∂ (wi/wj)
∂n
= σ(φ− 1)
2(σ − µ)
(µ(φ− 1)((n− 1)φ+ 1) + σφ(n+ φ− 2) + σ)2 ,
thus concluding the final part of the proof.
Appendix E - Exogenous asymmetries
Proof of Proposition 3.11. At concentration in region i, we have, after (3.13):
wi =
µL(n)
H(n)(σ − µ) ,
which means that the core’s nominal wage is still the same.
As for the peripheral regions, let Lm = arg maxLj∈S\{i} {wj}. Then:
wm ≡ max
Lj∈S\{i}
{wj} =
µ
(
Lm (µ (φ2 − 1) + σ) +∑nj 6=i,m Ljφ(µ(φ− 1) + σ) + Liσφ2)
H(n)σφ(σ − µ) .
Clearly, it follows that Lm = maxj∈S\{i} {Lj}. The nominal wage ratio is given by:
wi
wm
= L(n)σφ
Lm (µ (φ2 − 1) + σ) +∑nj 6=i,m Ljφ(µ(φ− 1) + σ) + Liσφ2 .
Given the ratio between price indices, agglomeration is stable if:
AA ≡ µ
L(n)σφ− φ µσ−1
Lm (µ (φ2 − 1)+ σ)+ n∑
j 6=i,m
Ljφ(µ(φ− 1) + σ) + Liσφ2
 < 0,
thus concluding the proof. 
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Chapter 4
Agglomeration patterns in a
multi-regional economy without
income effects
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4.1 Introduction
New Economic Geography (NEG) has been on the forefront in recent decades as an
economics subject that seeks to explain the spatial distribution of economic activity.
Many theoretical models have been built along the lines of the seminal Core-Periphery
(CP) model (Krugman, 1991), in which skilled labour mobility combined with a general
equilibrium framework under increasing returns, monopolistic competition and trans-
port costs contribute to explain how demand linkages and supply linkages interplay to
determine the geographical distribution of industry. Other NEG models have built on
the original CP model trying to improve on the former’s tractability and attempting to
reach new insights (Fujita et al., 1999; Ottaviano et al., 2002; Forslid and Ottaviano,
2003; Pflüger, 2004).
Among many of the common features and results, one that we find empirically
hard to justify is the prediction of catastrophic agglomeration, from an evenly disper-
sed distribution, into a single region as transport costs fall below a certain level. One
exception is Pflüger’s Quasi-Linear Log (QLLog) model (Pflüger, 2004), where the ab-
sence of income effects on regional demand for manufactures, due to the assumption of
a quasi-linear upper-tier utility function, significantly simplifies stability analysis. This
model reverses the predictions of the seminal CP model by Krugman (1991) that indu-
stry is doomed to stay dispersed among two symmetric regions or fully agglomerated
in one region. What is more, catastrophic agglomeration is ruled out as transport costs
fall below some threshold level, and thus agglomeration is rather a smooth and gra-
dual process. This means that there is some scope for stable asymmetric distribution
of industry in the 2-region QLLog model, contrarily to the predictions of many NEG
models.1
Although insightful, the lack of a multi-regional framework in the QLLog model
potentially overlooks complex interdependencies among different regions, which do not
arise in the 2-region set-up (Fujita et al., 1999; Fujita and Mori, 2005; Tabuchi et al.,
2005; Behrens and Thisse, 2007; Fujita and Thisse, 2009; Behrens and Robert-Nicoud,
1The importance of preferences and how these operate to influence long-run dynamics of industry
in the space economy are widely discussed in the paper by Pflüger and Südekum (2008a), where the
authors discuss qualitative migration pattern changes across different CP models.
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2011; Tabuchi, 2014). Moreover, the often assumed one-dimensional geography in NEG
hinders any serious empirical work on the field, since the latter typically faces a more
heterogeneous and multi-regional setting in the real world (Bosker et al., 2010). A
number of different extensions of NEG models to a multi-regional set-up have been
made so far, each with its own specificities. Some attempts focus on the role of hetero-
geneous distances between regions, such as the “Racetrack Economy” where regions are
equally spaced around a circumference (Krugman, 1993; Fujita et al., 1999; Picard and
Tabuchi, 2010; Mossay (2013). Heterogeneity in location space has also been tackled
in other papers, such as the role of different network topologies to explain locational
advantages of some regions (Barbero and Zofío, 2012), equally spaced regions along a
line segment (Ago et al., 2006), or hexagonal configurations (Ikeda and Murota, 2014).
Along different lines, Oyama (2009) considered an equidistant multi-regional CP model
with self-fulfilling expectations in migration that lead to global stability of a single core
region in the presence of exogenous asymmetries. Other works, such as Tabuchi and
Thisse (2011), have built an NEG model that accounts for the rise of a hierarchical
system of central places in a multi-regional set-up. Castro et al. (2012) studied a ver-
sion of Krugman’s CP model with 3 and more regions and concluded that additional
regions favour single-region agglomeration and discourage the dispersion of economic
activities. Akamatsu et al. (2012) and Ikeda et al. (2012) used a 2n-region CP model
to show that decreasing transport costs leads to spatial period doubling agglomeration,
whereby the number of regions (cities) in which firms locate is reduced by half and
the spacing between each evenly agglomerated regions doubles after each bifurcation.
Among these contributions, several other works considering multi-regional NEG models
are worth mentioning (e.g., Behrens et al., 2006; Forslid and Okubo, 2012; Tabuchi,
2014; Fabinger, 2015; Commendatore et al., 2015a).2
Many of the original main conclusions and implications of most 2-region NEG mo-
dels have been seldom challenged. As an example, Bosker et al. (2010) show that most
conclusions from 2-region NEG models hold under more realistic settings. This inclu-
des not only the extension to the equidistant multi-regional case, as they argue using
the paper by Puga (1999) as benchmark, but also the consideration of non-equidistant
2While it is not our purpose to provide an extensive overview of the literature concerning multi-
regional models, we refer the reader to the review of Commendatore et al. (2015b).
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regions. A notable difference, however, is that, in the second case, exogenous asym-
metries gives rise to the possibility of spatial distributions other than agglomeration or
dispersion. Recently, Tabuchi (2014) has used a multi-regional version of Krugman’s
(1991) CP model to show that it can account for the historical trend of agglomeration
in the capital regions over the past few centuries.
This motivates us to extend the QLLog model by Pflüger (2004) to an arbitrary
number of equidistant regions. Its simplicity allows us to obtain analytical expressions
for the indirect utilities of the inter-regionally mobile skilled workers in each region. One
of the most important features of our paper is that the assumption of equidistance does
not conflict with the existence of asymmetric spatial distributions. In fact, we uncover
novel spatial distributions that do not emerge in the 2-region setting. Therefore, while
exogenous asymmetries may help explain observed spatial imbalances, they should not
be seen as the only factors causing asymmetries in the distribution of economic activity.
Second, the assumption of equidistant regions coupled with the removal of income ef-
fects for the demand of manufactured good allows us to obtain explicit expressions for
the indirect utilities of the inter-regionally mobile workers and, thus, to fully characte-
rize the stability of several kinds of spatial equilibria under general parameter values.3
Moreover, our model is rich enough that we are able to study how long-run transitions
from dispersion to agglomeration depend not only on the change in transportation costs,
but also on the global size of the inter-regionally immobile (unskilled) workforce relative
to mobile (skilled) labour.4 Tabuchi et al. (2005) also developed a multi-region model
with equidistant regions and quasi-linear utility, but considered quadratic sub-utility,
as in Ottaviano et al. (2002), instead of CES, as in Pflüger (2004). They also consider
urban congestion costs (housing and commuting), which act as an additional dispersion
force. Studying the impact of falling transport costs on the size and number of cities
(non-empty regions), they find that cities initially grow in size, and then shrink at a
later stage, a situation which corresponds to agglomeration followed by re-dispersion
of industry. Their results are driven by the interplay between inter-regional transport
3Noteworthy, this is an important departure from Tabuchi’s (2014) multi-regional framework, who
focuses on stability analysis in limit cases for transportation costs.
4This is captured by a parameter that also exists in Pflüger’s model, but whose influence in the
spatial distributions is enhanced by the addition of an arbitrary number of regions.
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costs and intra-regional urban congestion costs. In contrast, our results do not hinge
on the existence of urban congestion costs.
In Castro et al. (2012) and Gaspar et al. (2013), the authors provided numerical
evidence that in CP models (resp. 3-region CP model and 3-region Footloose En-
trepreneur model) a configuration bearing a region without industry and two evenly
populated regions could not be a stable outcome. Using the QLLog model, we provide
an analytical confirmation of this result, extending it to an arbitrary number of regions;
that is, at least one empty region paired with a set of evenly distributed regions cannot
be a stable outcome.
Another feature of the n-region QLLog model is that interior asymmetric distribu-
tions of industry may arise. For simplicity, we focus on the particular one-dimensional
subspace of n− 1 evenly populated regions and one region with any industry size.5 For
these distributions, entrepreneurs face two decisions: that of migrating between any
of the evenly populated regions; and that of migrating between the smaller (bigger)
region and any of the other evenly distributed regions. This is true for n ≥ 3 because
the dimension of this particular sub-space is invariant in the number of regions. 6
We show that an asymmetric equilibrium where one region has comparatively less
industry than the other regions cannot be stable. This happens because an entrepreneur
who migrates between any of the evenly distributed regions will see his utility rise,
leading to further migration to the receiving region which, having now become the
largest, will attract more and more entrepreneurs up unto the point where that region
will eventually become an industrialized core.
We show that the QLLog model with n ≥ 3 exhibits a primary transcritical bi-
furcation at the symmetric equilibrium and a secondary saddle-node bifurcation that
branches from an interior asymmetric equilibrium, a feature which suggests that struc-
tural changes in the migration dynamics of entrepreneurs as transport costs decrease is
more complex than previously thought. This has important implications in the tran-
5In an equidistant n-region model, there are many other invariant spaces. For instance, a more
general invariant subspace is one whereby k regions share the same industry size a/k and the other
n−k regions each have a share equal to (1−a)/(n−k). We focus on the particular case corresponding
to k = 1.
6In a 2-region model, there is only one single decision because “moving away from one region
automatically implies that workers and firms necessarily go to the other” (Tabuchi et al., 2005).
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sition towards more agglomerated equilibria as transport costs steadily decrease. The
existence of a saddle-node bifurcation implies that industry will stay fully dispersed
even after transport costs have fallen below some threshold level that would deem a
partial agglomerative equilibrium stable. However, if the industry is initially at some
partial agglomeration equilibrium, a temporary rise in transportation costs will force
the industry to permanently fully disperse across regions.
We find that, along a smooth parameter path where transport costs decrease, the
transition from symmetric dispersion to agglomeration depends on the global size of
the inter-regionally immobile (unskilled) labour relative to mobile (skilled) labour. If
this ratio is very high (low worker mobility), there is immediate catastrophic agglo-
meration of skilled workers in one single region once dispersion loses stability. If the
ratio is low (high worker mobility), there is a discontinuous jump from dispersion to
a partially agglomerated equilibrium, and a smooth transition towards agglomeration
thereafter. Finally, for sufficiently low values of the global unskilled to skilled worker
ratio, dispersion is not possible, and the only possible structural change as transport
costs steadily fall is that of a smooth transition from partial agglomeration towards full
agglomeration.
We find that the symmetric equilibrium yields the worst possible welfare to entre-
preneurs. Still, even if migrating increases their average utility across all regions, the
utility of the migrant decreases when dispersive forces outweigh agglomerative forces.
For the immobile workers it is quite the opposite: farmers attain their highest welfare
at symmetric dispersion. For the population as a whole, we show that agglomeration
(partial or full), even when stable, may be socially inferior to more symmetric spa-
tial distributions. We thus conclude that the multi-regional QLLog model exhibits a
tendency towards over-agglomeration for intermediate levels of transport costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the n-region FE
model with quasi-linear log utility and discusses the short-run equilibrium of the mo-
del. Section 3 is the first part of the study of long-run equilibria, where the focus lies
on local stability analysis of some particular configurations. One goal is to study full
agglomeration and total dispersion to find how stability changes with the number of
regions. Second, we want to study whether partial agglomeration patterns are now
stable (contrary to the results of Fujita et al., 1999; Castro et al., 2012; and Gaspar et
al., 2013). We try to fully determine the number of interior equilibria along some inva-
riant spaces in order to study their local stability. Bifurcation patterns are accounted
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for in section 4. In section 5 we study social welfare in the QLLog model at different
possible distributions, first disentangling between mobile and immobile workers, and
then studying the economy as a whole. Section 6 is left for some concluding remarks.
4.2 The Quasi-linear log model with n regions
Many derivations in this model are a combination of those present in Forslid and Ottavi-
ano (2003), Pflüger (2004) and Gaspar et al. (2013). As a result, for the sake of presen-
tation, we omit calculations whenever reasonable. The set of regions is N = {1, ..., n}.
The masses of entrepreneurs and farmers are, respectively, H and L. Entrepreneurs
can move freely among regions (H = H1 + H2 + ... + Hn), while farmers are immobile
and evenly distributed among the regions (Li = L/n,∀i ∈ N).
4.2.1 Demand and indirect utility
As in Pflüger (2004), the representative consumer of region i ∈ N faces a translog
quasi-linear upper-tier utility function:
Ui = µ lnMi + Ai, 0 < µ < 1 (4.1)
where Ai is the consumption of agricultural products in region i and Mi is the con-
sumption of a CES composite of differentiated varieties of manufactures in region i,
defined by:
Mi =
[ˆ
sS
di(s)
σ−1
σ ds
] σ
σ−1
, (4.2)
where di(s) is consumption of variety s of manufactures in region i, S is the mass of exis-
ting varieties, and σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between manufactured
varieties. The regional price index Pi associated with (4.2) equals:
Pi =
 n∑
j=1
ˆ
sS
pji(s)1−σds

1
1−σ
. (4.3)
Let pji(s) and dji(s) denote the price and individual demand in region i of a variety, s,
that is produced in region j. Consumers in each region i maximize utility subject to
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the budget constraint:
Yi = PiMi + Ai,
where Pi is given by (4.3) and the price of the agricultural good is, as usual, normalized
to unity. This yields the following demand functions:
dij(s) = µ
pij(s)−σ
P 1−σi
, Mi = µP−1i , Ai = Yi − µ. (4.4)
Individual consumption of the agricultural good is positive if and only if µ < 1 (for
farmers), which is true, and wi > µ (for entrepreneurs).7
Using the upper-tier utility in (4.1) and the optimal consumptions of Mi and Ai in
(4.4), we reach the consumer’s indirect utility:
Vi = Yi − µ lnPi + µ(lnµ− 1). (4.5)
4.2.2 Supply
The agricultural good is produced using one unit of unskilled labour (farmers) for
each unit that is produced (constant returns to scale), and is freely traded across the
n regions. Absence of transport costs implies that its price is the same everywhere
(pA1 = pA2 = ... = pAn ). Furthermore, under marginal cost pricing: pAi = wLi . Con-
sequently, there is farmer’s wage equalization among regions, wL1 = wL2 = ... = wLn .
By choosing the agricultural good as numeraire, we can set pAi = wLi = 1,∀i. We are
assuming that the agricultural good is produced in all regions. This holds if global
expenditure on agricultural goods exceeds the total production of Ai in n− 1 regions.
Given regional demand in (4.4), global expenditure on agricultural goods is given by
w¯H + L− (H + L)µ, where:
w¯ =
n∑
j=1
hjwj, (4.6)
7For the particular distributions Hi = H,Hj = 0∀j 6= i, and Hi = H/n,∀i ∈ N , the nominal wage
is wi = µσ (1+
L
H ) (see equation (4.13) in section 2.3). For these distributions, a necessary and sufficient
condition is LH > σ − 1, which we assume to hold. For the minimum wage at any spatial distribution,
a sufficient condition is given by λ > n(σ − 1) (the proof is extensive and we omit it for the sake of
space). We do not assume the latter because it is too restrictive and mostly not necessary for our
results.
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stands for the weighted average nominal wage paid to entrepreneurs. Total production
of agricultural goods in n−1 regions is given by L(n−1)/n. The non-full-specialization
(NFS) condition (Baldwin et al., 2004) is then given by:
µ <
w¯ + λ/n
1 + λ , (4.7)
where λ = L/H where λ = L/H is the global unskilled (immobile) to skilled (mobile)
labour ratio. As such, a higher λ implies a lower worker mobility. We will later show
that w¯ = µ
σ
(1 + λ) . The NFS condition (4.7) then becomes:
µ <
λσ
n (λ+ 1) (σ − 1) .
which we assume to hold henceforth.
Production of a variety of manufactures requires α units of skilled labour and β
units of unskilled labour for each unit that is produced (Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003).
Therefore, the production cost of a firm in region i is:
Ci(xi) = wiα + βxi, (4.8)
where wi is the nominal wage of skilled workers in region i. Let the iceberg cost
parameterτij denote the number of units that must be produced in region i for each
unit that is delivered at region j ∈ N . We assume that transportation costs are
equal between any two (distinct) regions. If i = j, then τij = 1. If i 6= j, then
τij = τ ∈ (1,+∞).
In the industrial sector, the number of varieties manufactured in region i is Si =
Hi/α. A manufacturing firm in region i facing the total cost in (4.8) maximizes the
following profit function:
pii(s) =
n∑
j=1
dij(s)
(
Hj +
L
n
)
(pij(s)− β)− αwi, (4.9)
The first order condition for maximization of (4.9) yields the following pricing equation:
pii(s) = β
σ
σ − 1 and pij(s) = τβ
σ
σ − 1 , j 6= i (4.10)
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Using (4.10), the CES price index (4.3) becomes:
Pi = β
σ
σ − 1
 n∑
j=1
φijSj

1
1−σ
, (4.11)
where φij ≡ τ 1−σij ∈ (0, 1] represents the “freeness of trade” between regions i and j.
Note that when i = j then φij = 1.
4.2.3 Short-run equilibrium
Free entry in the manufacturing industry implies zero profit in equilibrium. As such,
operating profits must totally compensate fixed costs, which must equal the wage bill
paid to entrepreneurs:
αwi =
n∑
j=1
dij
(
Hj +
L
n
)
(pij − β) ,
which becomes, considering the prices in (4.10):
wi =
β
∑n
j=1 dij(s) (Hj + L/n)
α(σ − 1) , (4.12)
Using (4.4), (4.10) and (4.11), and replacing in (4.12) we end up with:
wi =
µ
σ
n∑
j=1
φij (L/n+Hj)∑n
m=1 φmjHm
. (4.13)
In the original Footloose Entrepreneur model (Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003) with in-
come effects, the term inside the first-tier summation would read φijYj, where Yj =
L/n + wjHj would correspond to the regional income that depends on the entrepre-
neurs nominal wage. The simplification due to Pflüger (2004) imposed on Ui removes all
income effects on the demand for manufactures, implying that the entrepreneur’s com-
pensation does not depend on the nominal wage of entrepreneurs residing in different
regions.
We describe the spatial distribution of industry in the economy by working with the
share of entrepreneurs residing in each region i, i.e., hi = Hi/H. The set of possible spa-
tial distributions is the (n−1)-dimensional simplex defined by4 =
{
h ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
i=1 hi = 1
}
.
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In terms of hi, the nominal wage in region i can be expressed as:
wi =
µ
σ
n∑
j=1
φij (λ/n+ hj)∑n
m=1 φmjhm
. (4.14)
The price index may be reformulated as:
Pi = β
σ
1− σ
H
α
n∑
j=1
φijhj

1
1−σ
. (4.15)
The indirect utility Vi becomes, after replacing (4.15) and (4.14) in (4.5):8
Vi =
µ
σ
n∑
j=1
φij (λ/n+ hj)∑n
m=1 φmjhm
+ µ
σ − 1 ln
 n∑
j=1
φijhj
+ η, (4.16)
where η = µ (lnµ− 1)− µ(1− σ)−1 ln [β(σ − 1)−1H/α] is a constant.
Proposition 4.1. The weighted average nominal wage paid to entrepreneurs at any
spatial distribution is given by:
w¯ = µ
σ
(1 + λ). (4.17)
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.3 Long-run equilibria
NEG frequently borrows the evolutionary dynamics from evolutionary game theory used
to study the evolution of states in population games. The popular replicator dynamics
are generally well suited to describe the migration of entrepreneurs when they are short-
sighted (Baldwin et al., 2004). The rate of change of the share of entrepreneurs in a
region i is assumed to be proportional to the difference between region i’s indirect
utility, Vi, and the weighted average utility across all regions, V¯ (h) =
∑n
j=1 hjVj(h).
The dynamical system is thus given by:
h˙i = hi
[
Vi(h)− V¯ (h)
]
, (4.18)
8For an entrepreneur, we have Yi = wi.
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where i ∈ N \ {n}.9
A spatial distribution of entrepreneurs h is said to be an equilibrium if it satisfies
h˙i = 0,∀i ∈ N. The boundaries of 4 are invariant for the dynamics. As a result, if
a region is initially empty of entrepreneurs, it will remain so unless some exogenous
migration to that region occurs.10 Second, every spatial distribution h such that hi =
1/k for k ∈ N regions is an equilibrium.
Our first goal is to study the local stability of equilibria. First, we study full agglo-
meration in a single region i (hi = 1). We then study symmetric dispersion, where the
entrepreneurs are evenly distributed among the n regions (hi = 1/n,∀i). We also study
equilibria whereby entrepreneurs are evenly dispersed among fewer regions. Such confi-
gurations are given by hi = 0 for at least one region i and hj = 1/k for k ∈ {2, ..., n−1}.
We refer to each one of these as boundary dispersion, since hi = 0 for at least one i
implies that the equilibrium is placed at the boundary of the simplex 4.
The last class of equilibria we study throughout this paper are particular asymmetric
interior configurations whereby one region has a share of entrepreneurs h ∈ (0, 1) and
the other n− 1 regions are evenly populated with shares (1− h)/(n− 1). We call this
type of equilibrium partial agglomeration.
4.3.1 Agglomeration
At agglomeration, since the core region i has all the industry, the weighted average
utility equals V¯ = Vi. Agglomeration is thus stable if Vj < V¯ , ∀j ∈ N \ {i}. The
following proposition gives the condition for local stability in parameter space.
Proposition 4.2. Agglomeration is stable if:
(1− φ) [λ(1− φ)− nφ]
nσφ
+ lnφ
σ − 1 < 0. (4.19)
Proof. See Appendix B.
9The dynamics of the nth region are residually given by h˙n = −
(∑n−1
j=1 h˙j
)
.
10This might seem unreasonable if an “empty” region has a positive utility differential. However,
the replicator dynamics are generally used to capture the effect of migration driven by imitation, so
one could simply assume that any entrepreneur would be reluctant to be the first to migrate.
74
Let us the call sustain point φs to the level of φ above which agglomeration is stable.
Rewriting (4.19) in terms of φs, we get:
ln (φs) = −(σ − 1)(1− φ) [λ(1− φ)− nφ]
nσφ
, (4.20)
and agglomeration is stable if φ > φs. The RHS of (4.20) must be negative, otherwise
agglomeration is always stable and condition (4.19) becomes trivial. To rule this out,
we need only consider λ > nφ/(1−φ). It shall be useful for Section 4 to have a stability
condition in terms of λ . Rewriting (4.19), we get:
λ < λs ≡ nφ [(σ − 1)(1− φ)− σ lnφ](σ − 1)(1− φ)2 . (4.21)
That is, agglomeration is stable if the worker mobility is high enough.
4.3.2 Symmetric dispersion
The following proposition establishes a sufficient condition for local stability of disper-
sion of entrepreneurs.
Proposition 4.3. Symmetric dispersion is stable if:
φ < φb ≡ σ(1− λ) + λ
λ+ n− σ (λ+ 2n− 1) . (4.22)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The RHS of (4.22) is called the break point, φb. Substituting n = 2 we recover the
corresponding break point of Pflüger’s (2004) original model.11 If φb < 0, the symmetric
equilibrium can never be stable. Therefore, a common assumption in NEG literature
is that φb > 0 so that stability of symmetric dispersion cannot be precluded. This
sufficient condition is called no black hole and is equivalent to:
λ >
σ
σ − 1 . (4.23)
11Which is φb = −2ρσ+2ρ+σ−2ρσ+2ρ−3σ+2 , with ρ =
λ
2 .
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Since we assume that consumption of the agricultural good is positive at total disper-
sion, it then follows that λ > max
{
σ − 1, σ
σ−1
}
.12
Rewriting the stability condition in (4.22) in terms of λ, we get:
λ > λb ≡ σ(2nφ+ 1− φ)− nφ(σ − 1)(1− φ) . (4.24)
Therefore, stability of dispersion requires a sufficiently high worker mobility.
4.3.3 Boundary dispersion
At boundary dispersion, entrepreneurs are evenly distributed among k ∈ {2, ..., n− 1}
regions. Without loss of generality, suppose that hj = 0 for j = 1, ..., n− k and hj = 1k
for j = n − k + 1, ..., n. Note that these configurations are particular of models with
more than 2 regions. The next result shows that entrepreneurs cannot disperse evenly
along regions while other regions remain empty.
Theorem 4.4. Boundary dispersion is always unstable.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 4.4 provides analytical confirmation of the numerical evidence found in
Fujita et al. (1999), Castro et al. (2012), Gaspar et al. (2013). In their works, the
authors used a Core-Periphery model with 3 (and more) regions to provide numerical
evidence in that border dispersion (resp. partial dispersion) in two regions is always
unstable.13 In the present paper, we further add to the conjecture that industry cannot
disperse evenly among regions if there is at least another region with no industry.
4.3.4 Partial agglomeration
4.3.4.1 Existence of partial agglomeration equilibria
In an n-region model, there potentially exist several different kinds of asymmetric equi-
libria. For simplicity, we shall restrict our analysis to a one-dimensional subspace of 4,
12The no black hole condition is satisfied by λ > σ−1 ifσ > 12 (3+
√
5) and thus becomes redundant.
13The first two used the original CP model by Krugman (1991), whereas the latter two used the FE
model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
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defined by 4inv =
{
h ∈ 4 : hj = 1−h1n−1 , ∀j 6= 1
}
, which is invariant for the dynamics.14
Note that this is a particular case of a more general one-dimensional subspace whereby
k regions have a share of entrepreneurs hi/k and the other n− k regions have a share
(1−h)/(n−k). We are focusing on the case where k = 1 (or, equivalently by symmetry,
k = n − 1), i.e., only one region differs from the others in its industry size. Note that
agglomeration and dispersion are patterns in 4inv. The next proposition determines
the maximum number of equilibria in 4inv.
Proposition 4.5. There can be at most two interior asymmetric equilibria for h ∈
(0, 1). However, at most one interior equilibrium exists for h ∈ (0, 1/n), whereas at
most two can exist for h ∈ (1/n, 1). These equilibria exist if and only if:
λ = λ∗(h) ≡
n(σ − 1)(1− φ)φ(hn− 1)− nσ [h(1− φ)− φ] [φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1] ln
{
φ(h+n−2)−h+1
(n−1)[h(1−φ)+φ]
}
(σ − 1)(1− φ)2(hn− 1) .
(4.25)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Equation (4.25) expresses the value of λ for which a spatial distribution h ∈ (0, 1) \{
1
n
}
is an interior equilibrium. Note that h ∈ (1/n, 1) means that region 1 has more
industry than the remaining regions and we thus refer to it as a partial core.
We illustrate in Figure 4.1 the multiplicity of partial agglomeration, drawing λ∗(h)
for n = 3 and σ = 4, for two different cases.
14All 1-dimensional spaces of the form hj = (1− hi)/(n− 1), i 6= j, for i ∈ N , are invariant.
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Figure 4.1 – Illustration of λ∗(h) for n = 3. On the vertical axis we present values
of λ such that h ∈ (0, 1) \ {1/3} is an interior equilibrium. To the left, we have
φ = 0.2 and to the right we have φ = 0.65. The equilibria occur at the intersection
of a horizontal line (λ constant) with the lines depicted in each figure.
In the first case (picture to the left), φ is low. For λA < λ < λB, there is only one
equilibrium: h < 1/3. For λB < λ < λC , there are two interior asymmetric equilibria. In
this region, at least one of these equilibria has a partial core. If λ is relatively high, both
equilibria are characterized by a partial core. If λ > λC , there are no equilibria. In the
second case (picture to the right), there is at most one interior asymmetric equilibrium.
The higher is λ, the more likely it is that the interior equilibrium corresponds a partial
core.
4.3.4.2 Stability of partial agglomeration
At a partial agglomeration equilibrium, two types of migrations can take place. One
migration concerns movements along the invariant space 4inv, i.e., from region 1 to
the evenly populated regions. If n − 1 entrepreneurs leave region 1, each of the other
regions will get 1 of those entrepreneurs. Since, along the invariant space, regions
{2, ..., n} share the same size, the decisions of these n− 1 entrepreneurs are the same.
The other migration concerns that of an entrepreneur who chooses to move exogenously
between two regions other than region 1 (transversally to 4inv). We have the following
result.
Theorem 4.6. Partial agglomeration is: (i) unstable for h ∈ (0, 1/n); and (ii) stable
if h ∈ (1/n, 1) and:
δ ≡ (1− φ)(hn− 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] + Φν < 0, (4.26)
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where Φ = h2n(1−φ)2− 2h(1−φ)2 +φ {n [(n− 3)φ+ 2] + 3φ− 4}+ 1 and ν is the log
term in (4.25).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Partial agglomeration can only be stable if one region is a partial core. Its stability
depends solely on the effect of migration between a partial core and any of the other
regions on utilities, i.e., δ.
It is important to detail further the economic intuition that leads to part (i) of
Theorem 4.6. First, a small exogenous migration from region n to region j 6= 1 decreases
the nominal wage in that region:
∂wj
∂hj
(
h,
1− h
n− 1
)∣∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗(h)
= (n− 1)
2σ(h(1− φ) + φ)ν
(σ − 1)(hn− 1) [φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1] ,
which is negative for h ∈ (0, 1/n). This decrease happens because there is a shift in
the demand for manufactures produced in region j towards manufactures produced in
region n. On the other hand, there is a positive cost-of-living effect in region j due to
immigration, which increases the utility of entrepreneurs residing in region j. This is
captured by differentiating the second term of Vj using (4.16) and evaluating at partial
agglomeration, which gives:
µ(n− 1)(1− φ)
(σ − 1) [φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1] > 0. (4.27)
When h < 1/n, the agglomerative cost-of-living effect due to an exogenous migration
in the receiving region always outweighs the dispersive decrease in nominal wage. The
receiving region, having become the largest after migration, will then further develop
into an industrialized core. This explains the fact that it is not possible for industry to
spread evenly among n− 1 regions when the other region is less industrialized.
Inspection of δ shows that partial agglomeration is unstable in an open interval h ∈
( 1
n
, 1
n
+ ε) for anyφ.15 That is, stability of partial agglomeration requires a significantly
industrialized partial core. Moreover, any partial agglomeration h is unstable for φ ∈
15This stems from the fact that δ(h = 1/n) = 0, ∂δ∂h (h = 1/n) = 0 and
∂2δ
∂h2 (h = 1/n) > 0.
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(1 − ε, 1).16 In order to convey a better picture, we illustrate in Figure 4.2 the region
δ < 0 in (h, n) space, for n = {3, 5, 10}.
Figure 4.2 – Regions of stability δn < 0 in (h, φ) space, for n = {3, 5, 10}. The
region below the solid line corresponds to δ3 < 0; below the dashed line we have
δ5 < 0; the dotted line contain δ10 < 0.
The numerical evidence suggests that, with more regions, partial agglomeration requires
higher barriers to trade (lower φ). With more regions, some partial agglomeration
equilibria may arise with less industry in the partial core because total dispersion implies
a lower share of entrepreneurs in each region (h = 1
n
is decreasing in n). Finally, Figure
4.2 shows that partial agglomeration h ∈ (1/n, 1) is stable if the freeness of trade is low
enough. The more industrialized is the partial core, the higher is the range of freeness
of trade for which partial agglomeration is a stable equilibrium.
4.4 Bifurcations in the n-region model
Most 2-region NEG models under exogenous symmetry undergo pitchfork bifurcati-
ons at the symmetric dispersion when the parameter path concerns smooth changes
only in transportation costs. Pflüger and Südekum (2008a) have shown that changes
in the functional form of the utility function produce modifications in the qualitative
16This is a consequence of δ(φ = 1) = 0, ∂δ∂φ (φ) = 0 and
∂2δ
∂φ2 (φ = 1) > 0.
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structure of a class of footloose-entrepreneur models. However, these changes affect the
type of pitchfork bifurcation rather than the type of bifurcation itself.17 For instance,
the 2-region QLLog (Pflüger, 2004) undergoes a supercritical pitchfork bifurcation at
symmetric dispersion. We next show that when more than 2 regions come to interplay,
the QLLog model exhibits instead a primary transcritical bifurcation at the symmetric
equilibrium and a secondary saddle-node bifurcation that branches from an interior
asymmetric equilibrium. A distinctive feature of these bifurcations is that the quali-
tative change in spatial distributions as transport costs decrease here is not reflected
symmetrically across all regions, even though the model is completely symmetric in all
respects. This suggests that the role of transport costs in an equidistant multi-regional
model may be more complex than what is envisaged in most agglomeration models.18
The remainder of the section is dedicated to explaining the details of these bifurca-
tions and their consequences on the qualitative transition towards more agglomerated
distributions as trade integration increases.
4.4.1 Primary and secondary bifurcations
We have the following results.
Proposition 4.7. In the n-region (n ≥ 3) QLLog model symmetric dispersion underg-
oes a transcritical bifurcation at the break point.
Proof. See Appendix C.
From this result, symmetric dispersion looses stability as φ rises above φb. A pri-
mary branch of partial agglomeration equilibria crosses symmetric dispersion at the
bifurcation point φ = φb. For φ < φb, this branch lies in the region h ∈ (1/n, 1). For
φ > φb, the branch lies in the region h ∈ (0, 1/n). Locally, both before and after the
bifurcation occurs, the partial agglomeration equilibria along the primary branch are
17In the model of Ottaviano et al. (2002), the resulting bifurcation is a borderline case between a
supercritical and subcritical pitchfork.
18Bifurcation in core-periphery models has been addressed by Berliant and Kung (2009) in a different
context. The variety of bifurcations is obtained through the addition of parameters to the original
model.
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unstable in a neighbourhood of the bifurcation point.19
In order to understand the behaviour of partial agglomeration equilibria on the entire
invariant space ∆inv for h ∈ (1/n, 1), we take a further step by verifying the conditions
for a secondary bifurcation along the primary branch that occurs at a fold point, φf .
Because we are looking at the invariant subspace (h1, hj(hi)) = (h, (1−h)/(1−n)), the
study of bifurcations at the symmetric dispersion equilibrium in this restriction of the
n-region model is reduced to a one dimensional case.
Proposition 4.8. Along the primary branch for h ∈ (1/n, 1), the n-region QLLog model
undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation as φ decreases from φb.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The existence of a secondary saddle-node bifurcation for h ∈ (1/n, 1), together with
the direction of the transcritical bifurcation and stability of its branches, ensures that
φf < φb and φf < φs. As φ increases above φf , two partial agglomeration equilibria
appear. The one with the more industrialized partial core is stable, whereas the other
one is unstable. In other words, the saddle-node bifurcation is characterized by a curve
of partial agglomeration equilibria along a primary branch for h ∈ (1/n, 1) that is
tangent to the line φ = φf and lies to its right.20
One important question concerns whether φb < φs or φb > φs. The relative position
of these thresholds determines the smoothness of the progressive industrialization pro-
cess as the freeness of trade increases. On the other hand, the qualitative structure of
the model ensures that there always exists a stable spatial distribution with h ∈ [1/n, 1],
for every freeness of trade value φ ∈ (0, 1).
We first focus on the case φb < φs, which requires a relatively low λ. Figure 4.3
depicts the QLLog model’s bifurcation diagram in the invariant space 4inv for n = 3.
For the illustrations we set µ = 0.3, σ = 4 and λ = 2.5.21 The interpretation strays
from that of the typical bifurcation diagrams of 2-region models in NEG literature,
19The branch for h ∈ (0, 1/n) is stable (only) along the invariant space. From Theorem 4.6, however,
it is unstable.
20The details that support these claims about the bifurcations are provided by the derivative in
(T3), (T4), and (SN3) in Appendix C.
21The parameter values chosen for the simulations ensure that wi, wj > µ at every partial agglome-
ration equilibrium, so that entrepreneurs consume both goods at every possible distribution.
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because we are restraining ourselves to the invariant subspace 4inv ⊂ 4. Just like the
simplex in the 2-region model, the subspace is also one dimensional here and migration
movements that affect region 1 will affect all other regions. A migration from (to) region
1 would result in 2x entrepreneurs leaving (entering) region 1 for x entrepreneurs that
enter (leave) each of the other 2 regions.22
Figure 4.3 – Bifurcation diagram for the 3-region model. Solid and dashed lines
represent stable and unstable equilibria, respectively. Vertical dashed lines delimit
areas (1) to (4) as follows: (1) stability of symmetric dispersion; (2) stability of
both dispersion and partial agglomeration; (3) stability of partial agglomeration;
(4) stability of full agglomeration.
It thus comes as no surprise to see that h = 0 corresponds to a qualitatively different
spatial distribution when n = 2 and when n ≥ 3. When n = 2, it corresponds to
agglomeration. When n ≥ 3, it corresponds to border dispersion, which is never stable.
In Figure 4.3 we can see the primary transcritical bifurcation branching from the
break point φb and the secondary saddle-node bifurcation occurring along the primary
22In a 3-region model, along the invariant space, region 1 has h1 = h entrepreneurs and regions 2
and 3 have h2 = h3 = (1− h) /2.
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branch, whose fold point, φf , is located in the upper part of the invariant subspace.
Notice that an initially partially agglomerated industry will be forced to fully disperse
across regions if there is a decrease in the freeness of trade below φf . If this decrease
is temporary, the industry will remain fully dispersed, so there are permanent effects,
which means that the n-region QLLog model exhibits locational hysteresis. Formally,
this happens because φf < φb.
Figure 4.4 – Migration dynamics of entrepreneurs inside the 2-simplex. From
left to right to bottom φ, each picture corresponds to a region in Figure 4.3
indexed from (1) to (4). In the first picture, only symmetric dispersion is stable.
In the second, both partial agglomeration and symmetric dispersion are stable.
In the third picture only partial agglomeration is stable. In the last picture,
agglomeration is the only stable equilibrium.
Figure 4.4 contains the different dynamics of the 3-region model inside the 2-
dimensional simplex, with correspondence to the regions (1)-(4) of Figure 4.3. We start
with low levels of φ. When the freeness of trade is very low, we have φ < φf < φb < φs,
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so only dispersion is stable (upper left picture). However, once φf < φ < φb < φs, two
partial agglomeration equilibria immediately arise on the upper part (for h ∈ (1/3, 1))
of the invariant space 4inv of the simplex (upper left picture). The one that lies closer
to agglomeration is the only stable equilibrium. In the bottom left picture, φ has risen
just above the break point but lies just below the sustain point, i.e., φf < φb < φ < φs.
At this point there are still two partial agglomeration equilibria; however, one of them
lies in the inferior part of the invariant space 4inv and is unstable whereas the other is
stable. As φ approaches the sustain point, the stable partial agglomeration equilibrium
approaches agglomeration until it disappears once φ > φs, after which agglomeration
becomes the only stable spatial distribution.
Intuitively, the absence of income effects mitigates agglomeration forces as transport
costs decrease, which justifies the existence of partial agglomeration just as in the 2-
region model. On the other hand, higher market access variability due to the presence
of more regions implies that lower transport costs enhance the relative strength between
centripetal and centrifugal forces, resulting in a spatial distribution where one region
is considerably more industrialized. Further decreases in transport costs then lead to a
progressive and smooth transition towards full agglomeration.
We now focus on the case whereby φb > φs. Note that, in Pflüger’s 2-region QLLog
model, the existence of a supercritical bifurcation at the break point φb precludes the
converse case, i.e., φb ≥ φs. For n ≥ 3, however, we have the following result.
Proposition 4.9. There exists a λ ∈ (λb, λs) such that agglomeration and dispersion
are both stable if:
n > nT ≡ − (1− φ)
2
φ(1− φ+ lnφ) , (4.28)
Proof. See Appendix C.
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Figure 4.5 – Threshold nT in (4.28). Agglomeration and dispersion are simulta-
neously stable in the graph above the thick line. For n ≥ 3, simultaneity requires
higher transport costs for a higher number of regions.
Figure 4.5 illustrates nT from (4.28) in φ space. It shows that simultaneity of
stability of agglomeration and dispersion is not possible in the 2-region model. It also
shows that an (n+1)-region model favours simultaneity of agglomeration and dispersion
for a wider range of transport cost values compared to an n-region model.
Corollary 4.10. For a sufficiently high λ, there exists a range of transport cost values
for which agglomeration and dispersion are both stable.
Proof. If condition (4.28) holds, then, for some λ, agglomeration and dispersion are
simultaneously stable. Since stability of both equilibria requires φ > φs and φ < φb,
then it follows that, for some λ, we must forcibly have φb ≥ φs. Moreover, we have
d(φb − φs)/dλ > 0, which means that φb − φs > 0 occurs for a sufficiently high λ.
We now proceed to illustrate the qualitative structure of spatial distributions when
φs < φb. We increase the ratio of immobile to mobile workers compared to the previous
simulations, by setting λ = 6. The resulting bifurcation diagram is now presented in
Figure 4.6. Clearly, the main qualitative difference compared to Figure 4.3 pertains to
the region indexed by (3), where we now have φ ∈ (φs, φb).
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Figure 4.6 – Bifurcation diagram for the 3-region model. Solid and dashed lines
represent stable and unstable equilibria, respectively. Vertical dashed lines delimit
areas (1) to (4) as follows: (1) stability of symmetric dispersion; (2) stability of
both dispersion and partial agglomeration; (3) stability of both dispersion and
full agglomeration; (4) stability of full agglomeration. Parameter values are σ = 5
and λ = 6.
Figure 4.7 portrays the 2-dimensional simplex for φb > φs once φ rises above the
sustain point (corresponding to region (3) in Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.7 – A 2-simplex portraying for φs < φ < φb. We can see that agglo-
meration and symmetric dispersion are both stable. A single unstable partial
agglomeration equilibrium exists in the upper part of 4inv.
We can observe that for φs < φ < φb, agglomeration and total dispersion are both
simultaneously stable, while a single unstable partial agglomeration equilibrium for
h ∈ (1/3, 1) exists in 4inv between them.
We can now sum up the implications of the relative position between the break point
and sustain point are as follows. If φb < φs, once symmetric dispersion looses stability, a
significant migration will occur to a partially agglomerated equilibrium. This migration
will be followed by a smooth transition towards agglomeration if φ rises further. This
scenario is illustrated in figures 4.3 and 4.4. Conversely, if φb > φs, entrepreneurs
will immediately agglomerate in one single region once dispersion becomes unstable.
Moreover, if the increase in φ above φb is due to some temporary policy, agglomeration
is permanent. This is depicted in Figure 4.6. Smoother transitions require a lower
immobile to mobile labour ratio λ, whereas catastrophic agglomeration is more likely
under higher values of λ.23
In economic terms, when overall inter-regional mobility is low, dispersion forces are
higher because firms have larger incentives to relocate to less industrialized regions in
order to capture local demand and avoid fiercer competition in more crowded markets.
However, dispersion forces due to existence of immobile workers in other markets are
23Our results can be shown to extend to a fairly general range of values for λ.
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naturally stronger at more symmetric distributions. The implication is that a lower
global inter-regional mobility encourages symmetric dispersion more than it discourages
full agglomeration. When it is too low, if agglomeration forces exceed dispersion forces
at symmetric dispersion, the spatial distribution then immediately shifts towards full
agglomeration.
4.4.2 A note on the black hole condition and on the role of
inter-regional mobility
We know that there is a condition on which stability of total dispersion hinges crucially;
the no black hole condition. In early NEG literature, the no black hole condition
may have been a requirement assumed out of necessity or convenience; after all, in
a fully symmetric two region, two industry setting, precluding dispersion would doom
geography to the unlikely prediction of full agglomeration in one region. In our context,
the no black hole condition would seem ad hoc to say the least.
Figure 4.8 shows a bifurcation diagram where the ratio of inter-regionally immobile
workforce relative to mobile (skilled) labour is lower than unity and, as such, total
dispersion is precluded. The results concerning bifurcations in the previous section
do not extend to this case since we know that φf < φb. In fact, as the freeness of
trade increases, the spatial distribution approaches agglomeration monotonically from
an interior asymmetric equilibrium along the invariant space 4inv.
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Figure 4.8 – If the unskilled labour force is relatively low, dispersion is not a stable
outcome, but partial agglomeration is still possible. We have σ = 2.5 and λ = 1.6.
On account of these findings, we conclude that a higher global inter-regional worker
mobility (lower λ) leads to smoother transitions towards agglomeration as transport
costs steadily decrease.
4.5 Welfare
So far we have analysed the different possible spatial distributions in the the QLLog
model with an arbitrary number of equidistant regions. We now analyse whether the
possible distributions are desirable from a social perspective. For normative purposes,
we adopt a utilitarian criterion similar to that of Pflüger and Südekum (2008b), thus
looking at the average indirect utility of entrepreneurs, farmers, and then at the whole
economy.
4.5.1 Entrepreneurs
We now discuss how distribution patterns relate to the entrepreneurs’ overall average
welfare.
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Theorem 4.11. The average utility of entrepreneurs is convex in the spatial distribution
of entrepreneurs h, attaining a global minimum at symmetric dispersion.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Theorem 4.11 shows that total dispersion is the spatial distribution that yields the
worst outcome for the entrepreneurs as measured by average utility. To understand
why entrepreneurs may be driven to a situation that reduces their overall welfare, it is
useful to perform a thought experiment by assuming an economy with 3 regions whose
distribution is initially fully dispersed. Suppose that total dispersion is the only stable
equilibrium. Consider now a marginal exogenous exodus occurs from region 1 to region
3, without loss of generality. By assumption that dispersion is stable, utility in region
1 must increase, as does the average utility in all regions. However, the entrepreneurs
in region 3 will now observe that V1 > V¯ . Since they are short-sighted and seek
the region with the highest utility, they will return to region 1, thus restoring the
symmetric dispersion distribution. This situation is similar to a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
As noticed by Pflüger and Südekum (2008b), the continuum of stable equilibria with
partial agglomeration that the absence of income effects allows for, as opposed to other
NEG models, may contribute to this result. Adding dispersion forces such as a housing
sector (Pflüger and Südekum, 2008b) or commuting costs such as in Ottaviano et al.
(2002) and Tabuchi et al. (2005) would most likely improve the welfare of entrepreneurs
at less agglomerated outcomes.
4.5.2 Farmers
The average nominal wage paid to farmers is equal to 1. Therefore, average indirect
utility for farmers is given by:
V¯ L = 1 + µ(σ − 1)n
n∑
j=1
ln [φ+ (1− φ)hj] + η. (4.29)
Average nominal wages are invariant to changes in h. Therefore, all changes in the
welfare of both farmers are completely caused by changes in average price indices.24
24Recalling Proposition 1, the same can be stated about the welfare of entrepreneurs.
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Theorem 4.12. The farmers’ average indirect utility is concave in the spatial distri-
bution of entrepreneurs h, attaining a global maximum at symmetric dispersion.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Therefore, farmers attain the highest welfare when all entrepreneurs are evenly
dispersed among the n regions. A consequence of the concavity of V¯ L is that, for the
farmers, the regional indirect utility is strictly increasing in the number of entrepreneurs
that reside there. This is explained by the fact that, due to equidistance, the regional
price index Pi in (4.15) is a strictly decreasing function of hi.25 Therefore, the cost of
living in a region decreases steadily as it becomes more industrialized. Industrialization
hence leads to a progressive improvement of the farmers’ residing in that region. On
the other hand, this implies higher spatial inequality while farmers as a whole become
relatively poorer in a core-periphery pattern.
4.5.3 Social welfare
The results shown so far evidence a clear trade-off between the welfare enjoyed by
entrepreneurs and the welfare enjoyed by farmers at a given spatial distribution. For
a given stable equilibrium, the welfare of the economy as a whole thus depends on the
global ratio of farmers to entrepreneurs, λ, and the number of regions n. Let us define
social welfare as an average of both average indirect utilities that depends on the spatial
distribution of entrepreneurs:
Ω(h) = 1
λ+ 1
[
V¯ (h) + λV¯ L(h)
]
. (4.30)
Rewriting (4.30) using (4.29) and V¯ we get:
Ω(h) = 1
λ+ 1
ε+ µ(σ − 1)
 n∑
j=1
ln [φ+ (1− φ)hj]
(
λ
n
+ hj
) , (4.31)
25One can rewrite Pi in a way that it depends only on hi. See proof of Theorem 4.11 for more
details.
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where ε = λ(1 + η) + w¯ + η is a constant. We compare social welfare at the different
possible distributions: agglomeration, symmetric dispersion, and partial agglomeration.
The next results provide valuable information concerning the local extrema of Ω(h) and
allow us to greatly simplify our analysis.
Proposition 4.13. Social welfare extrema are located on one-dimensional invariant
spaces whereby k regions have a share of entrepreneurs hi = h/k and the other n − k
regions have a share hj = (1− h)/(n− k).
Proof. See Appendix D.
As we have seen before, one particular invariant space of this kind is the one we
have studied so far, ∆inv, which corresponds to the particular cases k = 1 or k = n− 1.
From Proposition 4.15, a Corollary follows for the 3-region case.
Corollary 4.14. For n = 3, all social welfare extrema are located on the invariant
space ∆inv.
Proof. For the 3-region model, the only invariant spaces that correspond to the ones
identified in Proposition 4.15 are the three invariant spaces whereby one region has
hi = h entrepreneurs and the other two regions have hj = h/2. This exactly matches
the invariant space ∆inv, for 3 regions, which concludes the proof.
From Proposition 4.15, the study of social welfare extrema can be reduced to the
simpler one-dimensional invariant space, without loss of generality, as it contains all
the local extrema of Ω(h). Additionally, Corollary 4.14 ensures that in order to study
welfare in a 3-region model we need only look at ∆inv.26 Using (4.31) and n = 3, we
reach:
Ω (h ∈ ∆inv) = 13(λ+ 1)
[
3ε+ µ(σ − 1)ζ
]
, (4.32)
where:
ζ = (3h+ λ) ln [h(1− φ) + φ] + [2h+ 3(1− h)] ln
[
1− h
2 (1− φ) + φ
]
.
26For n ≥ 4, there may exist other potential extrema on other invariant spaces (as well as equilibria).
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We discuss the analytical details of the shape of Ω(h ∈ ∆inv) in Appendix D. Figure 4.9
plots the different possible shapes of social welfare for increasing levels of φ, for λ = 3
and σ = 5. When φ is low (upper left picture), symmetric dispersion is the only stable
and is a global welfare maximum. For a slightly higher φ (upper right picture), both
dispersion and a highly industrialized partial agglomeration dispersion are stable but
the former is still a global welfare maximum. Increasing φ further (medium left pic-
ture) makes dispersion unstable, whereas partial agglomeration is stable but is socially
inferior compared to any less agglomerated spatial distribution. 27 As φ rises even furt-
her (medium right picture) agglomeration is now stable but is dominated by another
less asymmetric distribution. However, continuous increases in φ steadily improve the
welfare at agglomeration until it eventually becomes a global welfare maximum (lower
pictures). The evidence here shows that the 3-region model exhibits a tendency towards
over-agglomeration for intermediate transport cost levels.
27It turns out that no partial agglomeration corresponds to a local (hence global) welfare maximum.
See Appendix D for more details on this matter.
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Figure 4.9 – Welfare along the invariant space ∆inv for the 3-region model. From
left to right to bottom, φ is increasing.
In order to check if this tendency carries over to the general n-region model, we
present the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.15. From a social point of view: (i) if dispersion is stable, it is a local
maximum and always superior to agglomeration; (ii) there exists φz ∈ (φs, 1) such that
agglomeration is stable forφ ∈ (φs, φz), but is socially inferior to other less asymmetric
distributions.
Proof. See Appendix D.
From Proposition 4.15 we learn that there is a range for the freeness of trade just above
the sustain point for which agglomeration is a stable outcome, but also whereby social
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welfare is lower compared to other less industrialized distributions. Therefore, there
is a tendency towards over-agglomeration. This is particularly notorious if φb > φs,
because a temporary increase in the freeness of trade just above φb permanently shifts
the spatial distribution to a socially inferior spatial distribution.28
4.6 Conclusion
The QLLog model presents itself as a good candidate for extending the study of NEG
to a higher number of regions. By considering a quasi-linear upper tier utility function,
the absence of income effects on consumers’ demand for manufactures enables one to
obtain simpler analytical expressions for the entrepreneurs’ real wages in each region.
In most other NEG models with different utility functional forms, regional wages feed
back on the entrepreneurs’ incomes in all other regions, which in turn depend on the
wages they get, making it progressively harder to obtain tractable expressions as more
regions are considered.
As we have seen, the QLLog model allows to study NEG with an arbitrary number
of equidistant regions under exogenous symmetry. Moreover, it accommodates for the
possibility of partial agglomeration equilibria, a feature which is ruled out in many CP
models under exogenous symmetry. This enforces the idea that exogenous asymmetries
are not the only source of asymmetric spatial distributions.
We look at equilibria where at least one region is absent of industry and the remai-
ning regions are evenly indutrialized, and find they are always unstable. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first analytical confirmation that an evenly distributed
industry among less than the total number of regions is not possible.
We look at partial agglomeration distributions along invariant spaces where all but
one region share the same level of industry. Contrary to the 2-region QLLog model
(Pflüger, 2004), where the only invariant space is the entire set of spatial distributions
itself and any distribution may correspond to a stable equilibrium, with three and more
28On the other hand, it can be shown that a higher worker mobility (lower λ) and a higher trade
freneess increases the likelihood that global welfare will be greater at agglomeration compared to
dispersion. This statement is true if λ > nφ/(1− φ), which we assume; otherwise dispersion is always
stable.
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regions, along the aforementioned invariant space, a partial agglomeration equilibrium
can only be stable if a single region has a relatively larger industry compared to all
other regions. This happens because, when a single region is comparatively smaller, an
entrepreneur who migrates between any two of the evenly distributed regions (which
are larger) will see his utility rise. Thus, if exogenous migration occurs to any such
region, it will attract more and more entrepreneurs until it becomes an industrialized
core.
A consequence of the stability analysis of partial agglomeration is that the QL-
Log model distribution patterns with three regions and more cannot be explained by
the 2-region model’s pitchfork bifurcation (Pflüger, 2004). Instead, it undergoes a pri-
mary transcritical bifurcation along the invariant space at the symmetric dispersion
equilibrium and a secondary saddle-node bifurcation that branches from partial agglo-
meration. The existence of a saddle-node implies that entrepreneurs, who are initially
partially agglomerated, will become permanently dispersed across all regions if trans-
port costs increase temporarily. Moreover, it is possible that agglomeration becomes
stable before dispersion becomes unstable, depending on the level of worker mobility.
Thus, from a smooth path where transport costs decrease, once symmetric dispersion
looses stability, there are two possibilities: (i) if the worker mobility is high, industry
converges immediately to partial agglomeration and then smoothly transits towards a
single region agglomeration; (ii) if mobility is low, industry immediately agglomerates
in a single region.
We have shown that the average utility of the entrepreneurs declines from agglo-
meration until dispersion, where their average utility is at its lowest. The converse
happens to the welfare of farmers. Their average utility is minimal at agglomeration
and is highest at dispersion. This evidences a clear trade-off in spatial distributions
between entrepreneurs and farmers in terms of social desirability. When we look at the
society as a whole, the model exhibits a tendency towards over-agglomeration when
transportation costs lie at intermediate levels. The social desirability of more agglo-
merated distributions is higher when the proportion of farmers is lower, and can be
improved for all workers by decreasing the cost of living through lower transportation
costs.
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4.A - Proofs of section 4.2
This appendix contains the formal proofs pertaining to section 2 of the paper.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Consider the nominal wage wi in (4.13):
wi =
µ
σ
n∑
j=1
φij
(
λ
n
+ hj
)
∑n
m=1 φmjhm
.
For w1 we have:
w1 =
µ
σ
(
λ/n+ h1
h1 + φh2 + . . .+ φhn
+ φ λ/n+ h2
φh1 + h2 + φh3 . . .+ φhn
+ . . .+ φ λ/n+ hn
φh1 + φh2 + . . .+ φhn−1 + hn
)
.
Notice that hi = φhi + (1− φ)hi and that ∑nj=1 hj = 1. Thus, we can simplify w1 to:
w1 =
µ
σ
[
λ/n+ h1
φ+ (1− φ)h1 + φ
λ/n+ h2
φ+ (1− φ)h2 + . . .+ φ
λ/n+ hn
φ+ (1− φ)hn
]
.
Analogously, we can compute wn :
wn =
µ
σ
[
φ
λ/n+ h1
φ+ (1− φ)h1 + φ
λ/n+ h2
φ+ (1− φ)h2 + . . .+
λ/n+ hn
φ+ (1− φ)hn
]
The average nominal wage w¯, defined in (4.17), is the weighted sum of the wi’s of the
previous form:
w¯ = µ
σ
n∑
j=1
∑n
m=1 hmφjm (λ/n+ hj)
φ+ (1− φ)hj .
For each j, let us decompose the summation in the numerator as follows:
w¯ = µ
σ
n∑
j=1
h1φ(λ/n+ hj) + ...+ hj(λ/n+ hj) + ...+ hnφ(λ/n+ hj)
φ+ (1− φ)hj .
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By using hj = φhj + (1− φ)hj and ∑nj=1 hj = 1, average wage then becomes:
w¯ = µ
σ
n∑
j=1
[φ+ (1− φ)hj] (λ/n+ hj)
φ+ (1− φ)hj ⇐⇒
w¯ = µ
σ
λ+ n∑
j=1
hj
 ⇐⇒
w¯ = µ
σ
(λ+ 1) ,
concluding the proof. 
4.B - Proofs of section 4.3
This appendix contains all the proofs concerning both existence and local stability of
equilibria (section 3).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. The indirect utility in the core region with hi = 1 is
given by:
Vi =
µ
σ
(λ+ 1),
which does not depend on transportation costs. For a peripheral region j we have:
Vj =
µ [λ+ φ2(λ+ n) + λ(n− 2)φ]
nσφ
+ µ lnφ
σ − 1 .
Agglomeration in the core region i is thus stable if:
Vi > Vj ⇐⇒
(1− φ) [λ(1− φ)− nφ]
nσφ
+ lnφ
σ − 1 < 0,
concluding the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Local stability of interior equilibria in 4 is given by the
sign of the real part of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the system in (4.18) at
(h1, h2, ..., hn−1) =
(
1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
. At symmetric dispersion, the average utility V¯ is inva-
riant in the permutation of any two coordinates, due to symmetry. If we interchange
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the distributions between region 1 and region n we then have V¯
(
1
n
+ ε, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
=
V¯
(
1
n
− ε, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
. But this implies that ∂hiV¯
(
1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
= 0.29 The argument of
invariance extends to the indirect utility Vi in the permutation of any two coordinates
j 6= i, which implies that ∂hjVi
(
1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
= 0,∀j 6= i. Finally, symmetry among regi-
ons establishes that we must have ∂hiVi
(
1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
= ∂hjVj
(
1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
. The Jacobian
matrix of (4.18) at the symmetric equilibrium is thus given by:
J =

∂Vi
∂hi
0 . . . 0
0 ∂Vi
∂hi
. . . 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 . . . ∂Vi
∂hi

,
which has a repeated real eigenvalue with multiplicity n− 1 given by:
∂Vi
∂hi
(
1
n
, 1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
,
and total dispersion is stable if ∂hiVi
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
< 0. Computing the derivative ∂hiVi
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
,
total dispersion is stable if:
∂hiVi
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
≡ µn(1− φ) [(2n− 1)σφ− λ(σ − 1)(1− φ)− nφ+ σ](σ − 1)σ [(n− 1)φ+ 1] 2 < 0 ⇐⇒
(2n− 1)σφ− nφ+ σ − λ(σ − 1)(1− φ) < 0.
Solving for φ, we get the equivalent stability condition:
φ <
σ(1− λ) + λ
λ+ n− σ (λ+ 2n− 1) ,
concluding the proof. 
29Notice that partial derivatives in this context imply that changes in hi are reflected symmetrically
in hn.
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Proof of Theorem 4.4. The analysis for the stability of partial dispersion is bipar-
tite. An “attracting boundary” condition first requires that regions absent of entrepre-
neurs remain empty, i.e., that hi = 0. All these regions have the same indirect utility
Vi. The other k regions have the same indirect utility Vj. Since there are n− k regions
with no entrepreneurs and k regions with the same distribution 1/k, the average utility
equals V¯ = Vj. Continuity of indirect utility in the spatial distribution ensures that,
after an exogenous migration into a region i, hi will return to zero if Vi < V¯ ≡ Vj, that
is,
Vi|BD − Vj|BD < 0
Second, one needs to ensure that the spatial distribution does not change “along the
boundary”. Given symmetry among the k regions, the second condition then requires
that an increase in hj leads to a decrease in the difference between Vj and V¯ , in order
to restore hj = 1/k. This condition thus becomes ∂hjVj − ∂hj V¯ < 0. If we allow for the
implicitly determined region n to take 1/k of the spatial distribution, then without loss
of generality we can assume that hj = 1/k and hn = 1/k. As a result, invariance of V¯
in the permutation of hj and hn (see proof of Proposition 4.3) asserts that ∂hj V¯ = 0
at boundary dispersion (BD). Thus, the second condition for stability of boundary
dispersion boils down to:
∂Vj
∂hj
∣∣∣∣∣
BD
< 0.
Computing the indirect utilities, Vi and Vj, and the first order derivative ∂hjVj, we
get the first condition and the second condition, respectively, for stability of boundary
dispersion:30
nσφ [(k − 1)φ+ 1] ln
[
kφ
(k − 1)φ+ 1
]
+ (σ − 1)(1− φ) [λ(1− φ)− nφ] < 0
k [λ(σ − 1)(1− φ)− n(2σ − 1)φ] + nσ(1− φ) < 0.
30Standard inspection of the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium can be shown to boil down to the
same conditions.
102
Rewriting the stability conditions in terms of λ we get:
n [k(2σ − 1)φ+ σ(1− φ)]
k(σ − 1)(1− φ) < λ <
nφ
{
σ [(k − 1)φ+ 1] ln
[
(k − 1)φ+ 1
kφ
]
+ σ(1− φ) + φ− 1
}
(σ − 1)(φ− 1)2 .
Therefore, no λ can satisfy the stability condition if:
nφ
{
σ [(k − 1)φ+ 1] ln
[
(k − 1)φ+ 1
kφ
]
+ σ(1− φ) + φ− 1
}
(σ − 1)(φ− 1)2 −
n [k(2σ − 1)φ+ σ(1− φ)]
k(σ − 1)(1− φ) < 0
⇐⇒ −nσ [(k − 1)φ+ 1]× Ω
k(σ − 1)(φ− 1)2 < 0, (4.33)
where Ω = kφ
{
ln
[
kφ
(k−1)φ+1
]
− 1
}
+ 1. The inequality in (4.33) holds if Ω(k, φ) > 0, i.e.,
if:
ln
[
kφ
(k − 1)φ+ 1
]
> −1 + k
φk
.
Notice that a sufficient condition for Ω > 0 is that:
ln
[
kφ
(k − 1)φ+ 1
]
> − 1
φk
⇐⇒ ln
[
(k − 1)φ+ 1
kφ
]
<
1
φk
⇐⇒
⇐⇒ ln
(
k − 1
k
+ 1
kφ
)
<
1
kφ
⇐⇒ 1
kφ
− ln
(
k − 1
k
+ 1
kφ
)
> 0.
We know that f(x) = x− ln(x+a) has a minimum in x = 1−a and f(1−a) = 1−a > 0
if a < 1. Here, we have:
f (x(k, φ)) = x(k, φ)− ln [x(k, φ) + a(k)] ≡ 1
kφ
− ln
[
1
kφ
+ k − 1
k
]
.
Therefore, Ω is positive if (k−1)/k < 1, which is true, and thus the inequality in (4.33)
holds, concluding the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Interior equilibria along ∆inv satisfy
(
h˙1, h˙j
)
= (0, 0) in
(4.18) if and only if V1 = Vj,∀j and 1 6= j. The configuration (h1, hj) =
(
h, 1−h
n−1
)
is an
interior asymmetric equilibrium if and only if:
λ = λ∗(h) ≡ n(σ − 1)(1− φ)φ(hn− 1)− nσ [h(1− φ)− φ] [φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1] ν(σ − 1)(1− φ)2(hn− 1) ,
(4.34)
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where ν = ln
{
φ(h+n−2)−h+1
(n−1)[h(1−φ)+φ]
}
and h ∈ (0, 1) \
{
1
n
}
.
Observe that λ∗(h) is always positive. It is given by (α + βν) /γ, where α/γ >
0, β < 0 and ν/γ < 0.31 Thus, for each h there is a positive λ that guarantees that the
corresponding spatial distribution is an interior asymmetric equilibrium.
The first and second derivatives of λ∗(h) in (4.34) with respect to h are given, respecti-
vely, by:
∂λ∗(h)
∂h
= α1 + β1ν(σ − 1)(1− φ)2(hn− 1)2 .
∂2λ∗(h)
∂h2
= nσ [(n− 1)φ+ 1]
2 (α2 + β2ν)
(σ − 1)(1− φ)2(hn− 1)3 [h(1− φ) + φ] (φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1) ,
where:
α1 = −(1− φ)(1− hn) [(n− 1)φ+ 1]
β1 = h2n(1− φ)2 − 2h(1− φ)2 + φ {n [(n− 3)φ+ 2] + 3φ− 4}+ 1
α2 = (1− φ)2(hn− 1) [h(n− 2) + (3− 2n)φ− 1]
β2 = −2(n− 1) [h(1− φ) + φ] [φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1] .
For h ∈ (0, 1/n) we have α2 < 0, β2 < 0 and ν > 0. Moreover, the denominator of
∂2λ∗(h)/∂h is positive. Thus, the second derivative is negative, which implies that
λ∗(h) is strictly concave in (0, 1/n).
When h ∈ (1/n, 1), we have α2 > 0, β2 < 0 and ν < 0. Since the denominator is now
negative, ∂2λ∗(h)/∂h is still negative, which implies that λ∗(h) is also strictly concave
in (1/n, 1).
By computing the limits of λ∗(h) and its derivatives as h approaches total dispersion
31The terms of λ∗(h) are given by α = n(σ − 1)(1 − φ)φ(hn − 1), β =
−nσ [h(1− φ)− φ] [φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1] , and γ = (σ − 1)(1− φ)2(hn− 1).
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we get:
lim
h→ 1
n
±
λ∗(h) = σ(2nφ+ 1)− nφ(σ − 1)(1− φ) > 0.
lim
h→ 1
n
±
∂λ∗(h)
∂h
= (n− 2)nσ2(n− 1)(σ − 1) > 0.
lim
h→ 1
n
±
∂2λ∗(h)
∂h2
= − n
4σ(1− φ)
3(n− 1)2(σ − 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] < 0.
The first limit ensures that λ∗(h) is continuous at h = 1/n. The second limit guaran-
tees that λ∗(h) is differentiable at h = 1/n, given continuity. Finally, the third limit
establishes strict concavity at h = 1/n. Thus, the invariant space 4inv contains at most
two interior asymmetric equilibria in (0, 1).
More specifically, the positive limit concerning the first derivative additionally en-
sures that λ∗(h) increases monotonically in (0, 1/n); therefore, there can be at most one
equilibrium in that interval. For h ∈ (0, 1/n), we know that λ∗(h) initially increases and
may or may not decrease after some point. As a result, we have at most two equilibria
for h ∈ (0, 1/n). This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4.6. On the invariant space 4inv, region 1 has a distribution
h1 = h and there are n−1 regions with distributions hj = (1−h)/(n−1). The dynamics
h˙1 = f1(h) on 4inv are invariant to the permutation of any of the j 6= i coordinates.
As a result, we have ∂hjf1 = 0 at partial agglomeration. Given symmetry, this implies
∂h1fj = 0, for j 6= 1. Applying the same argument of invariance to all the other n− 2
regions we have ∂hj−fj = 0, where j
− 6= j. This reduces the Jacobian of the dynamical
system at partial agglomeration to:
J =

∂f1
∂h1
0 . . . 0
0 ∂fj
∂hj
. . . 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 . . . ∂fj
∂hj

,
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or any permutation of its elements at the main diagonal, which gives us the eigenvalues.
One of the eigenvalues is given by
∂f1
∂h1
= V1 − V¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+h1
(
∂V1
∂h1
− ∂V¯
∂h1
)
∂f1
∂h1
= h
(
∂V1
∂h1
− ∂V¯
∂h1
)
,
where the latter equality is obtained after substituting h1 and hj for the partial ag-
glomeration equilibrium. The first term equals zero because it is the condition for an
equilibrium. The condition for stability reduces to:
∂V1
∂h1
− ∂V¯
∂h1
< 0.
The other eigenvalue δ has a multiplicity of n− 2 and is given by:
∂fj
∂hj
= Vj − V¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+hj
∂Vj∂hj − ∂V¯∂hj︸︷︷︸
0

⇐⇒ ∂fj
∂hj
= 1− h1− n
∂Vj
∂hj
.
The fact that the derivative concerning the average utility is zero stems from its invari-
ance in the permutation of coordinates j and n, since hj = hn at the interior equilibrium.
The previous condition reduces to:
∂Vj
∂hj
< 0.
As a result, partial agglomeration is stable if:

∂V1
∂h1
− ∂V¯
∂h1
∣∣∣∣∣
PA
< 0
∂Vj
∂hj
∣∣∣∣∣
PA
< 0
.
Computing the partial derivatives at (h1, hj) = (h, (1− h)/(1− n)) and evaluating
them at equilibrium using λ∗(h) in (4.34), the stability conditions for partial agglome-
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ration are given by:
γ ≡
(1−φ)(1−hn)−(n−1)[h(1−φ)+φ]×ν
(1−hn) < 0
δ ≡ (1−φ)(hn−1)[(n−1)φ+1]+Φ×ν(hn−1) < 0.
The rest of the proof is divided in two parts, supporting the claims in (i) and (ii).
(i). We will show that the first stability condition in (4.26) fails to hold for h ∈ (0, 1/n),
that is, γ > 0.
The log term is always positive, as is the denominator of γ. However, we have (1 −
φ)(1− hn) > 0 and −(n− 1) [h(1− φ) + φ] < 0. Hence, we have γ > 0 if and only if:
D ≡ (1− φ)(1− hn)− (n− 1) [h(1− φ) + φ] ν > 0.
As h approaches 1/n we have:
lim
h→1/n
D = lim
h→1/n
[(1− φ)(1− hn)]− lim
h→1/n
(n− 1) [h(1− φ) + φ]× lim
h→1/n
ν ⇐⇒
⇐⇒ lim
h→1/n
D = 0− (n− 1) [(n− 1)φ+ 1]
n
× lim
h→1/n
{
ln
[ (n−1)φ+1
n
(n−1)φ+1
n
]}
⇐⇒
⇐⇒ lim
h→1/n
D = 0.
Together with the knowledge that:
∂D
∂h
= −
(n− 1)2 [h(1− φ) + φ] 2
{
φ−1
(n−1)[h(1−φ)+φ] − (1−φ)[φ(h+n−2)−h+1](n−1)[h(1−φ)+φ]2
}
φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1 − (n− 1)(1− φ)ν − n(1− φ)
= − (1− φ)
[
(1− φ)(1− hn)
φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1 + (n− 1)ν
]
< 0,
we find that D is strictly decreasing and thus positive in (0, 1/n). As a result, γ > 0
for h ∈ (0, 1/n) implying that partial agglomeration is unstable in that interval.
(ii). We will now show that, provided h ∈ (1/n, 1), γ < 0,∀(φ, n).
Observe that ν is negative for h ∈ (1/n, 1), as is the denominator of γ. Moreover, we
have −(n− 1) [h(1− φ) + φ] < 0 and (1−φ)(1− hn) < 0. This altogether implies that
γ < 0 if and only if:
D ≡ (1− φ)(1− hn)− (n− 1) [h(1− φ) + φ] ν < 0.
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From proof of Theorem 4.6, we know that the limit of D as h tends to 1/n is zero.
This, together with the knowledge that ∂D/∂h is positive for h ∈ (1/n, 1) ensures that
D is also positive in that interval. Thus, γ is always negative for h ∈ (1/n, 1), which
concludes the proof. 
4.C - Proofs of section 4.4
This Appendix contains the formal proofs concerning section 4. For simplicity, we
consider h˙i = fi(h), where fi(h) is defined in (4.18).
Proof of Proposition 4.7. The conditions required for a transcritical bifurcation
(Guckenheimer and Holmes 2002; pp. 149 and 150) are as follows:
(T1.) For all values of the bifurcation parameter φ, we must have fi( 1n , ...,
1
n
;φ) = 0.
This condition is satisfied since total dispersion is always an equilibrium.
(T2.) The Jacobian of fi(h) has a zero eigenvalue at total dispersion.
Condition (T2) requires:
∂fi
∂hi
( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
;φb) = 0,
which gives us the break point φb in the n-region model.
After (4.22), it is given by:
φb ≡ σ(1− λ) + λ0
λ+ n− σ [λ+ 2n− 1] .
(T3.) At total dispersion and at the break point we must have ∂2fi
∂h2i
( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
;φb) 6= 0.
The second derivative of fi with respect to hi at the symmetric equilibrium is given by:
∂2fi
∂h2i
( 1n , ...,
1
n ) =
µ(n− 2)(1− φ){φ2 [nσ(2λ+ 4n− 3)− 2n(λ+ n) + σ] + σφ [(3− 2λ)n− 2] + 2λnφ+ σ}
(σ − 1)σ [(n− 1)φ+ 1]3 .
When evaluated at the break point, we end up with:
∂2fi
∂h2i
( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
;φb) =
µ(n− 2)(1− 2σ)2
(λ+ 1)2(σ − 1)3 ,
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which is zero for n = 2 and positive for n ≥ 3.
(T4.) At total dispersion and at the break point we must have ∂2fi
∂hi∂φ
( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
;φb) 6= 0.
Computing ∂2fi
∂hi∂φ
at the symmetric equilibrium yields:
∂2fi
∂hi∂φ
( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
) = µn {2 [λ(σ − 1)(1− φ)− nσφ] + nφ+ φ− 1}
(σ − 1)σ [(n− 1)φ+ 1]3 .
Evaluating at the break point we then get:
∂2fi
∂hi∂φ
( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
;φb) =
µ(2σ − 1) [λ− σ(λ+ 2n) + n+ σ]2
(λ+ 1)2n(σ − 1)3σ > 0.
Since all conditions are verified, we conclude that the model undergoes a transcritical
bifurcation at the break point φb. 
Proof of Proposition 4.8. A necessary and sufficient condition for an interior
distribution with h ∈ (1/n, 1) to be a partial agglomeration equilibrium is given by
λ∗(h) in equation (4.34). We use the conditions for a saddle-node bifurcation given by
Guckenheimer and Holmes (2002, Theorem 3.4.1). Applied to the QLLog model, they
are as follows:
(SN1.) At partial agglomeration we must have df
dh
(h;λ∗(h);φf ) = 0.
In this instance, f(hi) is the RHS of (4.18) and the proof of Theorem 78 gives:
df
dh
(h;λ∗(h);φf ) = 0 ⇐⇒
δ = 0,
where δ is as in (4.26). We rewrite δ = 0 as:
(1− φf )(1− hn) [(n− 1)φf + 1]
Φ(h;φf )
= ν(h;φf ), (4.35)
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where
Φ(h, φf ) = h2n(1− φf )2 − 2h(1− φf )2 + φf {n [(n− 3)φf + 2] + 3φf − 4}+ 1,
ν(h, φf ) = ln
{
φf (h+ n− 2)− h+ 1
(n− 1) [h(1− φf ) + φf ]
}
,
and φf is the level of freeness of trade at which the interior equilibrium changes stability.
(SN2.) It is required that d
2f
dh2
(h;λ∗(h);φf ) 6= 0.
From (4.25) and (4.35), we have:
d2f
dh2
(h;λ∗(h);φf ) =
(h− 1)hµ(1− φ)2 [(n− 1)φ+ 1]2 Γ
(σ − 1) [h(1− φ) + φ]2 [φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1]2 Φ ,
where Γ(h, φ) = h2(n−2)(1−φ)2+2h(1−φ) [(2n− 3)φ+ 1]−φ {n [(n− 5)φ+ 2] + 5φ− 4}−
1. The term Φ is positive. Therefore, the derivative is zero if Γ(h;λ∗(h);φf ) = 0. We
will show that this leads to a contradiction. The term Γ(h, φ) has only one (meaningful)
zero given by:
h = h∗ ≡ −φ(2n(1− φ) + 3φ− 4)−
√
n− 1(1− φ) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] + 1
(n− 2)(1− φ)2 .
It suffices to show that (SN1) does not hold for this value of h. By replacing h = h∗ in
(4.26) we obtain:
df
dh
(h∗;λ∗(h);φf ) = δ(h∗) ≡ − [(n− 1)φ+ 1]
2
(n− 2)2 Ξ,
where:
Ξ =(n− 2)
[(√
n− 1 + 2
)
n− 2
]
+ (n− 1)
(
n+ 2
√
n− 1
)
log(n− 1).
Since Ξ > 0, it follows that δ(h∗) < 0. Hence, (SN1) does not hold and we arrive at a
contradiction. It follows that Γ(h;λ∗(h);φf ) 6= 0 and thus d2fdh2 (h;λ∗(h);φf ) 6= 0.
(SN3.) It is required that df
dφ
(h;λ∗(h);φf ) 6= 0.
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From (4.25) and (4.35), we have:
df
dφ
(h;λ∗(h);φf ) =
(1− h)hµ(hn− 1)×Θ
(σ − 1)σ [h(φ− 1)− φ] [φ(h+ n− 2)− h+ 1]× Φ ,
where Θ = h2n(1−φ)2−h(1−φ) {(n− 2)σ [(n− 1)φ+ 1]− 2φ+ 2}−σ [(n− 1)φ+ 1] (2nφ−
3φ+1)+φ {n [(n− 3)φ+ 2] + 3φ− 4}+1 < 0. Since the term hn−1 > 0 for h ∈ (1/n, 1),
we can conclude that df/dφ > 0 when evaluated at partial agglomeration and at φf ,
ensuring that (SN3) is satisfied. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.9. We know that total dispersion is stable if λ > λb,
whereas agglomeration is stable if λ < λs. As a result, both equilibria are simultaneously
stable if there is a λ ∈ (λb, λs). Using (4.21) and (4.24), simultaneity of stability of
stability then requires λs − λb > 0 :
nφ [(σ − 1)(1− φ)− σ lnφ]
(σ − 1)(φ− 1)2 −
σ(2nφ+ 1− φ)− nφ
(σ − 1)(1− φ) . > 0 ⇐⇒
−(1− φ) [(n− 1)φ+ 1] + nφ log(φ)(σ − 1)(1− φ)2 > 0 ⇐⇒
− (1− φ)
2
φ(1− φ+ lnφ) < n,
which concludes the proof. 
4.D - Proofs of section 4.5
This Appendix contains the formal proofs concerning section 5.
Proof of Theorem 4.11. From (4.17), we know that the average nominal wage
paid to entrepreneurs is given by w¯ = µ
σ
(1 + λ). Therefore, the entrepreneur’s weighted
average utility is given by:
V¯ = µ
σ
(1 + λ) + µ
σ − 1
n∑
i=1
hi ln
 n∑
j=1
φijhj
+ η.
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By using hj = φhj + (1− φ)hj and ∑nj=1 hj = 1, V¯ simplifies to:
V¯ = µ
σ − 1
n∑
j=1
hj ln [φ+ (1− φ)hj] + µ
σ
(λ+ 1) + η.
Let us now define the summation term in V¯ as F (h) = f(h1) + f(h2) + ...+ f(hn−1) +
g(hn), where f : R 7→ R is continuous and twice differentiable, hn : (h1, h2, ..., hn−1) 7→
1− h1 − ...− hn−1, and g(hn) = f ◦ hn : Rn−1 7→ R. For each i 6= n, we have:
f ′′(hi) =
2 (1− φ) [φ+ (1− φ)hi]− hi (1− φ)
[φ+ (1− φ)hi]2
.
The derivative is positive if 2 [φ+ (1− φ)hi] > hi (1− φ) ⇐⇒ hi > −2φ/ (1− φ),
which is always true. Hence, each f(hi) is a strictly convex function for all i 6= n. Next,
we will show that the last term of F (h), g(hn), is also convex. First:
g
[
t(h01, ..., h0n−1) + (1− t)(h11, ..., h1n−1)
]
= g
[
th01 + (1− t)h11, ..., th0n−1 + (1− t)h1n−1
]
=
= f
[
1− th01 − (1− t)h11 − ...th0n−1 − (1− t)h1n−1
]
=
= f
[
1− t(h01 + ...+ h0n−1)− (1− t)(h11 + ...+ h1n−1)
]
.
Second, we have:
tg(h01, ..., h0n−1) + (1− t)g(h11, ..., h1n−1) = tf(1− h01 − ...− h0n−1) + (1− t)f(1− h11 − ...− h1n−1).
Since f is strictly convex, it follows that:
tf(1− h01 − ...− h0n−1) + (1− t)f(1− h11 − ...− h1n−1) ≥ f
[
t(1− h01 − ...− h0n−1) + (1− t)(1− h11 − ...− h1n−1)
]
=
= f
[
1− t(h01 + ...+ h0n−1)− (1− t)
]
(h11 + ...+ h1n−1).
We then conclude that:
g
[
t(h01, ..., h0n−1) + (1− t)(h11, ..., h1n−1)
] ≤ tg(h01, ..., h0n−1) + (1− t)g(h11, ..., h1n−1),
which implies that g(hn) is convex. Since F (h) is a sum of strictly convex functions, it
is strictly convex in h. Therefore, V¯ , a constant plus F (h), is also strictly convex.
Since ∂hiV¯
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
= 0 (see proof of proposition 4.3), the first order condition for
a minimum is satisfied. Given that V¯ is convex in h, it attains a global minimum at
dispersion, concluding the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 4.12. Define the summation in (4.29) as F (h) = f(h1)+f(h2)+
... + f(hn−1) + g(hn), where hn : (h1, h2, ..., hn−1) 7→ 1 − h1 − ... − hn−1. The second
derivative of each f(hi) is given by:
f ′′(hi) = − (1− φ)
2
[h(1− φ) + φ] 2 < 0.
Then, f(hi) is strictly concave. Analogous reasoning to that of Proof of Theorem 4.11
permits to show that g(hn) = f ◦ hn : Rn−1 7→ R is also strictly concave. Since F (h) is
a sum of strictly concave functions, it is itself strictly concave in h. Therefore, V¯ L, a
constant term plus F (h), is also strictly concave.
Each price index Pi in (4.15) is invariant to the permutation of any two region’s coor-
dinates. Therefore, we can assert that ∂hiV¯ L
(
1
n
, ..., 1
n
)
= 0, ∀i ∈ N .32 Given strict
concavity, V¯ L attains a maximum at h = (1/n, ..., 1/n), which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.13. Rewrite the social welfare function Ω(h) in (4.31) as:
Ω(h) = a+ g(h1) + g(h2) + ...+ g(hn). (4.36)
The optimization plan for Ω(h) consists on maximizing (minimizing) (4.36) subject
to the constraint ∑nj=1 hi = 1. We can write the Lagrangian function as L(h, γ) =
g(h1) + g(h2) + ... + g(hn) + γ(1 − h1 − ... − hn), where γ is the Lagrange multiplier.
The FOC’s for the optimization problem are, consistently, given by:

g′(h1) = γ
g′(h2) = γ
... ...
g′(hn) = γ.
32For a more formal reasoning, see Proof of Proposition 4.3 in Appendix B.
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Since the RHS is the same for every FOC, we must have g′(h1) = g′(h2) = ... = g′(hn).
Each g′(hi) is given by:
g′(hi) =
(1− φ)(hin+ λ)
hin(1− φ) + nφ + ln [hi(1− φ) + φ] .
The second derivative g′′(hi) is given by:
g′′(hi) = −(1− φ) [λ− hin(1− φ) +−φ(λ+ 2n)]
n [hi(1− φ) + φ)]2
,
which has either one zero for h ∈ [0, 1] or none. Therefore, g′(hi) is either concave or
convex. This implies that, at most, two different values of hi ∈ [0, 1] may correspond
to g′(hi) = γ. The consequence of this is that all potential maximizers (or minimizers)
of Ω(h) are characterized by a vector h = (h1, h2, ..., hn) such that k of its elements
correspond to a share of entrepreneurs equal to h/k and the remaining n− k elements
have a share equal to (1− h)/(n− k).33 This concludes the proof. 
Social welfare along the invariant space Ω(h ∈ ∆inv). Social welfare Ω(h)
attains a critical value at symmetric dispersion, because the derivatives of the farmers’
and entrepreneurs’ average utilities with respect to each hi are both equal to zero. The
other candidates for possible extrema are computed as follows. Equating Ω′(h) in (4.32)
to zero, we get:
λ∗max(h) ≡ λ =
3(3h− 1)(1− φ)φ− 3 [h(1− φ)− φ] [h(1− φ)− φ− 1] log
[ 2(h(1− φ) + φ)
h(φ− 1) + φ+ 1
]
(3h− 1)(1− φ)2 .
It is possible to show that λ∗max has at most two solutions for h ∈ [0, 1] \ {1/3}.34
This implies that Ω(h) has at most three critical points (including h = 1/n). More-
over, λ∗max(h) < λ∗(h) defined in (4.25) for n = 3 and h > 1/3, which means that
Ω′(h ∈ ∆inv) 6= 0 when evaluated at a partial agglomeration equilibrium. Therefore,
33This includes both dispersion if h = 1/n and agglomeration in any region h = 1.
34The analysis is similar to that of section 3.4.1. In fact, there exists at most one zero in (0, 1/n),
and at most two in (1/n, 1).
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no (market) stable partial agglomeration equilibrium corresponds to a socially optimal
partial agglomeration. Differentiating Ω(h) twice yields a second order polynomial in
h, which means that Ω′′(h) has at most two zeros and thus Ω(h) changes concavity at
most twice. This implies that Ω(h) can be in principle “W”-shaped or “M”-shaped.
The former can be ruled out numerically which means that Ω(h) can have, at most,
two maxima (including h = 0 and h = 1).35
Proof of Theorem 4.15.
(i). Define the summation term of Ω(h) in (4.31) as F (h) = f(h1)+f(h2)+...+f(hn−1)+
g(hn), where hn : (h1, h2, ..., hn−1) 7→ 1− h1 − ...− hn−1. The second derivative of each
f(hi) evaluated at hi = 1/n is given by:
∂2f(hi)
∂2hi
∣∣∣∣∣
hi=
1
n
= n(1− φ) [φ(λ+ 2n− 1)− λ+ 1][(n− 1)φ+ 1] 2 .
The derivative is negative if and only if:
φ < φw ≡ λ− 1
λ+ 2n− 1 .
Using (4.22), it is easily verified that φb < φw. If φ < φb < φw, symmetric dispersion
is stable and f(hi) is concave. Given that f : R 7→ R is strictly concave, replicating
the reasoning from the proof of Theorem 4.11 allows us to conclude that g(hn) =
f ◦ hn : Rn−1 7→ R is also strictly concave. Therefore, F (h) is strictly concave for
h = (1/n, ..., 1/n) and Ω(h), a constant term plus F (h), is also strictly concave at
symmetric dispersion when the latter is stable. Since Ω(h) attains a critical value at
symmetric dispersion, we conclude that the latter always attains a local maximum when
it is stable.
Evaluating welfare at symmetric dispersion gives us:
Ω
( 1
n
, ...,
1
n
)
= 1
λ+ 1
[
ε+ µ(λ+ 1)(σ − 1) ln
(
φ+ 1− φ
n
)]
.
35And also, at most, three minima.
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At agglomeration, welfare is given by:
Ω(hi = 1) =
1
λ+ 1
[
ε+ µλ(n− 1)(σ − 1)n lnφ
]
.
This implies that agglomeration yields a higher welfare than dispersion dispersion if
and only if:
∆Ω ≡ λ(n− 1)
n
lnφ− (λ+ 1) ln
(
φ+ 1− φ
n
)
> 0.
The difference ∆Ω is concave in φ, has a zero for φ ∈ (0, 1) and another at φ = 1, and
is negative at φ = φb. Symmetric dispersion is thus strictly better than agglomeration
from a social point of view when the former is stable.
(ii). It can be shown that Ω′(1) is concave in φ with only one root φz ∈ (0, 1) and
another at φ = 1. Moreover, it is negative when evaluated at the sustain point φs,
which implies that φs < φz. Therefore, there exists a φ ∈ (φs, φz) where agglomeration
is stable and Ω′(1) < 0, meaning that welfare is higher at another less asymmetric
distribution. This concludes the proof.

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Chapter 5
Economic Geography meets
Hotelling: a home-sweet-home
effect
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5.1 Introduction
New Economic Geography (NEG) seeks to explain the observed uneven spatial distri-
bution of economic activities. In the prosecution of this objective, it hinges heavily on
pecuniary factors such as inter-regional real wage differentials. As such, it frequently
overlooks the fact that potential migrants are heterogeneous, not only regarding their
tastes for manufactured goods, or their skill levels, but also regarding their idiosyncratic
preferences for residential location. Countries, cities, or generically regions, typically
differ in characteristics, each having its own tangible and intangible amenities. Some
regions may be perceived as better for most people because they have a considerable
advantage in these amenities compared to others (for instance, better provision of faci-
lities such as communal areas, parks, lower crime rates, or more pleasant views). Other
regional characteristics are perceived differently by different individuals. This is the
case for cultural and historic amenities, whose advantages are subjective as they are
typically perceived differently by different individuals and therefore each individual’s
response or attachment is more idiosyncratic (Rodríguez-Pose and Ketterer, 2012). In
this sense, some places may have clear advantages over others for everyone, while ot-
hers are only advantageous to certain people (Storper and Manville, 2006; Albouy et
al., 2015).
Most literature on residential location choice typically focuses on the first case, where
all consumers respond in the same way to interregional differences. However, when
consumers are differentiated with respect to their (cultural or historical) attachment
to different regions, then regions which are more industrialized and developed may fail
to attract some potential migrants from less developed regions. The fact that some
people think that “there is no place like home” implies that agents may effectively be
less willing to leave their region of origin. These individual idiosyncrasies in preferences
towards different locations constitutes an actual dispersive force, a fact which should be
considered in NEG (Fujita and Mori, 2005; Combes et al., 2008), but is not envisaged
by most models. Some notable exceptions in NEG are the works of Murata (2003),
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), Combes et al. (2008), Akamatsu et al. (2012) and Redding
(2016), who have considered the role of heterogeneous location preferences borrowing
from the literature of discrete choice theory (see McFadden, 1974). Another important
contribution is that of Mossay (2003), where geography is treated in a continuous
circular space, and individual preferences for residential location are assumed to follow
a random walk process.
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In discrete choice theory models of random utility, agents draw their utility from a
deterministic observable component (e.g., consumption from manufactured goods) and
another random unobservable component which represents their idiosyncratic tastes
(like preferences for residential location that stem from intangible amenities). When
each of the unobservable random components of utility are assumed to be indepen-
dently, identically, extreme value Type I distributed, the choice probabilities for each
alternative are given by the well known Logit model (McFadden, 1974). Since it has a
very simple closed form, it is generally one of the first choices used for qualitative beha-
vioural choice (Train, 2009). Under the logit, inter-regional migration thus responds to
the realization of a random variable (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002; Anderson et al., 1992).
In this paper, we propose a Core-Periphery (CP) model where consumers are hete-
rogeneous with respect to their preferences toward living in one country or the other.
While the countries are dimensionless points in physical space, from a consumer’s per-
spective, they are located at the opposite extremes of a virtual (or psychological) line
segment, which we assume to be the unit interval. Each consumer’s residential pre-
ference is then revealed by his location on the interval. The two consumers who are
located at 0 and 1 are those who have an extremely high preference for just one region,
and a lower preference for the other. The consumer at 1/2 has a similar preference for
either countries. This is an adaptation of Hotelling’s (1929) linear city to residential
location choice, where two differentiated regions play the role of two horizontally diffe-
rentiated goods. We thus attempt to reconcile Krugman’s (1991) framework, grounded
on market factors as determinants of spatial agglomeration, with a Hotelling frame-
work that focuses on heterogeneity concerning non-market factors. This heterogeneity,
by attaching consumers to their most preferred region, acts as a dispersive force on the
distribution of economic activities.
The short-run equilibrium is identical to Murata (2003) and Tabuchi et al. (2014;
2016), with one single good manufactured under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition
and a homogeneous workforce (regarding skill levels) that is interregionally mobile.1 All
consumers who live in a given country draw the same utility from consumption goods.
1To the best of our knowledge, the first attempt towards an NEG model where all labour is inter-
regionally mobile was put forward by Helpman (1998), where the dispersive force stems from a non-
tradable housing sector.
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However, each consumer bears an utility decrement which is a decreasing function of
his preference toward residing in their country. Therefore, those who have a lower
(higher) preference for a country (i.e., who are located farther away from one extreme
of the virtual line segment) will get a lower (higher) overall utility if they reside in that
country. In the long-run, consumers choose to live in the country that offers them the
highest overall utility. The long-run spatial distribution of consumers can then be seen
as the result of two counteracting forces. On the one hand, gains from agglomeration
due to increasing returns generate a higher utility differential from consumption goods
in the more populated country. This promotes the concentration of economic activities.
On the other hand, the less a consumer wishes to live in a country (as revealed by
his position on the unit interval), the higher the utility penalty differential he bears
if he resides there. We call this utility penalty the home-sweet-home effect, which
contributes to the dispersion of consumers across the countries. In the long-run, this
effect is analogous to congestion costs that are increasing in the population size of a
country.
We show that the probabilistic migration setting according to the Logit formulation
(Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002; Murata, 2003; Akamatsu et al., 2012) yields a specific
closed form expression for the decrement in the utility function due to heterogeneous
preferences in our model.2 However, our framework is broader in the sense that we are
able to take account of qualitatively different forms of heterogeneity. Borrowing from
Hotelling’s linear city model, we adapt the linear transportation costs function to our
utility penalty.
The Logit model corresponds to a situation where the home-sweet-home effect (uti-
lity penalty differential) is exponentially increasing in the distribution of consumer
preferences for residential location. For the consumer who has the highest preference
toward a country, his utility penalty from residing in the other country tends to in-
finity. Intuitively, we can say that full agglomeration is precluded, because there is
always a fraction of consumers (no matter how small) who will want to live in the less
industrialized country due to their high personal attachment to it.
With a linear utility penalty, the home-sweet-home effect is linearly increasing in
2In this sense, the Hotelling model can be reinterpreted as a discrete choice random utility model
(Anderson et al., 1992).
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the distribution of consumer preferences. Under this setting, we show that both the
symmetric equilibrium and agglomeration may be simultaneously stable. If this occurs,
selection between the two possible spatial outcomes depends on the initial spatial dis-
tribution, that is, “history matters” (Krugman, 1991; Matsuyama, 1991; Redding et
al., 2011). If spatial imbalances are initially very high, the relative utility in the more
industrialized country is so high that all consumers will decide to agglomerate in one
single country. Intuitively, even the consumers with stronger preferences will want to
avoid exceedingly low standards of living. Conversely, if regional disparities are initially
low, consumers will disperse evenly among the countries. The regional utility differen-
tial is not enough to offset even the consumers who make almost no distinction between
the countries.
We show that, whatever the scale and distribution of consumer preferences for resi-
dential location, stability of the symmetric dispersion equilibrium (resp. agglomeration
equilibrium) becomes more (less) likely and partial agglomeration becomes more sym-
metric as transportation costs fall. This happens because regional real wage differen-
tials shrink as trade barriers fall, which reduces the incentives for workers to relocate
from the less populated country to the more populated one. This is a reversion of the
usual prediction that lower transport costs lead to agglomeration, and contrasts the
findings that consumer heterogeneity leads to a bell-shaped relationship between decre-
asing transport costs and spatial inequality (Murata, 2003; Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002).
Hence, when all labour is inter-regionally mobile, spatial imbalances decrease as regions
become more integrated. One economic intuition is that the absence of an immobile
workforce decreases the incentive for firms to relocate to smaller markets in order to
capture a higher share of local demand and avoid competition when transport costs
are higher. Krugman and Elizondo (1996), Helpman (1998) and Murata and Thisse
(2005), have also obtained similar results concerning the relationship between trans-
portation costs and spatial inequality. The first includes a congestion cost in the core,
the second considers a non-tradable housing sector and the treatment is only numerical,
while the latter’s prediction cannot be disassociated from the interplay between inter-
regional transportation costs and intra-regional commuting costs. Recently, Tabuchi
et al. (2016) have reached similar conclusions to ours arguing that falling transport
costs increase the incentives for firms in peripheral regions to increase production since
they have a better access to the core, thus contributing to the dispersion of economic
activities. Empirically consistent with our findings is the work of Allen and Arkolakis
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(2014) who have estimated that the removal of the US Interstate Highway System,
which, by limiting accesses, can be interpreted as an increase in transportation costs,
would cause a redistribution of the population from more economically remote regions
to less remote regions in the US.
It is the goal of this paper to dwell further in the role of consumer heterogeneity,
showing that not only does it matters, but it has the potential to produce very different
predictions about the spatial distribution of economic activities. As such, while the
structure of spatial distributions remains invariant under changes in particular types
of heterogeneity (like the Logit model), it changes when we introduce preferences that
are qualitatively different. For instance, under linear or concave preferences, some
of the predictions of the original CP model (Krugman, 1991), such as catastrophic
agglomeration and locational hysteresis, are recovered.
Nevertheless, while heterogeneity is a contributing factor to reduced labour mobility,
it alone bears no implications on the relation between decreasing trade barriers and the
level of spatial inequality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model
and the short-run equilibrium. In section 3 we study the qualitative properties of
the long-run equilibria for a generic utility penalty. In section 4 we integrate discrete
choice theory based migration in our set-up and compare its results with different
specifications of the home-sweet-home effect. In section 5, we briefly discuss the impact
of trade integration on spatial imbalances. Finally, section 6 is left for some concluding
remarks.
5.2 The model
There are two countries L and R with a total population of mass 1. Consumers are
assumed to have heterogeneous preferences with respect to the country in which they
reside. For simplicity, we assume that these preferences are described by a parameter x,
uniformly distributed along the interval [0, 1]. The consumer with preference described
by x = 0 (resp. x = 1) has the highest preference for residing in country L (resp.
country R). An agent whose preference corresponds to x = 1/2 is indifferent between
either country. We can thus refer to each consumer with respect to his preference
towards living in country L as x ∈ [0, 1]. The two countries L and R can be thought of
as two points on opposite sides of the line segment [0, 1]. This interpretation is analogous
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to that of the linear city model by Hotelling (1929), which can be conveniently adapted
to problems dealing with heterogeneity and diversity of agents across a wide array of
economic domains (Rosen, 2002).
For a consumer with preference x, the utilities from living in country L and R are
given, respectively, by:
UL(x) =U (CL, t(x))
UR(x) =U (CR, t(1− x)) , (5.1)
where Ci denotes the level of consumption of a consumer living in country i ∈ {L,R},
and t(x) is the utility penalty associated with living in L, while t(1 − x) is the utility
penalty a consumer faces from living in country R. Countries are symmetric in all
respects. We assume that t′(x) > 0, ∂U/∂C > 0, and ∂U/∂t < 0.
The derivations and expressions for the short-run equilibrium are similar to those
made by Murata (2003) and Tabuchi et al. (2014, 2016). This stems from the fact that
we are considering only a monopolistically competitive sector that produces a tradeable
good under transport costs. The consumption aggregate is a CES composite given by:
C =
[ˆ
s∈S
c(s)
σ−1
σ ds
] σ
σ−1
,
where s stands for the variety produced by each monopolistically competitive firm and
σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The consumer is
subject to the following budget constraint:
PiCi = wi,
where Pi is the price index and wi is the nominal wage in region i. Utility maximization
by a consumer in region i yields the following demand for each manufactured variety
produced in j and consumed in i:
cij =
p−σij
P 1−σi
wi, (5.2)
where:
Pi =
[ˆ
s∈S
pi(s)1−σd(s)
] 1
1−σ
, (5.3)
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is the manufacturing price index for region i. A manufacturing firm faces the following
cost function:
TC(q) = w (βq + α) ,
where q corresponds to a firm’s total production of manufacturing goods, β is the input
requirement (per unit of output) and α is the fixed input requirement. The manufactu-
ring good is subject to trade barriers in the form of iceberg costs, τ ∈ (1,+∞): a firm
ships τ units of a good to a foreign country for each unit that arrives there. Assuming
free entry in the manufacturing sector, at equilibrium firms will earn zero profits, which
translates into the following condition:
pi ≡ (p− βw) q − αw = 0,
which gives the firm’s total equilibrium output, symmetric across countries:
qL = qR =
α(σ − 1)
β
, (5.4)
and the following profit maximizing prices:
pLL =
βσ
σ − 1wL and pRL =
βστ
σ − 1wL. (5.5)
The number of varieties in each region is, therefore, proportional to the number of
agents:
nL
nR
= hL
hR
= h1− h,
where h is the fraction of agents residing in country L. Labour-market clearing implies
that the number of agents in region L equals labour employed by a firm times the
number of varieties produced in a region:
h = nL (α + βqL) ,
from where, using (5.4), we get:
nL =
h
σα
and nR =
1− h
σα
. (5.6)
Choosing labour in region R as the numeraire, we can normalize wR to 1. The price
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index PL in (5.3) then becomes, after (5.6):
PL =
 h
σα
(
βσ
σ − 1w
)1−σ
+ 1− h
σα
(
βστ
σ − 1
)1−σ
1
1−σ
, (5.7)
whereas the price index in R is given by:
PR =
1− h
σα
(
βσ
σ − 1
)1−σ
+ h
σα
(
βστ
σ − 1w
)1−σ
1
1−σ
. (5.8)
Rewriting a firm’s profit in region L as:
piL = (pLL − βw) [hcLL + (1− h)τcRL]− αw,
the zero profit condition yields, after using (5.2), (5.5) and (5.7), the following wage
equation:
1 = hw
1−σ
hw1−σ + φ(1− h) +
φ(1− h)w−σ
1− h+ hφw1−σ , (5.9)
where φ ≡ τ 1−σ ∈ (0, 1) is the freeness of trade. Since h is given in the short-run,
we are interested in finding the nominal wage as a function of the spatial distribution,
which is impossible to obtain explicitly, except for very specific values of σ. However,
manipulating the expression in (5.9), we can write:
h = w
σ − φ
wσ − φ+ w(w−σ − φ) . (5.10)
The nominal wage w can be implicitly defined as a function of the spatial distribution
in country L, h ∈ [0, 1].3 We have w(0) = φ1/σ < 1, w(1/2) = 1 and w(1) = φ−1/σ > 1.
We say that L is larger than R when h > 1/2, and smaller otherwise. The nominal
wage is strictly increasing in the spatial distribution (Proposition 6 in Appendix A).4
3The conditions for application of the Implicit Function Theorem are shown to be satisfied in
Appendix A.
4This also guarantees that h < 1 in (5.10). This holds if if w−σ − φ > 0. Since w−σ(h) ∈ (φ, 1φ ),
the statement is true.
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Moreover, if σ ≥ 2,5 the nominal wage is convex when country L is larger than country
R (Proposition 7 in Appendix A). The first result corresponds to the home-market effect
identified by Krugman (1991). The second result states that the home-market effect is
magnified as the industrial size difference between countries becomes more pronounced.
Figure 5.1 illustrates w(h) for h ∈ [0, 1] with parameter values σ = 2 and φ = 0.5.6
Figure 5.1 – Short-run equilibrium relative wage as a function of the consumers
in country L. We set σ = 2 and φ = 0.5.
Remark 5.1. When h > 1/2, the relative wage w increases when trade barriers are higher
(see Proposition 8 in Appendix A). Conversely, if h < 1/2, higher trade barriers implies
lower wages in L. Therefore, whatever the initial spatial distribution of consumers,
higher trade barriers increase the wage divergence between the countries.
The intuition is as follows. When all workers are mobile, they can move to the
region that offers them a relatively better access to varieties. This advantage of the
larger country becomes higher as transport costs increase because markets become
more focused on local demand (i. e., more localized). At the same time, the absence
of a fixed number of immobile consumers in the smaller region implies that there is
a reduced incentive to relocate production in order to capture a larger share of the
market while avoiding costly transportation. All this increases expenditures in the
5In section 3.2 we discuss that this assumption is innocuous on empirical grounds.
6Our choice of parameters is made for graphical convenience and extends to the whole parameter
range, unless stated otherwise. Therefore, the conclusions under our choice are consistent with more
realistic empirical estimates.
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larger region relative to the smaller, which in turn pushes the nominal relative wage
upwards. Krugman (1991) identifies this as the home-market effect.
5.3 Long-run equilibria
We consider a general isoelastic sub-utility for consumption goods:

ui =
C1−θi − 1
1− θ , if θ ∈ [0, 1) ∪ (1,+∞)
ui = lnCi, if θ = 1,
,
where for θ = 1 we take the limit value of the upper expression of ui. The parameter
θ = −Ciu′′i (Ci)/u′i(Ci) is the rate at which marginal utility in country i decreases
as consumption increases. It also influences how a change in the regional consumption
differential, CL−CR, impacts the regional utility differential, uL−uR. If θ = 0, changes
in uL−uR are proportional to the corresponding change in relative consumption. From
an economic perspective, we can say that θ defines how the relative attractiveness of a
country changes in response to relative regional consumption levels. It thus influences
the strength of the self-reinforcing agglomeration mechanism when one country is more
populated than the other.
In a long-run spatial equilibrium, h consumers live in country L and 1−h consumers
live in country R. Knowing from utility maximization that C = W/P and assuming
that the utility is linear in t(x), we rewrite the indirect utilities as:
VL(h) =
C1−θL − 1
1− θ − t(h)
VR(h) =
C1−θR − 1
1− θ − t(1− h), (5.11)
where h satisfies the short-run equilibrium in (5.10). Notice that t(h) in (5.11) is deri-
ved from the way preferences for residential location affect each individual differently.
However, its impact can be seen as analogous to that of congestion costs that do not
affect the demand for consumption goods directly.7 Take the case of pollution. In that
7One commonly source of congestion cost stems from increasing housing prices. However, these
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instance, we could look at t(h) as a cost of pollution that is increasing in the population
(or industry) size in a country. In other words, our model has a correspondence with
others where congestion costs depend solely on population size.
In the short run, the spatial distribution of consumers is given. In the long-run,
we say that all consumers in the interval (0, h) prefer to live in country L, whereas the
consumers in (h, 1) prefer to live in country R. The indifferent consumer h, identified
by his position on the line, is thus obtained from equalization of indirect utilities VL(h)
and VR(1− h). Using the price indices in (5.7), the indirect utilities in (5.11) become:
VL(h) = η
w1−θ [(1− h)φ+ hw1−σ]
1−θ
σ−1 − 1
1− θ − t(h)
VR(h) = η
[1− h+ hφw1−σ]
1−θ
σ−1 − 1
1− θ − t(1− h), (5.12)
where η = {(σ − 1)/ [σβ]} (σα)1/(σ−1).
Workers are free to migrate to the region that offers them the highest indirect utility.
We focus on the difference between the regional utility in country L and the regional
utility in country R. A consumer is indifferent between both countries if the utility
differential from consumption goods, ∆u ≡ uL − uR, is equal to the utility penalty
differential t(h)− t(1− h), with:
∆u =

η
1− θ
{
w1−θ [(1− h)φ+ hw1−σ]
1−θ
σ−1 − [1− h+ hφw1−σ]
1−θ
σ−1
}
, if θ 6=1
lnw + 1
σ − 1 ln
[
hw1−σ+(1−h)φ
hφw1−σ+(1−h)
]
, if θ=1.
(5.13)
The utility penalty differential t(h)−t(1−h) is what we call the home-sweet-home effect,
i.e., the relative cost supported by the indifferent consumer h who lives in country L.
The consumers who have an attachment towards country R (at x ∈ (1/2, 1]) face a
positive cost when migrating to country L. Therefore, the home-sweet-home effect
constitutes a dispersive force driving consumers from country L back to country R.
Henceforth, we adopt the normalizations by Fujita et al. (1999), i.e., ασ = 1 so
typically also affect the consumer’s budget constrain and thus could not correspond to our setting.
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that the number of consumers in a country equals its number of firms. Moreover, we
assume that (σ − 1)/(σβ) = 1 so that the price of each manufactured variety in a
country equals its workers’ nominal wage. These imply that η = 1. For θ = 1, we may
discard any of the preceding normalizations as taking differences from utilities cancels
out ln [η/(1− θ)]. This means that, if utility in consumption is logarithmic, labour
input requirements do not affect differences in regional utilities.
Proposition 5.2. The utility differential ∆u is increasing in h.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The nominal wage gap w increases as country L becomes more populated. The same
happens to the price differential PR−PL (see equations 5.7 and 5.8)8, which constitutes
an agglomerative cost-of-living effect. These results explain the fact that the relative
utility from consumption goods in country L, as measured by the relative real wage,
becomes larger and larger as the population in L increases. To counter this process
of self-reinforcing tendency towards full agglomeration, we have the dispersive home-
sweet-home effect; it is the interplay between these forces that ultimately determines
the spatial configuration of the economy.
Figure 5.2 depicts ∆u in (5.13) for different levels of θ and with parameter values
φ = 0.5 and σ = 2.
8Refer also to Tabuchi et al. (2016) for a more detailed analysis.
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Figure 5.2 – Utility differential ∆u = uL − uR for different levels of θ. Parameter
values are σ = 2 and φ = 0.5.
We observe that a higher θ increases the utility differential ∆u for any spatial
distribution h > 1/2. Therefore, if L is relatively more industrialized, a higher θ
increases the attractiveness of L relative to R for consumers. Thus, it strengthens the
agglomeration forces towards country L.
5.3.1 Agglomeration
Since the model is symmetric in all respects, we focus on agglomeration in country L,
without loss of generality. We say that agglomeration with all population residing in
country L is an equilibrium if the individual with propensity x = 1 desires to stay at
country L, which implies that all other individuals will also want to reside in L. This
requires that the utility in the core, L, must be higher than the utility in the periphery,
R. If these conditions are met, agglomeration is stable.9 In formal terms, this implies
that u(1)− t(1) > u(0)− t(0). Alternatively, the utility differential ∆u(1) must exceed
the home-sweet-home effect, t(1) − t(0), when country L is the core. We have the
following result.
Proposition 5.3. Stability of agglomeration is as follows:
9Therefore, one can say that agglomeration is stable if it is an equilibrium.
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(i). When θ 6= 1, it is stable if
1− φ
(2σ−1)(1−θ)
σ(σ−1)
1− θ > t(1)− t(0); (5.14)
(ii). When θ = 1, it is stable if:
−
[
2σ − 1
σ(σ − 1)
]
lnφ > t(1)− t(0); (5.15)
Proof. Agglomeration in L is stable if ∆u(1) > t(1) − t(0). Using the first expression
in (5.13) at h = 1, for θ 6= 1, we have:
1− φ
(2σ−1)(1−θ)
σ(σ−1)
1− θ > t(1)− t(0), for θ 6= 1.
For θ = 1, ∆u at h = 1 is given by the limit of the expression above as θ tends to unity:
−
[
2σ − 1
σ(σ − 1)
]
lnφ > t(1)− t(0).
This concludes the proof.
Agglomeration in country L is stable when the consumer who likes country L the
least still prefers to live in L, rather then to stay alone in country R. This happens if
the home-sweet-home effect is not too strong. The utility differential when all workers
reside in country L, ∆u(1), is given by the LHS’s of expressions (5.14) and (5.15). Ana-
lytical inspection shows that ∆u(1) is decreasing in φ (for any value of θ). Therefore,
the utility gain from residing in the core instead of in the periphery is decreasing in
the freeness of trade. This means that, as countries become more integrated, agglome-
ration becomes harder to sustain. As φ approaches unity, ∆u(1) approaches zero, and
agglomeration is always unstable: when all consumers are mobile, the incentive to avoid
fiercer competition in the core region (market crowding effect) is lower because no local
demand exists in the periphery. In the absence of a fixed immobile local demand, the
burden of costly transportation can be avoided altogether if everyone agglomerates in a
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single region.10 Therefore, the tendency to agglomerate will be stronger when transport
costs are higher.
This reverses the conclusion of many CP models, whereby decreasing transport costs
foster agglomeration. One should note, however, that most CP models consider that
part of the workforce is inter-regionally immobile, which means that local expenditure
(even in smaller regions) is still significant such that firms in larger regions have an
incentive to relocate their production in order to avoid fiercer local competition.11
From a numerical perspective, the utility differential ∆u(1) is increasing in θ.
Figure 5.3 – Utility differential when all consumers reside in country L, given by
the LHS of (5.14), in (φ, θ) space. The utility differential is increasing in θ for any
φ ∈ (0, 1). We set σ = 2.
This is clear from Figure 5.3 where we depict ∆u(1) in (φ, θ) space. It shows
that a higher θ increases the relative attractiveness of the core region and thus fosters
agglomeration.
5.3.2 Interior equilibria
Again, due to symmetry, we focus only on the case where L is larger than R, i.e.,
h ≥ 1/2. We define an interior equilibrium h∗ ∈ [1/2, 1) as a spatial distribution h
10This fact was noted by Baldwin et al. (2004).
11In most of these models (e.g., Krugman, 1999; Fujita et al., 1999; Ottaviano et al., 2002; Forslid
and Ottaviano, 2003; Pflüger, 2004), the dispersive force is higher when transport costs are very high
because markets are more localized. Therefore, as transport costs rise, centrifugal forces increase more
than centripetal forces, promoting agglomeration.
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that satisfies both (5.10) and VL = VR (i.e., an interior equilibrium is given by the
indifferent consumer defined at the beginning of section 3). Such an equilibrium is said
to be stable if, after a small exogenous migration, the consumer with propensity to
locate in country L just slightly lower than the indifferent consumer (i.e., the consumer
located at x+ ε), will still rather live in L. Formally, if d (VL − VR) /dh < 0.
5.3.2.1 Symmetric dispersion
The symmetric dispersion (equilibrium) corresponds to h∗ = 1/2, which is always a
solution to VL = VR irrespective of the home-sweet-home effect. We establish the
following result.
Proposition 5.4. Symmetric dispersion is stable if:
d∆u
dh
(
1
2
)
≡ 2(2σ − 1)(1− φ)
(
1+φ
2
) 1−θ
σ−1
(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1) < t
′ (1
2
)
. (5.16)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 5.5. The condition in (5.16) holds for θ ∈ [0,+∞), as substituting for θ = 1
yields:
2(2σ − 1)(1− φ)
(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1) < t
′ (1
2
)
,
which gives us exactly the same as computing stability using the second expression in
(5.13) (see Appendix C).
A careful inspection of (5.16) allows us to conclude that the LHS is decreasing in φ
if θ ≥ 1. For θ < 1, it is decreasing in φ if σ ≥ 1 +√2/2 ≈ 1.71. Symmetric dispersion
then becomes easier to sustain under lower transportation costs if σ > 1+
√
2/2, which,
according to recent empirical estimations for σ, is more than reasonable.12 Since t(h)
does not depend on φ, this result does not depend on the home-sweet-home effect. As φ
approaches unity, the LHS of (5.16) goes to zero and dispersion is always stable. Since,
at symmetric dispersion, consumers in each country have access to the same amount of
12Estimations evidence that σ should be significantly larger than unity (Crozet, 2004; Head and
Mayer, 2004; Niebuhr, 2006; Bosker et al., 2010). Anderson and Wincoop (2004), for instance, find
that it is likely to range from 5 to 10.
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manufactures, an exogenous migration will induce a lower (higher) benefit from local
consumption goods in the larger market if transport costs are lower (higher). This is
captured by the fact that the relative decrease in prices and increase in wages (at the
symmetric equilibrium) is more pronounced when transport costs are higher.
The derivative of the LHS of (5.16) with respect to θ is given by:
d (d∆u/dh)
dθ
∣∣∣∣∣
h= 12
= −2(2σ − 1)(1− φ)
(
1+φ
2
) 1−θ
σ−1 ln
(
1+φ
2
)
(σ − 1)2(2σ + φ− 1) > 0,
implying that dispersion is less likely for higher values of θ. Therefore, if θ > 0, the
increase in consumption differential due to small increase in the population size of L
leads to a more than proportional increase in the attractiveness of country L relative
to R.
5.3.2.2 Partial agglomeration
When the home-sweet-home effect is neither too strong or too weak, agents may dis-
tribute themselves asymmetrically between country L and country R at an equilibrium
called partial agglomeration. Our first result concerns stability of partial agglomeration
in country L, i.e., h∗ ∈ (1/2, 1).
Proposition 5.6. Partial agglomeration is stable if:
ζ
{
ϕ
[
wσ + w1−σ − (w + 1)φ
w (1− φ2)
] θ−1
σ−1
− ψ
[
w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w
w (1− φ2)
] θ+σ−2
σ−1
}
< t′ (h∗) + t′ (1− h∗) ,
(5.17)
where h∗ satisfies the short-run equilibrium condition in (5.10), and:
ζ = w
−(θ+σ+1)
(σ − 1) [(σ − 1)φ+ (σ − 1)φw2σ + (−2σ + φ2 + 1)wσ] ;
ϕ = w {φ [σ + (σ − 1)w]wσ − 2σw + w}
[
w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w
]
;
ψ =
(
1− φ2
)
wθ+σ+1 [(2σ − 1)wσ − σ(w + 1)φ+ φ] .
Proof. See Appendix D.
It is extremely difficult to extract both numerical and analytical information from
(5.17) for a general θ. However, we saw through Figure 5.2 that ∆u is qualitatively
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invariant for a fairly low range of values for θ.13 Therefore, we consider the log-utility
case which corresponds to θ = 1, yielding:14
− (2σ − 1)w
−(σ+1) [w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w]2
(σ − 1) [(σ − 1)φ+ (σ − 1)φw2σ + (−2σ + φ2 + 1)wσ] < t
′ (h∗)+t′ (1− h∗) , (5.18)
Since ∆u is increasing in h, the LHS of (5.18) cannot be negative. This requires
(σ− 1)φ+ (σ− 1)φw2σ + (−2σ + φ2 + 1)wσ < 0, defining the following interval for the
nominal wage:
wσ ∈
(
1, 12
{
2σ − (φ2 + 1)
φ(σ − 1) +
√
(1− φ2) [(1− 2σ)2 − φ2]
(σ − 1)2φ2
})
,
which we assume to hold henceforth.
Proposition 5.7. For θ = 1, a stable partial agglomeration becomes more symmetric
as trade barriers decrease.
Proof. See Appendix D.
This proposition states that if most consumers reside in country L, increasing the
freeness of trade will lead to a smooth exodus from L to country R, irrespective of the
home-sweet-home effect. More integration thus increases the incentives for consumers
to distribute more equally among the two countries.
5.4 The impact of the home-sweet-home effect
Our discussion so far has left out functional forms for t(x). In this section we analyse
the impacts of different functional forms for the utility penalty t(h) on the spatial dis-
tributions. We will show that qualitative changes in preferences produce very different
spatial patterns.
Assumption 5.8. Let θ = 1.
13A higher θ increases ∆u and its convexity for h > 1/2.
14The other natural candidate θ = 0 yields linear utility but still produces significantly cumbersome
expressions.
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Under Assumption 1, we restrict the sub-utility to u(C) = lnC. The parameter θ
scales up the strength of agglomeration forces but has no impact on the home-sweet-
home effect. Since our focus here is the role of consumer of heterogeneity, Assumption
1 allows us to uncover analytically tractable expressions and to convey our results in a
clear way without loss of generality.15
5.4.1 Logit home-sweet-home effect
One of the most widely used models in discrete choice theory for choosing between
different alternatives is the Multinomial Logit. For the two region case, and following
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), Murata (2003), Combes et al. (2008) and Akamatsu et al.
(2012), the probability that a consumer will choose to reside in country L is given by
the binary logit model written as:
PL(h) =
eUL(h)/µ
eUL(h)/µ + eUR(h)/µ , (5.19)
where µ ≥ 0 is a scale parameter which measures the dispersion of consumer preferences.
If µ = 0, consumers do not care about their location preferences but rather solely about
relative wages. From section 3, the number of agents h is the same as the consumer x
who is indifferent between living in country L or in countryR. Therefore, the probability
PL(h) is tantamount to the indifferent consumer h in our model. Thus, using (5.19),
we can write:
h = e
UL(h)/µ
eUL(h)/µ + eUR(h)/µ . (5.20)
Manipulating (5.20) yields:
UL − µ ln h = UR − µ ln(1− h). (5.21)
Notice from the (5.21) that t(h) = µ ln h < 0 for h ∈ [0, 1], so that the overall utility
here is interpreted as the utility from consumption plus a benefit from living in the
most preferred country. The overall utility of a consumer in region i thus lies on the
interval [Ui,+∞]. It is readily observable that, for a strictly positive µ, the consumer
15The qualitative behaviour of the model is indeed similar for a high range of values of θ.
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who likes country R the most (at x = 1) will never want to live in L, because, at h = 1,
the overall utility gain from moving from region L to region R is infinite. This means
that the Logit penalizes (benefits) the consumers who are less (more) willing to leave a
country very strongly. This result is reasonable in contexts where some people have an
unbreakable attachment towards a given location. If the consumer who is more willing
to leave a given country faces no costs in doing so, he will always migrate to the more
preferred country. Therefore, agglomeration in any country is not possible. At the
same time, the consumer who is just less willing to live in a country than the indifferent
consumer will never want to live there, because the resulting gain from consumption
goods is always outweighed by the utility penalty he faces from having to live in a less
preferred country.
This discussion allows us to formalize the following result, which summarizes the
possible spatial outcomes under Logit type preferences, depending on the degree of
heterogeneity µ.
Proposition 5.9. Under Logit type preferences, the spatial distribution depends on the
level of consumer heterogeneity as follows:
• Symmetric dispersion is the only stable equilibrium if:
µ > µd ≡ (2σ − 1)(1− φ)(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1); (5.22)
• Partial agglomeration h∗ ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
is the only stable equilibrium if µ < µd.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Figure 5.4 illustrates how changes in the scale parameter µ affect the resulting spatial
distributions.
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Figure 5.4 – Utility differential ∆u (thick line) and penalty differentials t(h) −
t(1 − h) (dashed lines) as µ changes. For µ = 0.2 (lower dashed line), dispersion
is unstable and partial agglomeration is stable. For µ = 0.275 (medium dashed
line) dispersion is unstable, partial agglomeration is stable and is less asymmetric.
For µ = 1 (upper dashed line) dispersion is stable and is the only equilibrium.
Parameters are σ = 2 and φ = 0.4.
Using σ = 2 and φ = 0.4, Figure 5.5 shows that when consumer heterogeneity is
low there is a single stable partial agglomeration equilibrium that is very asymmetric
(close to agglomeration). As consumer heterogeneity increases, partial agglomeration
corresponds to a more even distribution. Finally, if consumer heterogeneity is high
enough (µ > µd in (5.22)), the home-sweet-home effect is very high and so consumers
disperse symmetrically across the two countries.
In Figure 5.5 we show how the spatial distribution of industry changes as countries
become more integrated. We set σ = 2.5 and µ = 0.2. Even with this value for
µ (low overall heterogeneity), the home-sweet-home effect is very high for the more
differentiated consumers near x = 1. Therefore, at partial agglomeration, there is a
fraction 1−h∗ consumers for whom the home-sweet-home effect offsets the utility from
consumption goods.
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Figure 5.5 – Utility differential ∆u (dashed lines) and penalty differential t(h) −
t(1 − h) (thick line) for increasing levels of φ. For φ = 0.3 (upper dashed line),
dispersion is unstable and partial agglomeration is stable. Forφ = 0.5 (medium
dashed line) dispersion is unstable, partial agglomeration is stable and is less
asymmetric. For φ = 0.9 (lower dashed line) dispersion is stable and is the only
equilibrium. The values for the parameters are σ = 2.5 and µ = 0.2.
For low levels of the freeness of trade, the home-market effect is stronger at symme-
tric dispersion, making it unstable. In this case, a unique stable partial agglomeration
equilibrium exists where most consumers reside in country L. This means that there
is just a small fraction of consumers in R that are not willing to forego their preferred
region because the gain in consumption goods from doing so is not high enough. As
countries become more integrated, the home-market effect becomes weaker implying
that less consumers in R are willing to migrate to country L. This results in a unique
partial agglomeration equilibrium which is more evenly populated between both coun-
tries. Finally, for a high level of inter-regional integration, agglomeration forces are so
weak that no consumer is willing to leave his most preferred region. Therefore, only
symmetric dispersion is stable.
The preceding analysis is summarized in the two bifurcation diagrams in Figure
5.6, along a smooth parameter path where µ and φ increase. We numerically uncover
two pitchfork bifurcations in µ and φ, which accurately fit the situations described for
Figures5.4 and 5.5. The picture to the right in Figure 5.6 (increasing φ) differs from
other supercritical pitchforks found in NEG literature (e.g., Pflüger, 2004) crucially in
the sense that the direction of change in stability as φ increases is reversed, i.e., lower
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trade barriers leads to more symmetric spatial distributions.
Figure 5.6 – Bifurcation diagrams. To the left, the bifurcation parameter is µ ∈
[0, 1] with φ = 0.4. To the right, we have φ ∈ (0, 1) as the bifurcation parameter
and set µ = 0.2. For both scenarios we use σ = 2.
5.4.2 A linear home-sweet-home effect
We now consider different functional form for the home-sweet-home effect. We choose
a utility penalty t(h) that allows us to relax the “extreme convexity” implicit in the
Logit specification, by considering a linear function for the utility penalty, t(x) = µx,
where µ is again a scale parameter.16 The home-sweet-home effect t(h) − t(1 − h) is
also linear in h. One important implication is that the consumer’s overall utility Vi is
bounded for the consumers at the ends of the distribution, x = {0, 1}. The next result
summarizes the different spatial outcomes under the linear home-sweet-home effect.
Proposition 5.10. When the home-sweet-home effect is linear in h, the possible spatial
patterns are: (i) agglomeration for a low degree of heterogeneity; (ii) either agglome-
ration or dispersion for an intermediate degree of heterogeneity; and (iii) symmetric
dispersion for a high degree of heterogeneity.
16From an analytical point of view, most discrete choice models do not allow for closed form ex-
pressions. Therefore, we choose a simple enough alternative that allows us to illustrate the impact of
different settings. Other more empirically founded settings could and should be considered.
140
Proof. See Appendix E.
We learn from Proposition 5.10 that dispersion and agglomeration are both stable for
an intermediate degree of heterogeneity. Hotelling-type consumer heterogeneity allows
us to interpret simultaneously stable equilibria in light of the relation between regional
income disparities and location preferences. When income inequalities are very low, the
differential is not high enough to trigger migration because region specific amenities are
relatively more important to potential migrants. In this case, even the consumer who
is slightly less indifferent than the indifferent consumer x = 1/2 will rather live in his
most preferred region. However, as discrepancies increase, potential migrants start to
value the gain in real wages more than they value their personal attachment towards
a given region. At the opposite extreme of regional disparity, even the consumer who
likes the periphery the most would rather live in the core than have to bear a very low
(relative) standard of living.
Following the graphical analysis of section 4.1, we first depict the change in the
spatial distributions as the scale parameter µ increases.
Figure 5.7 – Utility differential ∆u (thick line) and penalty differentials t(h)−t(1−
h) (dashed lines) as µ changes. For µ = 0.2 (lower dashed line), only agglomeration
is stable. Forµ = 0.4 (medium dashed line) both agglomeration and dispersion
are simultaneously stable. For µ = 1 (upper dashed line) dispersion is the only
(stable) equilibrium. Parameters are σ = 5 and φ = 0.3.
We set σ = 5 and φ = 0.3. In Figure 5.7, we now observe that when consumer
heterogeneity is sufficiently low, all workers will agglomerate in the largest country.
If consumer heterogeneity is at an intermediate level: consumers will agglomerate in
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the largest country if initial disparities are very pronounced; otherwise, consumers will
disperse evenly between the countries. Thus, history matters. Finally, if consumer
heterogeneity is very high, the only possible outcome is symmetric dispersion. Figure
5.8 illustrates the possible stable equilibria for an increasing level of integration, a fixed
level for the degree of heterogeneity µ = 0.2, and σ = 5.
Figure 5.8 – Utility differentials ∆u (dashed lines) and penalty differential
t(h)− t(1−h) for increasing levels of φ. For φ = 0.3 (upper dashed line), only ag-
glomeration is stable. Forφ = 0.5 (medium dashed line), both agglomeration and
dispersion are simultaneously stable . For φ = 0.9 (lower dashed line) dispersion
is stable and is the only equilibrium. We set σ = 5 and µ = 0.2.
With low values for the freeness of trade there can only be full agglomeration. For
intermediate values, both agglomeration and dispersion are stable, and the historical
relative sizes of the country matter for the selection of the spatial equilibrium. Finally,
when the freeness of trade is very high, the home-sweet-home effect outweighs the
agglomerative forces and symmetric dispersion is the only (stable) equilibrium.
In Figure 5.9 we present bifurcation diagrams for variations in µ and φ. These
diagrams provide a comprehensive view of Figures 5.7 and 5.8. Under the linear home-
sweet-home effect, we recover some of the classical predictions of the original CP model
(or its “identical twins” (Robert-Nicoud, 2005)). Namely, the model exhibits locatio-
nal hysteresis and there is the possibility for catastrophic agglomeration (Fujita et al.,
1999; Baldwin et al., 2004). The main difference is that the direction in the change of
stability as φ increases is reversed compared to other subcritical pitchforks identified
in NEG literature. As noted before, this happens because higher integration encoura-
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ges dispersion and discourages agglomeration. It is a temporary increase in transport
costs, rather than a decrease, above some threshold level, that may trigger permanent
agglomeration in one single country.
Figure 5.9 – Bifurcation diagrams. To the left, the bifurcation parameter path is
µ ∈ [0, 1] and we set φ = 0.3. To the right, we have φ ∈ (0, 1) as the bifurcation
parameter and set µ = 0.2. For both scenarios we use σ = 5.
Remark 5.11. Any functional form for which the home-sweet-home effect t(h)− t(1−h)
is concave rather than (strictly) convex for h > 1/2 provides spatial configurations that
are qualitatively similar to those of the linear case.
5.5 A note on trade integration and spatial inequa-
lity
Although qualitative differences in the home-sweet-home effect produce significant im-
pacts on structure of the space economy, heterogeneity alone bears no impact on the
relationship between trade integration and spatial inequality, which is a monotonic de-
creasing one. This contrasts the findings in other works with heterogeneity in consumer
preferences, such as Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and Murata (2003), who show evidence
of a bell-shaped relationship between trade integration and spatial inequality. The for-
mer’s setting differs from ours because the authors consider an inter-regionally immobile
workforce whose role as a dispersive force is enhanced by higher transportation costs.
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However, it is particularly worthwhile to discuss the results of Murata (2003), be-
cause his setting is a particular case of our model. Formally, Murata’s (2003) model is
obtained by setting θ = 0 (linear utility) and t(h) = µ ln h (Logit type heterogeneity).
Murata (2003) found that the relationship between trade integration and spatial ine-
quality need not be monotonic and depends on the degree of consumer heterogeneity,
which is at odds with our findings. For instance, for an intermediate degree of con-
sumer heterogeneity, the author finds that increasing trade integration initially fosters
agglomeration and later leads to re-dispersion of industry. However, these conclusions
can be shown to stem from the author’s particular choice of the value for the elasticity
of substitution, σ = 1.25. As we have argued in Section 3.2.1, such a low value is
empirically implausible. For exceedingly low values (σ < 1.71), increasing returns at
the firm level are too strong. Strong enough that the utility gain at dispersion becomes
increasing in φ, instead of decreasing. This would justify an initial concentration of
industry as a result of an increase in φ. However, we have seen that for a plausible
range of σ the utility gain at dispersion always decreases with φ. Moreover, if θ > 0,
this holds even for lower values of σ.17 Therefore, a higher φ always promotes more
equitable distributions as opposed to asymmetric ones. These findings are shown to
hold in a generalized setting.
Hence, when workers are completely mobile, more trade integration ubiquitously
reduces the spatial inequalities between the two countries, irrespective of the degree of
heterogeneity in location preferences. Therefore, a de facto lower inter-regional labour
mobility induced by consumer heterogeneity alone cannot account for the predictions
that a higher inter-regional integration will lead to more unequal spatial development
or an otherwise bell-shaped relationship between the two.
5.6 Concluding remarks
It is widely accepted that individual idiosyncrasies governing preferences over specific
locations with a different set of cultural or historical amenities constitute an effective
deterrent of inter-regional migration. This helps explaining why some people refuse to
17If θ ≥ 1, the result holds for σ > 1.
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move to regions where they could otherwise improve their standard of living (as measu-
red exclusively by pecuniary factors). Therefore, heterogeneity concerning preferences
for residential location can be seen as a contributing factor for the reduced inter-regional
mobility observed in some spatial contexts.
We have built a New Economic Geography model that allows us to arbitrarily specify
how the utility from residing in a region changes across different consumers. Modelling
the individual utility penalty of migrating to a given location is important because it
impacts regional utility differentials with consequent implications on the spatial distri-
bution of economic activities. Consumer heterogeneity toward residential location is
usually modelled through probabilistic migration according to the discrete choice Logit
model. This imposes an assumption on the distribution of consumer preferences which
implies that some consumers would bear a psychological cost, if they migrated to a
less preferred region, that is just too great. Therefore, no matter how large the gains
from agglomeration due to increasing returns and transportation costs, some people
will always choose to live in a relatively poor region. We acknowledge that, in some
geographical contexts, some people are in fact too attached to a given location, which
would help sustain the claim that full agglomeration in one single region is unlikely.
This is even more so when regions have their very own and distinct sets of cultural
and historical amenities. However, the importance of these amenities is likely to vary
both quantitatively and qualitatively according to the geographical scale. For instance,
cultural and historical differences are generally more important at a transnational scale
than at the national scale. This would make individuals more reluctant to move to
another country than to move to another region within his country.
While changes in the Logit model allow to account for different heterogeneity scales
(Scarpa et al., 2008; Train, 2009; Hess and Rose, 2012), they do not capture the fact that
consumer preferences may vary qualitatively. For instance, with the Logit, consumers
with the highest personal attachment towards a region are always heavily penalized if
they migrate to another region.
We illustrate our point of view, by using a very simple framework, where we allow the
utility penalty to be a linear (or otherwise strictly concave) function of the distribution
of consumer preferences. In the long-run, this means that the more personally attached
consumers face a lower utility penalty when they migrate to a less preferred region. This
increases the willingness to migrate as a response to regional differences in consumption.
Given the pecuniary gains from agglomeration, this allows us to obtain a relationship
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between agents’ reaction to regional non-market factors and regional income inequalities
that is potentially empirically relevant. Specifically, we find that when regional size
differences are small, the gains in consumption from relocating to the slightly larger
region are not enough to offset the decrement in utility of even the consumers who have
a just marginally higher preference for the relatively smaller region. However, if initial
spatial disparities are very high, then so is the prospective gain in consumption goods
of those who consider relocating from the smaller to the larger region. This gain is
large enough that it offsets the personal attachment of any consumer toward the less
populated region. In this case, the initial spatial distribution will determine if there is
a tendency towards spatial convergence or divergence. In other words, history matters.
The variety of possible spatial outcomes conveyed by just two different specifications
for consumer preferences, while overlooking other well-known potential determinants
of spatial inequality, highlights the importance of considering qualitatively different
distributions of individual sensitivities.
By considering that there are no other impediments to migration, i.e., all consumers
are allowed to migrate if they so desire, we have shown that a higher inter-regional trade
integration always leads to less spatial inequality. This result is independent of the level
and impact of consumer heterogeneity.
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5.A - Wages and freeness of trade
Consider h = f(w) in (5.10). Let us now define F (h,w) = f(w)−h = 0. Differentiation
of F (h,w) yields:
∂F (h,w)
∂w
= w
σG(wσ)
[w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w]2 , (5.23)
where:
G(wσ) = −
[
φ(σ − 1) + (σ − 1)φw2σ −
(
2σ − φ2 − 1
)
wσ
]
.
The derivative in (5.23) is zero if G(wσ) = 0. One can observe that G(wσ) has either
two (real) zeros given by some {w−, w+} , or none. Moreover, G(wσ) is concave in wσ.
Since G (wσ = φ) = σ [φ(1− φ2)] > 0 and G (wσ = φ−1) = − [σφ (1− φ−2)] > 0, it
must be that G(wσ) > 0 for wσ ∈ [φ, φ−1] ⊂ (w−, w+).
We now proceed to show that w ∈
(
0, φ1/σ
)
and w ∈
(
φ−1/σ,+∞
)
are not defined
in h ∈ [0, 1]. Using (9), we have the following:
lim
w→0h(w) = 0; limw→+∞h(w) = 1; h(φ
1/σ) = 0; h(φ−1/σ) = 1;
Since dh/dw = ∂F/∂w, we have that h(w) is increasing for wσ ∈ (w−, w+). The limits
above, together with the knowledge that the zeros of dh/dw lie to the left and right of
[φ, φ−1], ensure that h(w) < 0 for w ∈
(
0, φ1/σ
)
and h(w) > 1 for w ∈
(
φ−1/σ,+∞
)
.
Knowing that ∂F/∂h = −1 and ∂F/∂w are continuous, by the IFT we can write
w : h ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ R 7→ R such that dw/dh exists and F (h,w(h)) = 0.
Proposition 5.12. The nominal wage w(h) is increasing in the spatial distribution.
Proof. Using implicit differentiation on (5.10), we get:
dw
dh
= [w
2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w]2
wσG(wσ) . (5.24)
This derivative is positive for w ∈ [φ1/σ, φ−1/σ], which implies that w(h) is increasing
in [0, 1] and concludes the proof.
Proposition 5.13. The nominal wage is convex in the spatial distribution.
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Proof. Using F (w, h) to find d2w/dh2, we know that:
∂2F
∂h2︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+∂
2F
∂w2
(
dw
dh
)2
+ ∂F
∂w︸︷︷︸
>0
d2w
dh2
= 0,
from which we obtain:
d2w
dh2
= −
∂2F
∂w2
(
dw
dh
)2
∂F
∂w
. (5.25)
We can compute ∂2F/∂w2 as:
∂2F
∂w2
= − w
σ−1P
[w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w]3 , (5.26)
where:
P =− w4σ(σ − 1)σφ− w3σ {2σ(1− 2σ) + φ2 [σ2 + σ + (σ − 2)(σ − 1)w]}+
+ w2σφ
{
w
[
3(σ − 3)σ + 2 (φ2 + 2)]− 3(σ − 1)σ}+ wσ(σ − 1){φ2 [σ + (σ + 4)w] + (2− 4σ)w}+
+ (σ − 2)(σ − 1)wφ,
which is a 4th degree polynomial in wσ. Therefore, P (X = wσ) has either zero, two or
four real roots. Since wσ = 0 if and only if w = 0, X = 0 is one solution to P (X) = 0.
Let us focus on the case where σ ≥ 2.18 We have the following results concerning
P (X).
(i). Evaluating P (X) at X = φ yields:
P (X = φ) = σφ
(
1− φ2
) {
2σφ2 +
[
(σ − 3)φ2 + 3(1− σ)
]
φ1/σ
}
,
which, by substituting σ = 2, becomes:
−2φ3/2
(
1− φ2
) (
3 + φ2 − 4φ3/2
)
,
18Empirically, we find this to be a more than reasonable assumption. See the discussion in Section
3.2 for more details.
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which is negative since 3+φ2−4φ3/2 > 0. Taking the derivative of [(σ − 3)φ2 − 3(σ − 1)]φ1/σ+
2σφ2 with respect to σ yields:
d (.)
dσ
= − [(σ − 3)φ
2 + 3(1− σ)]φ1/σ log φ
σ2
−
(
3− φ2
)
φ1/σ + 2φ2.
This derivative is negative, since
−
(
3− φ2
)
φ1/σ + 2φ2 < 0,
and
−
{[
(σ − 3)φ2 + 3(1− σ)
]
φ1/σ log φ
}
/σ2 < 0.
Therefore, the term [(σ − 3)φ2 − 3(σ − 1)]φ1/σ + 2σφ2 is negative for all σ ≥ 2,
which implies that P (X = φ) < 0 for all σ ≥ 2.
(ii). Evaluating P (X) at X = 1 gives us the following:
P (X = 1) = 2(1− φ)2(2σ + φ− 1) > 0.
(iii). The derivative of P (X) at X = 0 is positive, since:
dP (X)
dX
∣∣∣∣∣
X=0
= (σ − 1)σφ2.
From (i) to (iii), we conclude that two more zeros exist for X ∈ (0, 1).
(iv). We have the following limit:
lim
X→∞
P (X) = −∞,
because the coefficient of the term of highest order is negative. Using (ii) and (iv), we
then know that the last root of P (X) lies in the interval (0,+∞).
(v). Evaluating P (X) at X = 1/φ > 1 yields:
P
(
X = 1
φ
)
= −σ
(
1− φ2
)
φ−
1+3σ
σ
{
2σφ2 +
[
(σ − 1)φ2 − 3σ + 1
]
φ
1
σ
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω
.
149
Substituting, as in (i), σ = 2 in Ω, we get:
φ
(
4φ+ φ2 − 5
)
< 0.
Taking the derivative of Ω with respect to σ yields:
dΩ
dσ
= 2φ2 + φ1/σ(φ2 − 3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− lnφ
σ2
[
(σ − 1)φ2 − 3σ + 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
We have B < 0 and A < 0. Therefore, dΩ/dσ < 0. As a result, P (X = 1/φ) > 0, for
all σ ≥ 2. Thus, we conclude that the last root of P (X) lies in the interval (φ−1,+∞),
thus implying that P (X) > 0 for X ∈ [1, φ−1].
(vi). The denominator in expression (5.26) is positive if:
w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w > 0.
This statement is true if w2σ + w − (w + 1)wσ > 0. Substituting X for wσ we get
Q(X) ≡ X2 − (w + 1)X + w,
which has roots X = 0 and X = 1. Since Q(X) is convex, it is positive for X > 1
implying that w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w > 0 if h ∈ [1/2, 1].
From (i) to (vi) we can thus conclude that ∂2F/∂w2 < 0 for h ∈ [1/2, 1]. Hence,
from expression (5.25) we know that d2w/dh2 > 0 for h ∈ [1/2, 1]. In other words, the
nominal wage is convex in the spatial distribution when L is the largest country.
Proposition 5.14. The nominal wage w is decreasing in the freeness of trade when L
is the largest country (h > 1/2).
Proof. From F (h,w) = 0 defined above, differentiating with respect to φ, we get:
∂F
∂φ
+ ∂F
∂w
dw
dφ
= 0 ⇐⇒
dw
dφ
= − ∂F
∂φ
/
∂F
∂w
.
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Using (5.10) we get:
∂F
∂φ
= w
σ+1 (w2σ − 1)
[w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w]2 ,
which is positive if h > 1/2, because the latter implies w > 1 (recall from (1) in the
Appendix that w is increasing in h). As a result, we have dw/dφ < 0.
5.B - Utility differentials
In this Appendix we establish the sign of the derivative of the utility differential ∆u
with respect to h.
Proof of Proposition 5.2.
(1). General isoelastic utility with θ ∈ [0, 1) ∪ (1,+∞).
Using the chain rule we can write the derivative of ∆u with respect to h as follows:
d∆u
dh
= ∂∆u
∂h
+ ∂∆u
∂w
dw
dh
.
First:
∂∆u
∂h
=
w1−θ
(
w1−σ − φ) [h (w1−σ − φ)+ φ]− θ+σ−2σ−1 + (1− φw1−σ) [h (φw1−σ − 1)+ 1]− θ+σ−2σ−1
σ − 1 .
We shall restrict to the case where h ∈ (1/2, 1], i.e., w ∈ (1, φ−1/σ]. We have w1−σ−φ >
0, because w1−σ is decreasing in w, and w1−σ(w = 1) = 1 and w1−σ(w = φ−1/σ) =
φ(σ−1)/σ > φ. The terms h (w1−σ − φ) + φ and h (φw1−σ − 1) + 1 are both positive
because 1 − h > 0. Finally, we have 1 − φw1−σ > 0 because φw1−σ(w = 1) = φ < 1,
φw1−σ(w = φ−1/σ) = φ(2σ−1)/σ < 1 and φw1−σ is increasing in w. Therefore, ∂∆u/∂h >
0 for θ < 1.
Second, we have:
∂∆u
∂w
= φ
(1− h)w−θ [h (w1−σ − φ)+ φ]− θ+σ−2σ−1 + h
[
h
(
φw1−σ − 1)+ 1] 1−θσ−1
(1− h)wσ + hwφ
 .
Given the preceding arguments it follows also that ∂∆u/∂w > 0. Since, from Appendix
A, we know that dw/dh > 0, we thus conclude that d∆u/dh > 0.
(2). Log-utility (θ = 1), ui = lnCi:
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d∆u
dh
= d(uL − uR)
dh
,
which is given by the following expression:
d∆u
dh
= h
2(σ − 1)φw2w′ + wσ+1 [2(1− h)h(σ − 1)φ2w′ − (φ2 − 1)w]+ (h− 1)2(σ − 1)φw2σw′
(σ − 1)w [hφw + (1− h)wσ] [hw + (1− h)φwσ] .
Since w′ > 0, it follows that d∆u/dh > 0. This concludes the final part of the proof.
5.C - Stability of symmetric dispersion
In this Appendix we compute the stability condition for symmetric dispersion.
Proof of proposition 5.4. For θ ∈ [0, 1) ∪ (0,+∞), using the indirect utility in
(5.13), we reach:
d∆u
dh
= −
w−(θ+σ)
{
wθ
(
hφw1−σ − h+ 1
)− θ+σ−2
σ−1 [−h(σ − 1)φw′ − wσ + φw] +
(
hw1−σ − hφ+ φ
)−(1+ θ
σ−1
)
Ω
}
(σ − 1) ,
(5.27)
where:
Ω = −w
(
hw1−σ − hφ+ φ
) 1
σ−1 [−h(σ − 1)w′ − φwσ + w]−(σ−1)wσw′ (hw1−σ − hφ+ φ) σσ−1 ,
and w′ = dw/dh. From Appendix A, we know that:
w′ = − w
−σ [w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w]2
(σ − 1)φ+ (σ − 1)φw2σ + (−2σ + φ2 + 1)wσ .
Knowing that w = 1 for h = 1/2, evaluating the derivative simplifies to:
w′(1/2) = 8σ2σ + φ− 1 − 4.
Using h = 1/2 and w = 1 in (5.27) yields:
d∆u
dh
∣∣∣∣∣
h= 12
= −
{
1+φ
2
−(1+ θσ−1)Ω
(
1
2
)
−
(
1+φ
2
)− θ+σ−2
σ−1
[
1
2(σ − 1)φw′
(
1
2
)
− φ+ 1
]}
σ − 1 ,
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with:
Ω
(
1
2
)
=
(
1 + φ
2
) 1
σ−1 [1
2(σ − 1)w
′
(1
2
)
+ φ− 1
]
− (σ − 1)
(
1 + φ
2
) σ
σ−1
w′
(1
2
)
.
Finally, we use w′(1/2) to substitute for the expression above, which yields:
d∆u
dh
∣∣∣∣∣
h= 12
=
4(2σ − 1)(1− φ)
(
φ
2 +
1
2
) 1−θ
σ−1
(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1) .
Since d [t(h)− t(1− h)] /h = t′(h) + t′(1− h), symmetric dispersion is stable if:
2(2σ − 1)(1− φ)
(
1+φ
2
) 1−θ
σ−1
(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1) < t
′ (1
2
)
.
If θ = 1, then the inequality above simplifies to:
2(2σ − 1)(1− φ)
(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1) < t
′ (1
2
)
,
which concludes the proof. 
5.D - Partial agglomeration
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Taking the derivative of (5.13) with respect to h yields
the expression in (5.27) from Appendix C.
Substituting for w′ using (5.24) from Appendix A, and given that any partial equi-
librium h∗ must satisfy the short-run equilibrium condition given by (5.10), we reach:
d∆u
dh
∣∣∣∣
h=h∗
= ζ
{
ϕ
[
wσ−1 + w−σ − (1 + w−1)φ
1− φ2
] θ−1
σ−1
− ψ
[
w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w
w (1− φ2)
] θ+σ−2
σ−1
}
,
with:
ζ = w
−(θ+σ+1)
(σ − 1) [(σ − 1)φ+ (σ − 1)φw2σ + (−2σ + φ2 + 1)wσ] ;
ϕ = w {φ [σ + (σ − 1)w]wσ − 2σw + w}
[
w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w
]
;
ψ =
(
1− φ2
)
wθ+σ+1 [(2σ − 1)wσ − σ(w + 1)φ+ φ] .
Since partial agglomeration is stable if d∆u/dh < d [t(h)− t(1− h)] /dh at h = h∗,
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partial agglomeration is stable if:
ζ
{
ϕ
[
wσ + w1−σ − (w + 1)φ
w (1− φ2)
] θ−1
σ−1
− ψ
[
w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w
w (1− φ2)
] θ+σ−2
σ−1
}
< t′ (h∗)− t′ (1− h∗) ,
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5.7. Any interior long-run equilibrium h∗ ∈ (1/2, 1) must
satisfy the following system of equations:
F (h,w) ≡ f(w)− h = 0 (5.28)
G(h,w) = ∆u(h,w) + t(1− h)− t(h) = 0,
where f(w) is given by the expression in (5.10) and ∆u(h,w) is utility differential given
by (5.13). For points (w0, h0, φ0) satisfying (5.28), if F (w, h, φ) and G(w, h, φ) have
continuous partial derivatives in a neighbourhood of (w0, h0, φ0) and:
det

∂F
∂h
∂F
∂w
∂G
∂h
∂G
∂w
 6= 0,
then there exists a neighbourhood B of φ0 ∈ R and a continuous differentiable function
W : B 7→ R such that F (φ,W (φ)) = 0 and G (φ,W (φ)) = 0 for all φ ∈ B. Then, using
Cramer’s rule, we can compute the following derivative:
dh∗
dφ
=
∂F
∂w
∂G
∂φ
− ∂G
∂w
∂F
∂φ
∂F
∂h
∂G
∂w
− ∂F
∂w
∂G
∂h
. (5.29)
Computing all partial derivatives in (5.29), and evaluating at h∗ using (5.10) yields:
dh∗
dφ
= (2σ − 1) (w
2σ − 1)
Θ
,
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where:
Θ =(σ − 1)
[
(σ − 1)φ+ (σ − 1)φw2σ +
(
−2σ + φ2 + 1
)
wσ
] [
t′ (h∗) + t′ (1− h∗)]+
+ w−(σ+1)(2σ − 1)
[
w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w
]2
.
The numerator is positive since w2σ > 1 for h > 1/2. As for Θ, it is negative if (5.18)
holds, since we are assuming that:
[
(σ − 1)φ+ (σ − 1)φw2σ +
(
−2σ + φ2 + 1
)
wσ
]
< 0.
Therefore, when agglomeration is stable, we have dh∗/dφ < 0, implying that partial ag-
glomeration becomes more symmetric as the freeness of trade increases. This concludes
the proof. 
5.E - Logit and linear heterogeneity
Proof of Proposition 5.9. When t(x) = µ ln x, the RHS of expression (5.17) is
given by:
t′ (h∗)− t′ (1− h∗) = µ
[
1
h(1− h)
]
.
Replacing in (5.17) and rearranging, partial agglomeration is stable if:
− w
−σ−1 [w2σ − (w + 1)φwσ + w]2 Γ
(σ − 1) (wσ − φ) (1− φwσ) [(σ − 1)φ+ (σ − 1)φw2σ + (−2σ + φ2 + 1)wσ] < 0, (5.30)
where
Γ = φ
[
µ(σ − 1)2 − 2σ + 1
]
+ φ
[
µ(σ − 1)2 − 2σ + 1
]
w2σ−
− wσ
{
φ2 [−(µ+ 2)σ + µ+ 1] + (2σ − 1) [µ(σ − 1)− 1]
}
.
The numerator of (5.30) except Γ is positive, and so is (wσ − φ) (1− φwσ). From
Appendix A, we know that:
(σ − 1)φ+ (σ − 1)φw2σ +
(
−2σ + φ2 + 1
)
wσ < 0.
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Therefore, (5.17) holds if and only if Γ < 0, which gives:
µ > µp ≡ (2σ − 1)(w
σ − φ)(1− wσφ)
(σ − 1) [(2σ − φ2 − 1)wσ − (σ − 1)φw2σ − (σ − 1)φ] .
The condition for partial agglomeration in (5.30) holds for any interior equilibrium
including symmetric dispersion h∗ = 1/2. At symmetric dispersion we have w = 1 and
the condition above simplifies to:
µ > µd ≡ (2σ − 1)(1− φ)(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1) .
The derivative of µp with respect to X ≡ wσ equals:
∂µp
∂X
= σ(2σ − 1) (X
2 − 1)φ (φ2 − 1)
(σ − 1) ((σ − 1) (X2 + 1)φ− 2σX +Xφ2 +X)2 < 0.
We can also see that µp approaches zero as wσ approaches φ−1 (i.e., as partial agglo-
meration tends to full agglomeration in L). Therefore, we conclude that 0 < µp < µd.
Under the assumption that only one partial agglomeration equilibrium h∗ ∈ (1/2, 1)
exists, we have two possibilities: (i) if µ ∈ (µp, ud), partial agglomeration is the only
stable equilibrium; and (ii) if µ > µd, symmetric dispersion is the only stable equili-
brium. Assume now, by way of contradiction, that µ ∈ (0, µp). This would imply that
both dispersion and partial agglomeration are unstable. Since the state space is one
dimensional, this would require agglomeration to be stable. However, we know that
agglomeration is always unstable, which implies that either partial agglomeration or
dispersion are stable. Hence, µ /∈ (0, µp).
Therefore, we can sum up the two previous cases by saying that symmetric dispersion
is the only stable equilibrium if µ > µd; otherwise, partial agglomeration is the only
stable equilibrium. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5.10. Considering Proposition 5.4 and t(h) = µh, dispersion
is stable if:
−2 [µ(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1)− 2(2σ − 1)(1− φ)](σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1) < 0.
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Rewriting the inequality in terms of µ we get:
µ > µb ≡ 2(2σ − 1)(1− φ)(σ − 1)(2σ + φ− 1) .
Using Proposition 5.3, together with t(h) = µh, we conclude that agglomeration is
stable if:
µ < µs ≡ −(2σ − 1) lnφ
σ(σ − 1) .
If µs > µb, there exists a µ ∈ (µb, µs) for which both agglomeration and dispersion are
simultaneously stable. We have:
µs − µb = −(2σ − 1) [−2σ(1− φ) + (2σ + φ− 1) log φ](σ − 1)σ(2σ + φ− 1) > 0.
Therefore, µs > µb. We thus conclude that if µ < µb, only agglomeration is stable. If
µ ∈ (µb, µs), both dispersion and agglomeration are simultaneously stable. Finally, for
µ > µs, only dispersion is stable. 
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and discussion
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We now briefly discuss the generality of our results, namely what plausible different
assumptions are likely to qualitatively change our predictions and what could be done
in the future as a follow-up of the present work.
Throughout Chapters 3 and 4, we have sought to further contribute to the under-
standing of spatial distributions that may arise in a multi-regional setting. As we have
seen, the results for the n-region FE model do not stray far from the results of the
original 2-region model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). Conversely, adding more regi-
ons to the QLLog model by Pflüger (2004) alters the qualitative structure of the model
substantially. This allows us to conjecture that, in some frameworks, many results seem
to carry over from the pre-existing 2-region setting to the multi-regional setting for a
class of Core-Periphery models, but this is not universally the case.
As discussed in Chapter 2, a lot of effort has been dedicated to investigate what per-
sistent features are likely to render most 2-region Core-Periphery “isomorphic” (Robert-
Nicoud, 2005). Similarly, a significant number of papers have extracted conclusions from
various multi-regional models under a variety of different assumptions. What is then
perhaps lacking is a deeper comprehension on why some models produce results that
remain by and large invariant under the number of regions, while other models show
significant changes when more regions are considered.
Answering these questions is far from trivial, but there are some obvious starting
points. One such starting point has to do with how the number of regions actually
relates to the geographical structure. In this respect, one main concern relates to
the internal dimension of regions themselves, so that they are not mere dimensionless
points in space. The other is related with the transport cost structure, which is the
embodiment of geography in NEG and whose complexity is likely to co-vary with the
number of existing regions. On the other hand, this is far from an easy task, because
most NEG models are inherently difficult to study analytically and numerically, which
makes it difficult to compare between different spatial topologies.
To be more clear on this matter, it is worth mentioning the case of the FE model
studied in Chapter 3. The FE model is an analytically solvable version of the original
Core-Periphery model whose results are identical to the latter (i.e., it is convenient be-
cause it allows to confirm them analytically). However, the fact that we have obtained
a tractable multi-regional model is more likely the result of pair-wise equidistance than
that of considering a Footloose Entrepreneur structure. A few studies have shown that
results from 2-region models carry over to their multi-regional extensions when regions
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are equidistant. This is the case, e.g., of the paper by Bosker et al. (2010) discussed in
Chapters 2, 4 and 5, which uses a multi-regional version of Puga’s (1999) model with
equidistant regions. Equidistance is key here, as it limits the potential geographical role
of new regions, whose interdependencies greatly depend on the distances between one
another. In other words, including more regions while keeping the assumption of equi-
distance only marginally increases the dimensionality in NEG, because differences bet-
ween each pair of regions are reflected symmetrically across all pair of regions. In spite
of this, equidistance is also extremely useful because it greatly simplifies multi-regional
analysis. Other geometries, such as equally spaced regions around a circumference (ra-
cetrack economy) or along a line segment, albeit simple by construction, still render
the analysis significantly complicated and have no clear benefit in terms of empirical
realism other than the fact that they account for some (very stylized) asymmetry. On
the other hand, the fact that these geometries introduce regional asymmetries means
that varying the number of regions is likely to produce a more significant impact on the
resulting spatial distributions. To conclude, there exists a clear trade-off between more
complex geometries and the ability to extract meaningful and intelligible insights.
We may raise yet another issue with respect to the introduction of complex asymme-
tries. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the extension of the QLLog model to an arbitrary
number of equidistant regions has allowed us to obtain qualitatively different results
compared to the original 2-region model. Therefore, in spite of some of the previous
arguments, a complex spatial structure may arise even under a simple geographical
structure. In this instance, equidistance is not only useful but also warranted, because
it allows us to understand what causes different spatial structures without the interfe-
rence of complex exogenous asymmetries. The challenge in this particular case is then
quite the opposite: to understand whether a more complex geographical structure for
the QLLog model allows to extract additional meaningful insights.
In Chapter 5, we have integrated market-driven factors with Hotelling-type prefe-
rences. This way of modelling consumer heterogeneity in an otherwise very simple NEG
setup has allowed us to provide a reinterpretation of how consumers make their location
choices and, hence, how different spatial distributions arise. Assuming a uniform distri-
bution of preferences for consumers along a line allows us to rank each consumer with
respect to his willingness towards residing in a region or another. This separates our
framework from the widely used probabilistic migration setting in the following sense.
Even though the population distributions in the long-run are the same, for equivalent
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formulations in both settings,1 Hotelling-type preferences enable us to identify which
consumers choose which region. This is not possible under probabilistic migration be-
cause the probability that an individual chooses a region over another depends on a
random utility component that is unobservable and assumed to follow some statistical
distribution.
Although it transcends the scope of this dissertation, being able to identify the con-
sumers in a given region may be useful in future work for a number of reasons. Suppose
we introduce other dimensions of consumer heterogeneity. For instance, consumers are
heterogeneous not only in their preferences for location but also regarding their skill
levels. In that case, a ranking of consumers by preferences, and by skill levels, would
allow us to say more about the empirically observed spatial sorting of heterogeneous
workers in different regions. As discussed in Chapter 2, such an analysis would certainly
confer richness to the study of urban hierarchy formations.
We have also seen that Hotelling-type preferences induce a dispersive force (home-
sweet-home effect) whose long-run implications on spatial distributions are similar to
those of urban congestion costs. However, the interpretation is different. In the first
case, all consumers have a different preference towards residing in one region or another,
so we know which consumers become increasingly willing to migrate to a region where
income levels progressively rise. In the latter case, all consumers in a region are equally
and negatively affected by increases in population sizes (due to increases in income
levels). Therefore, just as with probabilistic migration, congestion costs alone do not
allow us to tell anything about the spatial sorting of agents. However, some agents are
environmentally more conscientious than others, while some people are more sensitive
to commuting costs or housing prices than others. In other words, congestion costs are
also likely to affect individuals differently. This adds yet another level of heterogeneity
which could be encompassed in Hotelling-type heterogeneity.
Along the lines of these suggestions we conclude that the role of multiple regions
and individual heterogeneity may be yet enriched in several ways that could help NEG
provide a better description of the causes underlying the spatial distribution of economic
activities.
1Recall the Logit discrete choice model in a probabilistic migration setting and its equivalent form
under Hotelling-type preferences studied in Chapter 5.
161
Bibliography
Aghion, P., Howitt, P. (1992), “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction.”,
Econometrica, 60, 323–351.
Ago, T., Isono, I., Tabuchi, T. (2006), “Locational disadvantage of the hub”, Annals of
Regional Science, 40 (4), 819-848.
Akamatsu, T., Takayama, Y. (2009), “A simplified approach to analyzing multi-regional
core-periphery models”, Technical report, University Library of Munich.
Akamatsu, T., Takayama, Y., Ikeda, K. (2012), “Spatial Discounting, Fourier, and
Racetrack Economy: A Recipe for the Analysis of Spatial Agglomeration Models”,
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 36, 1729-1759.
Albouy, D., Leibovici, F., Warman, C. (2013), “Quality of life, firm productivity, and
the value of amenities across Canadian cities”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 46
(2), 379-411.
Allen, T., Arkolakis, C. (2014), “Trade and the Topography of the Spatial Economy”,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129 (3), 1085-1140.
Anderson, J., van Wincoop, E. (2004), “Trade Costs”, Journal of Economic Literature,
42, 691-751.
Anderson, S. P., De Palma, A., Thisse, J. F. (1992), Discrete choice theory of product
differentiation, MIT Press.
Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., Ottaviano, G., Robert-Nicoud, F. (2004), Economic Geography
and Public Policy, Princeton University Press.
Baldwin, R. (1999), “Agglomeration and endogenous capital”, European Economic Re-
view, 43 (2), 253-280.
162
Baldwin, R., Martin, P. (2004), “Agglomeration and regional growth”, Handbook of
Regional and Urban Economics, 4, 2671-2711.
Baldwin, R., Okubo, T. (2006), “Heterogeneous firms, agglomeration and economic
geography: spatial selection and sorting”, Journal of Economic Geography, 6 (3),
323-346.
Baldwin, R., Okubo, T. (2009), “Tax reform, delocation, and heterogeneous firms”, The
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 111 (4), 741-764.
Barbero, J., Zofío, J. L. (2012), “The multiregional core-periphery model: The role of
the spatial topology, Networks and Spatial Economics, 1-28.
Behrens, K. (2005), “Market size and industry location: traded vs non-traded goods”,
Journal of Urban Economics, 58 (1), 24-44.
Behrens, K., Gaigne, C., Ottaviano, G. I., Thisse, J.-F. (2006), “Is remoteness a loca-
tional disadvantage?”, Journal of Economic Geography, 6(3), 347-368.
Behrens, K., Murata, Y. (2007), “General equilibrium models of monopolistic compe-
tition: a new approach”, Journal of Economic Theory, 136 (1), 776-787.
Behrens, K., Ottaviano, G. I., Lamorgese, A. R., Tabuchi, T. (2004), “Testing the home
market effect in a multi-country world: the theory”, CEPR Discussion Paper, 4468.
Behrens, K., Robert-Nicoud, F. (2011), “Tempora mutantur: in search of a new testa-
ment for NEG”, Journal of Economic Geography, 11 (2), 215-230.
Behrens, K., Thisse, J.-F. (2007), “Regional economics: A new economic geography
perspective”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 37(4), 457-465.
Berliant, M., Fujita, M. (2008), “Knowledge creation as a square dance on the Hilbert
cube ”, International Economic Review, 49 (4), 1251-1295.
Berliant, M., Fujita, M. (2009), “Dynamics of knowledge creation and transfer: The
two person case”, International Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 155-179.
Berliant, M., Fujita, M. (2011), “The dynamics of knowledge diversity and economic
growth”, Southern Economic Journal, 77 (4), 856-884.
163
Berliant, M., Fujita, M. (2012), “Culture and diversity in knowledge creation”, Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 42 (4), 648-662.
Berliant, M., Kung, F. (2009), “Bifurcations in Regional Migration Dynamics”, Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 39, 714-720.
Blaug, M. (1997), Economic theory in retrospect, Cambridge university press.
Boschma, R. and K. Frenken (2006), “Why is economic geography not an evolutio-
nary science? Towards an evolutionary economic geography”, Journal of Economic
Geography, 6, 273-302.
Bosker, M., Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., Schramm, M. (2010), “Adding geography to
the new economic geography: bridging the gap between theory and empirics”, Journal
of Economic Geography, 10 (6), 793-823.
Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., Van Marrewijk, C. (2009), The new introduction to geo-
graphical economics, Cambridge University Press.
Castro, S.B.S.D., Correia-da-Silva, J., Mossay, P. (2012), “The Core-Periphery model
with three regions and more”, Papers in Regional Science, 91 (2), 401-418.
Combes, P. P., Mayer, T., Thisse, J. F. (2008), Economic geography: The integration
of regions and nations, Princeton University Press.
Commendatore, P., Kubin, I., Sushko, I. (2015a), “Typical bifurcation scenario in a
three regional identical New Economic Geography model”, Mathematics and Com-
puters in Simulation, 108, 63-80.
Commendatore, P., Filoso, V., Grafeneder-Weissteiner, T., Kubin, I. (2015b), “To-
wards a multiregional NEG framework: comparing alternative modelling strategies,
in Complexity and Geographical Economics, 13-50, Springer.
Crozet, M. (2004), “Do migrants follow market potentials? An estimation of a new
economic geography model”, Journal of Economic Geography, 4(4), 439-458.
Davis, D. R., Weinstein, D. E. (2002), “Bones, bombs, and break points: the geography
of economic activity”, The American Economic Review, 92 (5), 1269-1289.
164
Dinopoulos, E., Segerstrom, P. (2010), “Intellectual property rights, multinational firms
and economic growth”, Journal of Development Economics, 92 (1), 13-27.
Dixit, A. K., Stiglitz, J. E. (1977), “Monopolistic competition and optimum product
diversity”, The American Economic Review, 67 (3), 297-308.
Duranton, G., Puga, D. (2001), “Nursery cities: Urban diversity, process innovation,
and the life cycle of products”, American Economic Review, 1454-1477.
Duranton, G., Puga, D. (2004), “Micro-foundations of urban agglomeration economies”,
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, 4, 2063-2117.
Fabinger, M. (2015), “Cities as solitons: Analytic solutions to models of agglomeration
and related numerical approaches”, available at SSRN 2630599.
Forslid, R., Ottaviano, G. (2003), “An analytically solvable core-periphery model”,
Journal of Economic Geography, 3 (3), 229-240.
Forslid, R., Okubo, T. (2012), “On the development strategy of countries of intermedi-
ate size - an analysis of heterogeneous firms in a multi-region framework”, European
Economic Review, 56(4), 747-756.
Frenken, K., Van Oort, F., Verburg, T. (2007), “Related variety, unrelated variety and
regional economic growth”, Regional studies, 41 (5), 685-697.
Fujita, M. (2007), “Towards the new economic geography in the brain power society”,
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 37 (4), 482-490.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. (1995), “When is the economy monocentric?: von Thünen and
Chamberlin unified”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 25 (4), 505-528.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P., Mori, T. (1999), “On the evolution of hierarchical urban
systems”, European Economic Review, 43 (2), 209-251.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P., Venables, A. (1999), The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions
and International Trade, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Fujita, M., Mori, T. (2005), “Frontiers of the new economic geography”, Papers in
Regional Science, 84 (3), 377-405.
165
Fujita, M., Thisse, J. F. (2002), Economics of agglomeration: cities, industrial location,
and globalization, Cambridge university press.
Fujita, M., Thisse, J. F. (2003), “Does geographical agglomeration foster economic
growth? And who gains and loses from it?”, Japanese Economic Review, 54 (2),
121-145.
Fujita, M., Thisse, J. F. (2009), “New economic geography: an appraisal on the occasion
of Paul Krugman’s 2008 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences”, Regional Science and
Urban Economics, 39 (2), 109-119.
Garretsen, H., Martin, R. (2010), “Rethinking (new) economic geography models: ta-
king geography and history more seriously”, Spatial Economic Analysis, 5 (2), 127-
160.
Gaspar, J.M., Castro, S.B.S.D., Correia-da-Silva, J. (2013), “The Footloose Entrepre-
neur Model with 3 regions”, FEP Working Papers, 496.
Guckenheimer, J., Holmes, P. (2002), Nonlinear Oscillations, Dynamical Systems, and
Bifurcations of Vector Fields, Springer-Verlag.
Harvey, D. (1985), “The geopolitics of capitalism”, in: D. Gregory & J. Urry (eds)
Social Relations and Spatial Structures, 128-163, London, Macmillan.
Head, K., Mayer, T. (2004), “The empirics of agglomeration and trade”, Handbook of
Regional and Urban Economics, 4, 2609-2669.
Helpman, E. (1998), “The size of regions”, in: Pines, D., Zilcha, I., Topics in Public
Economics, Cambridge University Press.
Henderson, J. V. (1974), “The sizes and types of cities”, The American Economic
Review, 64 (4), 640-656.
Henderson, V., Thisse, J. F. (2004), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics: cities
and geography, 4, 2063-3073.
Hess, S., Rose, J. M. (2012), “Can scale and coefficient heterogeneity be separated in
random coefficients models?”, Transportation, 39 (6), 1225-1239.
Hotelling, H. (1929), “Stability in Competition”, Economic Journal, 39 (157), 41-57.
166
Howitt, P. (1999), “Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R&D Inputs Gro-
wing.”, Journal of Political Economy, 107, 715–730.
Ikeda, K., Akamatsu, T., Kono, T. (2012), “Spatial period-doubling agglomeration of
a core-periphery model with a system of cities”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 36(5), 754-778.
Ikeda, K., Murota, K. (2014), Bifurcation Theory for Hexagonal Agglomeration in Eco-
nomic Geography, Springer.
Isard, W. (1956), Location and space-economy, MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Krugman, P. (1980), “Scale economies, product differentiation and the pattern of
trade”, The American Economic Review, 70 (5), 950-959.
Krugman, P. (1991), “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography”, Journal of Poli-
tical Economy, 99 (3), 483-499.
Krugman, P. (1993), “First nature, second nature, and metropolitan location”, Journal
of Regional Science, 33 (2), 129-144.
Krugman, P., Elizondo, R. L. (1996), “Trade policy and the third world metropolis”,
Journal of Development Economics, 49 (1), 137-150.
Krugman, P., Venables, A. (1995), “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations”, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 110 (4), 857-880.
Lösch, A. (1954), The Economics of Location, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
Martin, R. (1999), “The new ‘geographical turn’ in economics: some critical reflections”,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23, 65-91.
Martin, P., Rogers, C. (1995), “Industrial location and public infrastructure”, Journal
of International Economics, 39 (3), 335-351.
Matsuyama, K. (1991), “Increasing returns, industrialization, and indeterminacy of
equilibrium”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 617-650.
McFadden, D. (1974), “The measurement of urban travel demand”, Journal of Public
Economics, 3 (4), 303-328.
167
Melitz, M. J., Ottaviano, G. I. (2008), “Market size, trade, and productivity”, The
review of economic studies, 75 (1), 295-316.
Mossay, P. (2003), “Increasing returns and heterogeneity in a spatial economy”, Regional
Science and Urban Economics, 33 (4), 419-444.
Mossay, P. (2006), “The core-periphery model: A note on the existence and uniqueness
of short-run equilibrium”, Journal of Urban Economics, 59 (3), 389-393.
Mossay, P. (2013), “A theory of rational spatial agglomerations”, Regional Science and
Urban Economics, 43 (2), 385-394.
Murata, Y. (2003), “Product diversity, taste heterogeneity, and geographic distribu-
tion of economic activities: market vs. non-market interactions”, Journal of Urban
Economics, 53, 126-144.
Murata, Y., Thisse, J.-F. (2005), “A simple model of economic geography à la Help-
man–Tabuchi”, Journal of Urban Economics, 58 (1), 137-155.
Neary, J. (2001), “Of hype and hyperbolas: introducing the new economic geography”,
Journal of Economic Literature, 39 (2), 536-561.
Niebuhr, A. (2006), “Market access and regional disparities”, The Annals of Regional
Science, 40 (2), 313-334.
Nocke, V. (2006), “A gap for me: Entrepreneurs and entry”, Journal of the European
Economic Association, 4 (5), 929-956.
Okubo, T., Picard, P. M., Thisse, J.-F. (2010), “The spatial selection of heterogeneous
firms”, Journal of International Economics, 82 (2), 230-237.
Ottaviano, G. (2000), “Ad usum delphini: A Primer in" New Economy Geography"”,
Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 87-114.
Ottaviano, G. (2010), “‘New’new economic geography: firm heterogeneity and agglo-
meration economies”, Journal of Economic Geography, 11 (2), 231-240.
Ottaviano, G. (2012), “Agglomeration, trade and selection”, Regional Science and Ur-
ban Economics, 42 (6), 987-997.
168
Ottaviano, G., Peri, G. (2006), “The economic value of cultural diversity: evidence
from US cities”, Journal of Economic Geography, 6 (1), 9-44.
Ottaviano, G., Peri, G. (2008), “Immigration and national wages: Clarifying the theory
and the empirics”, National Bureau of Economic Research, 14188.
Ottaviano, G., Prarolo, G. (2009), “Cultural Identity and Knowledge Creation in Cos-
mopolitan Cities”, Journal of Regional Sciences, 49 (4), 647-662.
Ottaviano, G., Robert-Nicoud, F. (2006), “The ‘genome’of NEG models with vertical
linkages: a positive and normative synthesis”, Journal of Economic Geography, 6 (2),
113-139.
Ottaviano, G., Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J. F. (2002), “Agglomeration and trade revisited”,
International Economic Review, 43, 409-436.
Oyama, D. (2009), “Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations: Potentials and
global stability”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 39 (6), 696-713.
Pflüger, M. (2004), “A simple, analytically solvable, Chamberlinian agglomeration mo-
del”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34 (5), 565-573.
Pflüger, M., Südekum, J. (2008a), “A synthesis of footloose-entrepreneur new economic
geography models: when is agglomeration smooth and easily reversible?”, Journal of
Economic Geography, 8 (1), 39-54.
Pflüger, M., Südekum, J. (2008b), “Integration, agglomeration and welfare”, Journal
of Urban Economics, 63, 544-566.
Picard, P. M., Tabuchi, T. (2010), “Self-organized agglomerations and transport costs”,
Economic Theory, 43 (2), 565-589.
Puga, D. (1999), “The Rise and Fall of Regional Inequalities”, European Economic
Review, 43, 303-334.
Puga, D. (2010), “The magnitude and causes of agglomeration economies”, Journal of
Regional Science, 50 (1), 203-219.
Redding, S. J. (2016), “Goods trade, factor mobility and welfare”, Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 101, 148-167.
169
Redding, S. J., Sturm, D. M. (2008), “The costs of remoteness: Evidence from German
division and reunification”, The American Economic Review, 98 (5), 1766-1797.
Redding, S. J., Sturm, D. M., Wolf, N. (2011), “History and industry location: Evidence
from German airports”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 93 (3), 814-831.
Robert-Nicoud, F. (2005), “The structure of simple ‘New Economic Geography’models
(or, On identical twins)”, Journal of Economic Geography, 5 (2), 201-234.
Rodríguez-Pose, A., Ketterer, T. D. (2012), “Do Local Amenities affect the appeal of
regions in Europe for migrants?”, Journal of Regional Science, 52 (4), 535-561.
Rosen, S. (2002), “Markets and diversity”, The American Economic Review, 92 (1),
1-15.
Scarpa, R., Thiene, M., Train, K. (2008), “Utility in willingness to pay space: a tool to
address confounding random scale effects in destination choice to the Alps”, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90 (4), 994-1010.
Starrett, D. (1978), “Market allocations of location choice in a model with free mobi-
lity”, Journal of Economic Theory, 17 (1), 21-37.
Storper, M., Manville, M. (2006), “Behaviour, preferences and cities: Urban theory and
urban resurgence”, Urban Studies, 43 (8), 1247-1274.
Tabuchi (2014), “Historical trends of agglomeration to the capital region and new eco-
nomic geography”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 44, 50-59.
Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J.-F. (2002), “Taste Heterogeneity, Labor Mobility and Economic
Geography, Journal of Development Economics, 69, 155-177.
Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J.-F. (2011), “A new economic geography model of central places”,
Journal of Urban Economics, 69 (2), 240-252.
Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J.-F., Zeng, D. Z. (2005), “On the number and size of cities”,
Journal of Economic Geography, 5 (4), 423-448.
Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J.-F., Zhu, X. (2014), “Technological Progress and Economic Ge-
ography”, CIRJE Discussion Papers, 915.
170
Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J. F., Zhu, X. (2016), “Does technological progress magnify regional
disparities?”, IDE Discussion Papers, 599.
Takahashi, T. (2006), “Economic geography and endogenous determination of transport
technology”, Journal of Urban Economics, 60 (3), 498-518.
Tavassoli, S., Carbonara, N. (2014), “The role of knowledge variety and intensity for
regional innovation”, Small Business Economics, 43 (2), 493-509.
Tirole, J. (1988), The theory of industrial organization, MIT press.
Train, K. E. (2009), Discrete choice methods with simulation, Cambridge University
Press.
Venables, A. J. (1996), “Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries”, Interna-
tional Economic Review, 341-359.
Von Ehrlich, M., Seidel, T. (2013), “More similar firms—More similar regions? On the
role of firm heterogeneity for agglomeration”, Regional Science and Urban Economics,
43 (3), 539-548.
Young, A. (1998), “Growth without Scale Effects”, Journal of Political Economy, 106,
41–63.
Zhelobodko, E., Kokovin, S., Parenti, M., Thisse, J. F. (2012), “Monopolistic compe-
tition: Beyond the constant elasticity of substitution”, Econometrica, 80 (6), 2765-
2784.
171
